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1.  Abstract 
The elite athlete routinely performs impressive cognitive feats. Not only do they 
undertake complex decision-making seemingly intuitively, they do so under 
conditions of intense pressure, limited time and restricted resources.  Decision-
making refers to the cognitive processes that underpin the selection of one 
course of action from several alternatives (Reason, 1990); it is essential for high-
quality performance in sport (Farrow & Raab, 2008; Jordet & Hartman, 2008; 
Paserman, 2007).  Decision-making is the focus of the following thesis. In 
particular, undertaken in the Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory at UCL, 
this thesis has the translational goal of understanding and increasing insight into 
the decision-making of elite athletes. It focuses on how psychological knowledge 
can be of use in the ‘real world’, as well as aiming to learn about behaviour 
outside of a laboratory; this is undertaken by focusing on two areas. Initially the 
utility of transcranial electrical stimulation (tES) as a tool for modifying decision-
making is explored to assess the potential for use in decision-making training in 
sport. The thesis then moves on to examining the influence that physical and 
mental performance pressures have on decision-making across different 
developmental stages of elite athlete expertise.  
Chapter 2 provides a review of the background literature of topics relating to this 
thesis.  Chapter 3 assesses the potential application of tES techniques as a tool 
for enhancing the cognitive abilities underlying peak performance in athletes.  It 
does so by examining the reliability of claims that transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) influences decision-making via direct replication of a key study 
in this field.  In particular the seminal work of Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 
(2007) who reported bilateral DLPFC tDCS to decrease risky decision-making on 
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART).  Despite closely reproducing the 
methodology, this chapter did not replicate the original findings of Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007), and there was no evidence that tDCS affected 
decision-making.  Consequently, in Chapter 4, the mechanistic basis of this 
failure to replicate was explored; in particular, the physiological effects of tDCS 
on brain excitability (measured via changes to the motor evoked potential (MEP) 
amplitude) were examined using the parameters applied in chapter 2 (i.e., 
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bilateral electrode placement and increased stimulation intensity). Our knowledge 
of tDCS is based on work that has previously applied stimulation using a unilateral 
M1/contralateral orbit montage at 1mA. In experiment 1, using these parameters, 
the classical effects of anodal-excitation/cathodal-inhibition were reported. 
Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that the anodal-excitation/cathodal-inhibition 
effects of tDCS were not present when electrodes comprised a bilateral (right 
M1/left M1) montage for stimulation intensities of 1 and 2mA. Not only were these 
parameters used in chapter 2, they are common in the cognitive neuromodulation 
field and, thus, these results have wider consequences. This finding undermined 
tDCS as a potential candidate for application in elite athletes and, in Chapter 5 
the eligibility of transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS) is assessed as an 
alternative approach. In line with previous work, the physiological underpinnings 
of tRNS were examined to assess the assumptions of excitation that underpin 
the rationale and justification of results of studies in this area. Again, parameters 
used in the application of this technique differ from those used to establish the 
original effects of cortical excitation (unilateral M1/contralateral orbit montage, 10 
minutes). The results of this chapter reveal that the excitatory effects of tRNS do 
not withstand deviation from these parameters. More specifically, when 
increasing stimulation durations from 10 to 20 minutes (Experiment 1), and when 
using bilateral electrode arrays (Experiment 2), increased cortical excitation were 
not present. Together, the findings from these chapters led to the conclusion that 
tES methods are not robust enough to proceed with in investigations in elite 
athletes. 
In the second part of the thesis, the original goal of exploring decision-making in 
elite sport is returned to, with the aim of providing useful insights for applied 
populations. Much of the previous work in this area has largely ignored the highly 
stressful context in which athletes operate. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the influence 
that performance pressure has on decision-making is examined across three age 
groups, spanning the developmental trajectory of elite sport.  Three categories of 
decision-making abilities were investigated, including fast reactive responses, as 
well as decision-making under risk and under uncertainty.  
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In Chapter 6 the influence of physical exhaustion (completion of a maximal 
exertion exercise protocol) on decision-making was examined in world-class elite 
athletes (including six Olympic medal winners; mean age = 28). The results 
showed that, under physical pressure, indicators of decision-making were 
generally robust. Under physical pressure, elite athletes showed faster response 
times to perceptual stimuli. Physical pressure was also found to increase risk 
taking for decisions under risk, but did not influence decision-making under 
uncertainty. Moreover, elite athletes retained the ability to make appropriate bets 
according to probability outcomes, suggesting a possible calculated shift towards 
risk taking. Chapter 7 employed a similar protocol in a sample of semi-elite 
athletes (mean age = 20), who were enrolled on a national talent development 
program and were undergoing training for possible Olympic competition in four-
eight years. Under physical pressure, the decision-making of semi-elite athletes 
showed an increase shift towards increased risk taking - for both decisions under 
risk and uncertainty. Additionally, these athletes showed a reduced ability to 
optimally adjust betting behaviour according to reward and loss contingencies. 
Fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli and response inhibition did not 
change as a result of physical pressure in this sample. 
 
In Chapter 8, the influence of mental pressure (dual auditory memory task) was 
examined in elite junior athletes (mean age = 13) who are at the earliest stage of 
entry to elite sport, having undergone initial selection for inclusion on national 
talent development programs. For decision-making under risk, there was an 
interaction of mental pressure and gender, whereby under pressure males 
showed increased - and females decreased - risk-taking. There was no effect of 
mental pressure on decision-making under uncertainty. Moreover, under mental 
pressure, there were slower reaction times to perceptual stimuli. Mental pressure 
may act to impair tasks that have a high requirement for working memory 
resources.   
 
Together, the findings from these chapters highlight that work undertaken in non-
elite athletes may not transfer to elite athletes and that there are differences in 
decision-making capabilities within sub-categories of elite athletes. The findings 
also highlight a practical point: that of the limitations of statistical approaches 
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based on group averages in the elite sporting environment, where an 
understanding of the individual is paramount. In the application of this work in a 
sport setting, the use of individualized profiling in feedback sessions is 
highlighted. Moreover, the different types of decision-making assessed in the 
study were used to form a taxonomy which sports professionals could use to 
conceptualize and discuss decision-making. This was done via the use of real-
world analogies to develop a common accessible language to describe key 
concepts. The importance of embedding this work within the sporting culture is 
also highlighted.  
 
Collectively, the data in this thesis has furthered our understanding of how 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience can be applied in elite sport to increase 
insights into decision-making. Moreover, the findings had unintended implications 
of advancing our understanding of tES, highlighting that parameters used in the 
application of these techniques should be based on the parameters used to 
establish the physiological effects.  
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2.  Literature Review 
2.1. Defining Decision-Making  
Decision-making can be formally defined as the mental processes that underpin 
the selection of one course of action from various alternatives (Reason, 1990).  
Thus a decision-making situation presents the individual with more than one 
possible outcome to consider whenever there is uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of these outcomes. A decision maker forms expectations relating 
to these different choices and evaluates them according to judgments and values 
(Hastie & Dawes, 2010). The study of decision-making in cognitive science 
examines the ways in which humans form and integrate these expectations and 
subjective evaluations (Hastie & Dawes, 2010).  Indeed, common processes are 
thought to underpin decision-making across the wide array of different domains 
in which they occur (Hardman & Hardman, 2009).   
 
2.1.1. Types of Decision-making 
The degrees to which different cognitive processes contribute to a decision 
depend on the characteristics of the decision in question.  One axis by which 
decisions can be differentiated is according to how much information about an 
expected outcome is available (Starcke & Brand, 2012).  When an outcome is 
not guaranteed a decision is said to involve risk (Gigerenzer, 2014). At one end 
of this continuum is certainty, when information is most abundant.  Here only one 
outcome could arise from a particular choice (Starcke & Brand, 2012).  As 
information relating to the outcome of the decision diminishes, the categorization 
of decision type moves from decision-making under risk to decision-making under 
uncertainty (Starcke & Brand, 2012; Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012). Decision-making 
under risk is where there is explicit information (or this can be calculated) about 
both the decision outcomes and their probabilities of occurrence (Gigerenzer, 
2014).  Thus in these situations it is possible to deduce optimal responses via 
cognitive calculations (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  A real world example of 
decision-making under risk is the decision to enter a raffle.   When buying a ticket 
one can either win or lose, with the precise odds of winning calculated as 1/ the 
number of tickets sold (Hardman & Hardman, 2009).  Outside of the laboratory 
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these types of decisions are infrequent and usually occur in gambling scenarios 
(Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  Decision-making under uncertainty, on the other 
hand, refers to situations where decision outcomes are known but the 
probabilities of their occurrence are unknown or unknowable (Gigerenzer, 2014).   
In these situations one has to judge advantageous outcomes through trial and 
error learning.  In real life as the future is almost always uncertain, these types of 
decision scenarios are common (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  Real world examples 
include deciding where to live, whether to attend university or whom to marry 
(Hardman & Hardman, 2009).  
 
Decision-making is explored in the laboratory with the use of tasks that attempt 
to simulate yet simplify these distinct types of decision-making. These tasks 
provide measures of decision-making behavior, with a particular focus on 
assessing an individual’s preference for risk taking.  Risk taking can be defined 
both in terms of the variance of reward outcomes, a definition stemming from 
economics, and in terms of exposure to negative outcomes, a definition stemming 
from clinical psychology (Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011).  This latter 
definition is in keeping with the lay persons’ perception of risk, as demonstrated 
by a psychometric study exploring attitudes underlying this construct (Slovic, 
1997). Perceptions of risk were shown to involve a dread component 
representing the potential of disastrous consequences and a lack of control, as 
well as an unknown component relating to the unobservable costs risky 
behaviours may entail (Slovic, 1997). Examples of real world risk taking are 
outlined in the Domain Specific Risk Attitude Scale (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002), 
high-risk activities include extreme sports, smoking, illegal drug use, cheating on 
a tax return and unprotected sex. 
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2.2. Theories of Decision-making 
There are a number of key theories relating to how we make decisions.  Those 
outlined in the following section include Dual Process Thinking (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2013), Heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) 
and Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) .  
 
2.2.1. Dual Process Thinking 
The dual process theories propose that there are two systems or modes of 
thinking which we use to make decisions, intuition (System 1) and deliberation 
(System 2) (Newell, Lagnado, & Shanks, 2015).  It is proposed that these two 
systems broadly differentiate the processes underlying decision-making under 
risk and under uncertainty (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  The characteristics 
attributed to these two systems, across a number of theories, are outlined in 
Table 2.1. The intuitive System 1 is proposed to be automatic, responsive and 
thought to operate outside of rational control.  It permits fast decision-making that 
does not require working memory resources, via the use of heuristics, or simple 
rules of thumb, that can be applied generically for quick effect.  System 1 is 
thought responsible for processing information relating to gains and losses of 
decision outcomes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2013). 
  
The deliberative System 2, on the other hand, is purported to be slow, rational 
and effortful and is responsible for higher order cognitions or analytical 
approaches to decision-making (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2013).  
System 2 is particularly attributed to deliberating on information relating to 
probability outcomes, as well as the inhibition of unwanted behavioural impulses 
(Starcke & Brand, 2012).  Applying the ‘head-heart’ distinction of human 
reasoning System 1 would be the ‘heart’ and System 2 the ‘head’ (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2013).   
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System 1 (Intuitive) System 2 (Deliberative) 
Working memory independent 
Autonomous 
Fast 
High capacity  
Non- conscious  
Contextualized  
Automatic 
Associative 
Independent of cognitive ability 
Working memory dependent 
Mental simulation  
Slow  
Capacity limited 
Conscious 
Abstract 
Controlled 
Rule based 
Correlated with cognitive ability 
 
Table 2.1: A list of the characteristics attributed of System 1 and System 2 
thinking across different theories, taken from Newell et al., (2015). 
 
 
Volz & Gigerenzer (2012) proposed that System 1 and System 2 thinking are 
tools for different types of decision-making (Volz & Gigerenzer 2012).  In 
particular, for decision-making under risk, the rational analytical processes of 
System 2 are favoured given there is available information for computations to 
be based upon. Conversely, decision-making under uncertainty requires the skills 
of the intuitive System 1.  In these types of decisions optimal solutions can not 
be calculated from conscious deliberation (Volz & Gigerenzer 2012) (Figure 2.1).  
In addition, it has been proposed that there are a number of factors that may bias 
the mode of processing used for decision-making. For example, the intuitive 
System 1 is thought to take precedence under high cognitive load, as these 
conditions consume the processing resources of the deliberative System 2. In 
addition there is preference for the intuitive System 1 under time pressure, 
asunder these conditions the slow effortful cognitions of the deliberative System 
2 are insufficient (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).   
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Figure 2.1: Dual-process thinking of decision-making;  For decision-making 
under uncertainty when there is high ambiguity, deliberative thinking is of little 
value and the intuitive System 1 is most appropriate.  For decision-making under 
risk, when there is low uncertainty, the deliberate System 2 is most appropriate. 
(figure taken from Gigerenzer, 2014).    
 
Schiebener & Brand's (2015) description of the neuropsychological processes 
responsible for decision-making under risk is useful in describing the attributes of 
the deliberative System 2.  The component cognitive processes outlined include 
executive function, working memory, numerical abilities and reasoning. Executive 
functioning and working memory are thought to allow for categorization of 
information relating to decision outcomes, the development and application of 
strategies and the integration of feedback. Numerical abilities, including 
knowledge about numbers and ratios allow the deduction and processing of 
outcome probabilities.   While reasoning skills allow one to weigh up and deduce 
favourable outcomes among several alternatives (Schiebener & Brand 2015). 
 
These cognitive abilities are thought to be involved in decision-making under risk 
as they are disrupted by dual task performance (Schiebener & Brand 2015). Dual 
task performance requires the participants to perform two tasks simultaneously; 
it follows the logic that if two tasks require the same processing resources when 
performed concurrently performance decrements will result.   For example, using 
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this method, Starcke, Pawlikowski, & Wolf, (2011) reported that high working 
memory load (2-back working memory task) impaired performance on the Game 
of Dice task (Brand, Fujiwara, Borsutzky, & Kalbe, 2005).   Participants were 
found to adopt a suboptimal risky strategy, thus implicating working memory in 
the performance of decision-making under risk.  In comparison, decision-making 
under uncertainty has been shown to be less susceptible to dual task working 
memory performance.  For example Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, & Carzolio, (2005) 
report that increased working memory load (random number generation) did not 
impair performance of the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 
2000). Thus it was concluded that decision-making under uncertainty may not 
require working memory resources to the same extent as decision-making under 
risk (Schiebener & Brand 2015).  In addition to these deliberative processes 
Schiebener & Brand (2015) propose that for decision-making under risk the 
evaluation of options requires the processing of intuitive System 1, and for 
optimal outcomes to be deduced the integration of both systems are required.   
 
There are a number of theories outlining how these systems are recruited or how 
they interact.  The two main proposals are the default-interventionist approach or 
parallel processing (Evans, 2007). The default-interventionist approach suggests 
that the intuitive System 1 is the default mode of processing making initial 
judgments which get subsequently adjusted for by the deliberative System 2 
(Newell et al., 2015; Cobos et al., 2003).   The parallel processing account on the 
other hand proposes that these systems are occurring simultaneously (Newell et 
al., 2015).  Both proposals provide inadequate accounts (Newell et al., 2015; 
Neys & Glumicic, 2008).  For example, for System 2 to be brought on board 
appropriately as proposed by the default interventionist model, some of System 
2 processes would need to be ongoing.  Moreover, parallel processing of System 
1 and System 2, would deem the slow computations of System 2 redundant and 
cognitively costly in situations where both modes of thinking produced the same 
solution (Newell et al., 2015).  
 
 
2.2.2. Heuristics 
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For decision-making under uncertainty, it is proposed that the intuitive System 1 
applies heuristic processing. Heuristics are mental short cuts or ‘rules of thumb’ 
that allow for quick and efficient decision-making (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011).  They operate by ignoring parts of the information available in a given 
setting and their simplicity means that they can be easily learnt and applied to 
novel situations.  Heuristics are thought to rely on the ‘adaptive toolbox’ a term 
used to describe the collection of mental abilities that one has for constructing, 
selecting and applying heuristics in a given situation (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011). This includes recognition memory, frequency monitoring, object tracking 
and an ability to imitate, as well as the components that heuristics are constructed 
from, including search, stopping and decision rules (Gigerenzer, 2014; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).   
 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier (2011) put forward the idea that heuristics are 
evolutionarily adaptive, having evolved to meet the demands of an uncertain 
environment (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  The success of heuristic decision-
making is, therefore, dependent on whether it fits a given situation.   Indeed 
Gigerenzer’s notion of ‘ecological rationality’ describes that heuristic decision-
making is neither positive or negative, but rather suited or not well suited to a 
given environment (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Thus a person’s 
intelligence is reflected in assessing the suitability of a particular heuristic to a 
given environment (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  This is in contrast to the dominant 
view that the deliberative System 2 is superior, as it does not require the effort-
accuracy trade off characteristic of heuristic processing (Kahneman, 2013).  
 
Examples of common heuristics include the recognition-heuristic and the take-
the-best-heuristic (for a review of these and others see Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011).  The recognition heuristic proposes that when faced with a choice of two 
alternatives, one of which is familiar and the other which is not, the familiar option 
is given a higher preference (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). When the 
recognition heuristic cannot be applied, for example, if both choice options are 
familiar, a search for value clues is thought to occur. The take-the-best heuristic 
states that instead of systematically weighing up various indicators of value for 
the different choice options, a decision is based on one attribute only (Hardman 
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& Hardman, 2009). The take-the-best heuristic proposes that the decision options 
are searched according to the cue with the highest validity first, if one option has 
a positive attribute and the others do not, the search is stopped and the decision 
made (Hardman & Hardman, 2009).  
 
2.2.3. Prospect Theory  
An area of work that also views decision-making as involving the use of heuristics 
is Prospect Theory (Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This theory 
was developed following the observation that individuals do not act as rational 
decision makers and fail to choose outcomes that maximize expected utility (as 
stipulated by Expected Utility Theory).  This theory highlights the ‘systematic 
errors’ that occur in human decision-making due to the application of heuristics 
(Hardman & Hardman, 2009; Kahneman, 2013).  
 
Prospect Theory states that there are two phases of decision-making, the editing 
phase and the subjective evaluation stage.  In the editing phase, an internal 
representation of the decision is constructed.  Information relating to the decision 
is encoded, transformed and simplified according to a number of heuristics.  
These processes include; framing potential gains and losses relative to a 
reference point, as well as simplifying the choice outcomes by rounding up or 
down and eliminating unwanted options (Kahneman, 2003; Newell et al., 2015). 
The subjective evaluation phase is undertaken on the edited information, and 
involves computing utility values for outcomes. The alternative with the highest 
utility is then chosen (Hardman & Hardman, 2009; Kahneman, 2013). 
 
In Prospect Theory the way in which information is edited is critical to the outcome 
of the decision, and it is noted that application of heuristics at this stage bias 
decision-making. One observation is the influence of how a decision is framed in 
terms of gains and losses.  In particular people tend to make risker decisions in 
relation to losses, in comparison to gains, which is known as loss aversion 
(Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  This theory is well regarded as 
one of the most prominent accounts of decision-making under risk (Newell et al., 
2015), and has given rise to the development of a new discipline - behavioural 
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economics (Hardman & Hardman, 2009).  The theory however is lacking detailed 
psychological explanations for the concepts it proposes (Newell et al., 2015). 
 
2.3. The Brain Regions Underlying Decision-making 
The decision-making under risk and uncertainty involves a distributed network of 
brain regions including frontal, parietal, and limbic structures (Figure 2.2).  There 
are three main frontal regions implicated, including the Orbitofrontal Cortex 
(OFC), Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(ACC).   Key subcortical regions include the amygdala, striatum (comprising the 
Nucleus Accumbens, Nucleus Caudate and Putamen) and the insula 
(Rosenbloom & Schmahmann, 2012; Starcke & Brand, 2012).  In the next section 
the functions of these structures in relation to decision-making will be described. 
Following this, the development of these regions and their contribution to 
decision-making during the first and second decade of life will be examined.  
 
2.3.1. OFC 
Decision-making literature has paid particular attention to the OFC, a region 
located on the ventral surface of the prefrontal cortex (Rosenbloom & 
Schmahmann, 2012).   This area has been implicated in stimulus reward learning 
and, as such, its function has been likened to a ‘working memory for emotion’ 
(Wallis, 2007).  It is thought to aid decision-making by representing the reward 
values of different outcomes; information that is needed to guide behaviour 
(Wallis, 2007). Thus the OFC is often credited with intuitive, emotional aspects of 
decision-making (Starcke & Brand, 2012).  Indeed, patients with OFC lesions 
present impaired decision-making despite retaining intact executive functioning 
(Rosenbloom & Schmahmann, 2012). 
 
In particular these patients have been reported to perform poorly on the 
Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 1999).  On this task participants 
have to decide how many points to gamble on decisions with differing odds, 
patients with OFC damage were found to show generically risky decisions 
whereby they opt for high gambles regardless of the odds of winning (Clark, 
Bechara, Damasio, & Aitken, 2008).  This observation led to the proposal that the 
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OFC may be responsible for biasing individuals towards safe options (Clark et 
al., 2008).   
 
Similar results have also been reported in patients with OFC damage on the Iowa 
Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, & Tranel, 2005; Wallis, 2007).  The Iowa 
Gambling Task requires participants to learn the reward contingencies of different 
decks of cards.  Unlike healthy controls, patients with OFC lesions fail to learn 
advantageous strategies and persist in selecting risky high reward, high loss 
cards that have a low net gain (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000).  Moreover 
these patients do not show anticipatory skin conductance responses to risky 
cards, yet retain intact autonomic arousal for rewards and loses.  These 
anticipatory physiological responses, known as somatic markers, are proposed 
as the mechanism by which the OFC may guide decision-making via hunches or 
gut feelings (Bechara et al., 2000; Starcke & Brand, 2012). However, this 
hypothesis has been criticized, for example Fellows & Farah (2005) report that 
the performance deficits of OFC patients may instead be due to impairments in 
reversal learning, as these patients do not show behavioural impairments if 
losses occurred when risky decks were first chosen (Wallis, 2007).   
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Figure 2.2: The anatomical location of brain regions implicated in decision-
making. Pink = ACC; grey = DLPFC; orange = OFC; blue = Nucleus Accumbens; 
red = Amygdala; light blue= Insula; yellow = Nucleus Caudatus; green = Putamen 
(figure taken from Starcke & Brand, 2012). 
 
2.3.2. ACC 
The ACC, located in the medial frontal lobe, has been implicated in decision-
making with a high degree of ambiguity.  In particular decisions which present 
conflicting information (i.e. those which involve risk taking where there is a 
competing desire to win but fear of loss), or those that require selection between 
equally acceptable courses of action (Rosenbloom & Schmahmann, 2012).  It 
has also been proposed that the ACC plays a role in monitoring response conflict, 
whereby one has to override concurrent competing responses (Krawczyk, 2002).   
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In support of this ACC activation has been reported in response to incongruent 
trials on the Stroop task (where there is conflict between word name and ink 
colour) (MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000) and in response to flanker images that 
present opposing responses to those associated with the target (Botvinick, 
Cohen, & Carter, 2004). The ACC is also thought to play a role in evaluating 
decision outcomes, particularly when errors are made (Botvinick et al., 2004).  In 
support of this, ACC activation has been reported following aversive outcomes 
including pain (Rainville, 2002) and social rejection (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & 
Williams, 2003). Drawing these findings together, it has been concluded that the 
ACC may play an important role in guiding decision-making towards efficient 
strategies (Rosenbloom & Schmahmann, 2012). 
 
2.3.3. DLPFC 
The DLPFC is another frontal region thought to serve particular aspects of 
decision-making.  This area has been repeatedly linked to working memory and 
executive functioning (Krawczyk, 2002), and patients with DLPFC lesions present 
‘dysexecutive syndrome’, which manifests as impairments in planning, inhibitory 
control, cognitive flexibility and working memory (Krawczyk, 2002; Rosenbloom 
& Schmahmann, 2012).   Many of the aforementioned abilities are thought to be 
cognitive requirements for successful decision-making as they allow for the 
manipulation and deliberation of information relating to outcomes, and are also 
responsible for maintaining decision goals (Krawczyk, 2002).  Thus the DLPFC 
is often credited with rational, calculated aspects of decision-making (Starcke & 
Brand, 2012). For example, during moral decision-making, increased activation 
in the DLPFC is reported in response to impersonal moral decisions, thought to 
be more rational, when compared with personal dilemmas thought to be more 
emotive (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, & Darley, 2004).  
 
There have also been suggestions of functional lateralisation within the DLPFC 
(Krawczyk, 2002), with some studies implicating the right DLPFC in risky 
decision-making.  In particular, patients with damage to the right DLPFC have 
shown an increased tendency to opt for choices with larger potential rewards but 
larger potential loses in comparison to healthy controls, which was not shown in 
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patients with predominantly left DLPFC damage (Clark, Manes, Antoun, 
Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003). Similar findings have been reported with 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS).  The transient disruption of the right, 
but not left, DLPFC has been reported to induce increased risk taking (Knoch, 
Gianotti, & Pascual-Leone, 2006).  These findings led to the suggestion that the 
right DLPFC may play a particular role in the inhibitory control of superficially 
desirable decision options (Knoch et al., 2006).  
 
2.3.4. Subcortical Structures  
In decision-making the amygdala, striatum and insula are regions typically 
attributed to the processing of gains and losses in decision-making (Starcke & 
Brand, 2012).  The striatum has been implicated in the processing of hedonic 
reward value, in particular associated with the lure of gains.  Indeed increased 
activation in this area has been reported following the presentation of primary 
rewards such as food and money (Starcke & Brand, 2012).  The amygdala, on 
the other hand, is a structure commonly associated with the processing of threat.  
Thus in decision-making it is implicated in the fear of loss or avoidance of 
punishment (Weller, Levin, Shiv, & Bechara, 2009).  Lastly, the insula is a 
structure proposed to be integral to the processing of risk.  Patients with lesions 
to this area show an indifference to expected value of decision outcomes 
involving losses and gains (Weller et al., 2009).  This observed ‘emotional 
bluntness towards risk’ led to the proposal that this region interprets information 
relating to gains and losses in risky decision-making (Weller et al., 2009).  
 
2.3.5. The Development of Decision-making  
Marked changes in decision-making occur during development, which are 
thought to be underpinned by the asymmetrical developmental trajectories of the 
different brain regions underlying decision-making (Blakemore & Robbins, 2012).  
These changes include increases in risk taking with the onset of puberty which 
peaks in adolescence (Defoe, Dubas, & Figner, 2015).  As such, adolescents 
show non-optimal decision-making in emotional contexts (i.e. on the emotional 
variant of the Columbia Card Task), yet similar decision-making as adults in 
contexts involving deliberative rational choices (i.e. the cognitive variant of the 
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Columbia Card Task) (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009).  In line with 
this adolescents also show heightened reward sensitivity during this time. For 
example studies examining stimulus reward learning tasks across different age 
groups (Cohen et al., 2010) revealed that adolescents (aged 14-19) were the only 
group that were quicker and more accurate in their selections for items with high 
reward values in comparison to items with low reward values.  Moreover studies 
also report a linear increase in inhibitory processes across the second decade of 
life (Blakemore & Robbins, 2012).     
It has been proposed that these changes are due to a period of ‘developmental 
immaturity’ in brain regions underlying decision-making (Blakemore & Robbins, 
2012).   In particular during adolescence the dopaminergic reward system is 
hypersensitive, yet the regions underpinning cognitive control are not yet fully 
developed (Blakemore & Robbins, 2012),  predisposing these individuals to 
elevated risk taking behaviour. Indeed functional neuroimaging studies have 
shown increased activation in the striatum in response to both high and low risk 
gambles during adolescence (Galvan, Hare, Parra, & Penn, 2006).   Moreover 
when performing tasks that involve inhibition, such as the Stroop task 
adolescents (aged 18-19) have been reported to show reduced activation in 
cognitive control regions, such as the DLPFC and middle Cingulate, in 
comparison to young adults (aged 23-25) (Veroude, Jolles, Croiset, & 
Krabbendam, 2013).  Moreover structural brain development has been shown to 
not cease until the mid twenties, especially in frontal regions, the corpus callosum 
and association tracts (Pujol, Vendrell, & Junqué, 1993).  Together these findings 
highlight that age is an important factor in understanding decision-making. 
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2.4. The Application of tES to Decision-Making  
Building on our knowledge of the neural correlates of decision-making, studies 
using non-invasive brain stimulation have explored whether manipulating activity 
in these regions influences, or can lead to improvements in decision-making (for 
a review see Levasseur-Moreau & Fecteau, 2012). Techniques referred to as tES 
have been applied to this effect.  TES refers to a set of methods that alter 
neuronal excitability by modulating the spontaneous firing rate of neurons 
(Nitsche et al., 2003; Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000).  They do 
so by delivery of weak electrical currents via electrodes attached to the scalp 
(Figure 2.3a).  In the following section two of these techniques, tDCS and tRNS 
are outlined. The application of tES to modulate decision-making is then 
discussed, as well as issues relating to the application of these techniques 
outside of the laboratory.  
 
2.4.1. TDCS      
TDCS is the most widely applied tES method (Bestmann, de Berker, & Bonaiuto, 
2015). The technique passes a small direct current between the two electrodes, 
the current flows from the positively charged anode to the negatively charged 
cathode (Tergau & Paulus, 2008) (Figure 2.3b). The electrodes are often referred 
to as the active and the reference; the active electrode delivers stimulation to the 
brain region of interest, while the reference electrode is placed over an area 
deemed to be of no interest (Kuo & Nitsche, 2012).  When the active electrode is 
the anode, the stimulation type is referred to as anodal, when the active electrode 
is the cathode the stimulation type is referred to as cathodal (Tergau & Paulus, 
2008). 
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Figure 2.3: TES methods. A) TES delivers a small electrical current with a 
battery driven stimulator via electrodes attached to the scalp (figure taken from 
Dayan, Censor, Buch, & Sandrini, 2013) B) During tDCS a direct current flows 
from a positive anode electrode to a negative cathode electrode (figure taken 
from George & Aston-Jones, 2010). C) The waveform of different tES techniques; 
tDCS delivers a constant current, tRNS and tACS delivers an oscillating current. 
The horizontal axis represents time and the vertical axis stimulation intensity in 
milliamps (which can be adjusted by the researcher) (figure taken from Saiote, 
Polanía, Rosenberger, Paulus, & Antal, 2013) 
 
 
The physiological basis of this technique is well documented through the study of 
motor cortex plasticity (for a summary see Stagg & Nitsche, 2011), and the effects 
have been shown to be polarity dependent.  Work in this area has revealed 
anodal stimulation to exert an excitatory effect, and cathodal stimulation an 
inhibitory effect, via respective modulations in MEP amplitude, a global measure 
of corticospinal excitability (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003) (Figure 
2.4a). These shifts in excitation and inhibition are thought to reflect sub threshold 
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depolarization (anode) and hyperpolarization (cathode) of the neurons underlying 
the electrode.  At a conceptual level, these changes in resting potentials make it 
more (anodal) or less (cathodal) likely that a neuron will produce an action 
potential (Bestmann et al., 2015; Kuo & Nitsche, 2012).   
 
Pharmacological studies have allowed the physiological basis of the online 
effects, i.e. those that occur during stimulation, to be distinguished from the offline 
effects, i.e. those that persist after stimulation has ceased. The online effects of 
tDCS have been shown to result from modulations of membrane potentials, in 
particular by influencing the sodium and calcium ion channels (Stagg & Nitsche, 
2011).   For example the administration of drugs which block sodium and calcium 
channels abolish the online excitatory effects of anodal stimulation (Nitsche et al., 
2003).  
 
The offline effects of tDCS appear following stimulation protocols lasting 5 
minutes.  Stimulation durations of 5 minutes induce after effects that last for up 
to 15 minutes, while stimulation that lasts for 13 minutes induces after effects that 
persist for longer than one hour (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003).  
The offline after-effects of tDCS have been shown to arise from both modulations 
of membrane potentials, as well as changes at the synaptic level (Paulus et al., 
2016).  As seen with online effects, the after effects of tDCS are also abolished 
via the adminstration of drugs that block sodium and calcuim ion channels 
(Nitsche et al., 2003), implicating modulations in the membrane processes in the 
after-effects of tDCS.   To explore the influence of synaptic processes studies 
administered N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) antagonists, to inhibit this post-
synaptic glutamate receptor.   The online effects of tDCS were unchanged by 
blocking of the NMDA receptors, however the excitatory and inhibitory after-
effects of tDCS were abolished (Liebetanz, Nitsche, Tergau, & Paulus, 2002; 
Nitsche et al., 2003).  Therefore implicating the synaptic glutamatergic system in 
the offline that effects persist following the application of tDCS.  There is some 
evidence that these offline effects may also arise from modifications of inhibitory 
GABAergic transmission, although this is less clear (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011).  A 
notable study by Stagg et al (2009) examined the in-vivo neurotransmitter 
concentrations using MR spectroscopy of anodal and cathodal tDCS. Anodal was 
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found to decrease the concentrations of inhibitory neurotransmitter GABA, while 
cathodal stimulation was shown to reduce both inhibitory neurotransmitter GABA 
and excitatory neurotransmitter glutamate.  Lastly, work using paired pulse TMS 
protocols has further implicated changes in synaptic activity in the after effects of 
tDCS (Nitsche et al., 2005).  In particular anodal tDCS has been reported to 
reduce intracortical inhibition and increase intracortical and I-wave facilitation 
(measures controlled by synaptic activity), these effects occur following, but not 
during, stimulation (Nitsche et al., 2005).  
 
Together these findings suggest that the after-effects of tDCS arise from 
additional changes in synaptic processes, arising from Hebbian like Long Term 
Potentiation (LTP) and Long Term Depression (LTD) processes (Paulus et al., 
2016; Stagg & Nitsche, 2011). Hebbian learning describes the changes that occur 
to neurons that fire in close succession that improve the efficiency by which one 
neuron causes the others to fire. The increase in NMDA activity associated with 
anodal tDCS is thought to lead to an increase in synaptic strength via LTP.  The 
reduction in NMDA receptor activity and hyperpolarization of the post synaptic 
membrane following cathodal tDCS is thought to lead to a decrease in synaptic 
strength via LTD (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011).  
 
2.4.2. TRNS 
TRNS is the most novel of the tES approaches (Santarnecchi et al., 2015) 
(Figure 2.4c). Its potential application to cognitive neuromodulation has been 
demonstrated (Ambrus et al., 2011; Cappelletti et al., 2013; Romanska, 
Rezlescu, Susilo, Duchaine, & Banissy, 2015; Snowball et al., 2013) but at 
present is much less well developed than other approaches.  TRNS applies an 
alternating current whereby the amplitude and frequency of oscillations are 
generated at random (Figure 2.3c).  Frequencies from a spectrum of 0.1- 640 Hz 
can be selected, with narrower ranges routinely applied. The band 0.1-100Hz 
refers to low frequency tRNS (lf-tRNS) and 100-640 to high frequency tRNS  (hf-
tRNS) (Moreno-Duarte et al., 2014).  Hf-tRNS have been shown to increase 
corticospinal excitability, as evidenced by modulation in the MEP amplitude, an 
increase which was not observed following lf-tRNS (Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, 
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Antal, & Paulus, 2008).  Although the mechanism of action is likely to differ 
(Paulus et al., 2016) the time course of MEP modulation is akin to that observed 
with anodal tDCS (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001). Indeed following hf-tRNS applied 
over the M1 for duration of ten minutes, sustained elevations in MEP amplitude 
after effects post stimulation were observed lasting ninety minutes (Terney et al., 
2008) (Figure 2.4b).  In contrast, the bidirectional nature of tRNS means that it 
does not have the polarity constraints of tDCS, and that these effects occur 
beneath both the active and reference electrode (Paulus, 2011).   
 
The physiological mechanism of action by which tRNS exerts its effect is, at 
present, not clear (Paulus, 2011).  One recent study by Chaieb, Antal, & Paulus 
(2015)  explored the physiological basis of hf-tRNS. This revealed that excitatory 
after-effects arise partly from sodium channels since blocking the action of these 
channels via drugs have been found to reduce the efficacy of stimulation.   
Moreover, the after effects of tRNS were shown to be unaffected by blocking 
NMDA receptors, contrary to the synaptic modulation which underlies the after-
effects of tDCS, suggesting that the two techniques rely on different mechanisms 
(Chaieb, Antal, & Paulus, 2015). 
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Figure 2.4: A) Figures taken from i) Nitsche & Paulus, 2001 and ii) Nitsche et al., 2003) depicting the time course of changes in MEP 
amplitude following M1/contralateral orbit tDCS at 1mA/ 0.029mA/cm2. (Ai) Anodal tDCS resulted in increased MEP amplitude 
indicating heighted neuronal excitability. (Aii) Cathodal stimulation resulted in decreased MEP amplitude indicating reduced neuronal 
excitability. B) Figure taken from Terney et al., (2008) depicting the effect of hf-tRNS (applied with a M1/contralateral orbit montage 
for 10 minutes) on MEP amplitude. Excitatory after-effects of hf- tRNS were evident 5- 60 minutes post stimulation.  Filled stimulation 
symbols indicate significant differences from baseline * Denotes significant differences in comparison to sham.  C) The growth of 
brain stimulation research as evidenced by number of publications (search results from Medline database).  Results are broken down 
by particular technique. (Figure taken from Santarnecchi et al., (2015).  
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2.4.3. The Neuromodulation of Decision-making 
Much of the research that has applied tDCS with the goal of manipulating 
decision-making has applied stimulation to the DLPFC due to the accessibility of 
this brain region (Levasseur-Moreau & Fecteau, 2012). One attribute that has 
been the focus of much of this work is altering an individual’s propensity for risk 
taking.  
 
The seminal studies in this field are that of Fecteau, Knoch, et al., (2007) and 
Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) who revealed tDCS reduces risk-taking on 
tasks assessing decision-making under risk (Fecteau, Knoch, et al., 2007) and 
uncertainty (Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 2007).   Indeed, when reward and 
loss contingencies were explicit on the CGT, right anode and left cathode DLPFC 
tDCS caused participants to opt for more safe prospects, which was not the case 
following bilateral tDCS with reverse polarity (left anode and right cathode) and 
sham stimulation (Fecteau, Knoch, et al.,  2007).  When reward and loss 
contingencies were not explicit, performing the BART, bilateral tDCS over the 
DLPFC (irrespective of polarity) caused a decrease in risk taking in comparison 
to unilateral (with the anode over the right or left DLPFC and the cathode placed 
over the contralateral orbit) and sham stimulation (Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 
2007).    
 
A number of subsequent studies have also reported changes to risk taking 
following DLPFC tDCS (Beeli et al., 2008; Boggio, Campanhã, et al., 2010; 
Boggio, Zaghi, et al., 2010; Cheng & Lee, 2016; Gorini, Lucchiari, Russell-Edu, 
& Pravettoni, 2014; Pripfl, Neumann, Köhler, & Lamm, 2013; Ye, Chen, Huang, 
Wang, & Luo, 2015). However, across these studies there is relative 
inconsistency in modulatory effects across the different tasks that are commonly 
used to assess decision-making, direction of polarity required for effect, 
characteristics of the sample group and parameters used for stimulation.  
 
Following on from Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007), a further study reported 
similar reductions in risk taking on the BART following bilateral DLPFC tDCS in a 
sample of healthy volunteers, and in those experiencing withdrawal from cocaine 
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(Gorini et al., 2014).  This study showed that the effect can also be observed 
when stimulation was delivered prior to task performance, in addition to when 
stimulation is delivered during task performance as demonstrated by Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007).  However not all work has replicated these findings, 
with a number of studies reporting tDCS to have no effect on BART performance 
(Cheng & Lee, 2016; Weber, Messing, Rao, Detre, & Thompson-Schill, 2014).  
Such discrepancies in the literature have been attributed to divergent 
methodologies including a reduced number of trials (Cheng & Lee, 2016). These 
studies highlight that the effects of tDCS are likely to be fragile in respect to 
methodological parameters.  
 
Later studies examining decision-making under risk, have reported similar 
reductions in risk taking on the CGT following right anodal and left cathodal 
DLPFC tDCS (Cheng & Lee, 2016) as initially presented by Fecteau, Knoch, et 
al., (2007).  In this study, the influence of tDCS correlated with individual 
differences in impulsivity, with stimulation exerting a greater effect in those 
scoring highly on this trait (Cheng & Lee, 2016). There are also subsequent 
studies that have reported similar risk adverse decision-making when tDCS was 
applied with the reverse polarity (left anodal and right cathodal DLPFC), which 
was originally shown to have no effect in Fecteau, Knoch, et al (2007).  
Specifically, participants opted for more safe prospects on the CGT when 
receiving left anode and right cathode DLPFC tDCS (Boggio et al., 2010).  In this 
study, the same stimulation was also shown to have an opposite effect in older 
adults (aged 55-70), resulting in increased risk taking behaviour (Boggio et al., 
2010).   
 
Other work has reported heterogeneous outcomes of DLPFC tDCS in clinical 
samples. Cocaine users, for example, show similar reductions in risk taking as 
demonstrated by Fecteau, Knoch, et al (2007) with right anodal left cathodal 
DLPFC tDCS, whereas stimulation with the reverse polarity was shown to 
increase risk taking behaviours in this population (Gorini et al., 2014).  In contrast 
chronic marijuana smokers presented increased preference for high risk choices 
with right anodal and left cathodal DLPFC tDCS (Boggio, Zaghi et al., 2010).  
These findings indicate that the effects of tDCS may be additionally dependent 
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on the characteristics of the sample group and have been attributed to alterations 
in underlying anatomical structure resulting in differing responses to stimulation 
(Boggio, Campanhã, et al., 2010; Boggio, Zaghi, et al., 2010; Gorini et al., 2014).  
There has however been other studies which have reported no effect of DLPFC 
stimulation on decision-making under risk tasks  (Minati, Campanhã, Critchley, & 
Boggio, 2012). 
 
In summary, these studies provide some evidence for the potential of tDCS 
applied to the DLPFC to affect risk taking, however, there are a number of 
discrepant findings within the literature.   One important factor for my purposes 
and particularly in reference to applying the technique outside of the laboratory is 
in discerning the reproducibility of the original effects observed by Fecteau et al 
studies.  
 
2.4.4. The Neuromodulation of Decision-making Outside of the Laboratory 
An ability to modulate tendencies towards risk would have beneficial applications 
outside of the laboratory.  At present the usefulness of tES in everyday life has 
been discussed, both in terms of application to clinical and healthy populations 
(Cohen Kadosh, 2014).  One example application that has received much 
attention is the reduction of risky decision-making in those suffering from 
addiction disorders.  At present there have been a number of small-scale studies 
to this effect showing differing degrees of success (Boggio, Sultani, Fecteau, & 
Merabet, 2008; Fecteau et al., 2014; Shahbabaie & Golesorkhi, 2014).  
 
Considering other contexts, there has also been much speculation regarding the 
application of brain stimulation to improving performance in healthy populations, 
an area dubbed ‘neuro-doping’ (Davis, 2013). Within this, the potential application 
of tDCS has been extrapolated to the arena of sport, with interest in the possibility 
of enhancing abilities thought to underlie peak performance in athletes (Banissy 
& Muggleton, 2013; Cohen Kadosh, 2014; Reardon, 2016). For example recent 
studies have reported tDCS to modulate fatigue on an incremental cycling 
exercise test, with healthy participants who receive anodal tDCS to M1 (& 
cathodal over CZ) showing greater endurance in comparison to when receiving 
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sham and cathodal stimulation (Vitor-Costa et al., 2015).  Additionally, anodal 
tDCS over the temporal cortex has been reported to reduce heart rate and ratings 
of perceived exertion in response to a cycling endurance test in a sample of 
trained athletes (Okano et al., 2015). While the application of brain stimulation to 
sport is speculated to increase  (Reardon, 2016), whether the theoretical leaps 
from laboratory to real world application become reality will in part depend on a 
number of issues being addressed by researchers in this area.   
 
The first hurdle in translating these studies is one of replicability, especially in the 
context of greater methodological rigor.  A number of limitations endemic in this 
field have been highlighted as potential challenges to the generalizability of 
research (Parkin et al., 2015; Walsh, 2013).  For instance, many studies in this 
field lack the use of control tasks, which limit the conclusions that can be drawn 
regarding the specificity of processes being affected by stimulation.  Furthermore, 
studies also often lack sufficient control sites for brain stimulation or use bilateral 
electrode montages, which have untested physiological effects (Parkin et al., 
2015; Walsh, 2013, see chapter 4 and 5 on this).  
Knowledge of how our laboratory proxies translate to real world decision-making 
is also currently limited.  One study attempting to address this limitation is that of 
Beeli, Koeneke, Gasser, & Jancke (2008) who investigated the effects of tDCS 
on real world decisions during virtual reality driving simulation. Anodal DLPFC/ 
cathodal contralateral orbit tDCS was reported to lead to more careful driving 
styles when tested immediately after stimulation (Beeli et al., 2008).  Despite this 
applied focus, even this study did not explore the question of whether their results 
remain post-immediate testing.  Understanding how long the effects of the studies 
persist, as well as the intricacies of how they occur, are important factors in 
improving translation of these techniques.  Other issues include exploring 
whether the effects generalize to diverse sample groups (Walsh, 2013), with 
initial indications suggesting that results may vary according to age (Boggio, 
Campanhã, et al., 2010) and gender (Chaieb, Antal, & Paulus, 2008).  
2.5. Decision-Making in Sport  
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The ability to make optimal choices, to quickly and accurately select one course 
of action in a dynamic sporting environment, is essential for high quality 
performance in sport (Farrow & Raab, 2008).   Indeed, decision-making abilities 
can differentiate levels of sporting expertise (Baker, Cote, & Abernethy, 2003), 
with top elite athletes often described as being able to ‘read the play’, basing their 
decisions on a seemingly intuitive ability to correctly predict a game’s future 
(Farrow & Raab, 2008).    
 
Sub optimal sporting performance has been linked to poor decision-making.  For 
example, in basketball, decision-making errors leading to increase turnovers (a 
loss of possession of the ball) have been identified as a top predictor of match 
losses (Ibáñez et al., 2008).  Previous work has also highlighted changes in risky 
decision-making as contributing to poor sporting performance (Jordet & Hartman, 
2008; Paserman, 2007).  In particular, reductions in risk taking have been linked 
to match losses of female tennis players during grand slam tennis tournaments 
(Paserman, 2007), and to performance decrements on football penalty shoot outs 
during international matches (Jordet & Hartman, 2008).  Despite the importance 
of decision-making to sporting performance, these skills are often overlooked in 
coaching in comparison to training physical attributes of the athlete with the 
assumption that decision-making abilities will develop implicitly with practice of a 
sport (Farrow & Raab, 2008).    
 
In order to drive progress in the field of decision-making and sport Bar-Eli et al., 
(2011) outlines the need to apply developments in psychological theories to the 
realm of sport.  They note the ‘impressive delay’ in theory development in 
mainstream psychology and application to sports psychology (Bar-Eli et al., 
2011).   Nevertheless a number of key theories have been applied to increase 
understanding of decision-making in sport, which will be examined in the 
following section.  This includes dual process thinking, heuristics and prospect 
theory. A further area of focus relating to understanding the abilities underlying 
optimal decision-making in those with high levels of sporting expertise will then 
be described.   
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2.5.1. Dual Process Thinking in Sport 
There is a large emphasis on the intuitive System 1 in relation to decision-making 
in sport (Furley, Schweizer, & Bertrams, 2015).  The idea that “what must be 
done, is simply done” when describing how elite athletes make choices highlights 
the perceived automaticity of the processes involved (Furley et al., 2015). Indeed 
athletes perform highly practiced procedural skills attributed to System 1 (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013), processes that are interrupted by conscious self-focused 
attention of the deliberative System 2 (DeCaro, Thomas, Albert, & Beilock, 2011). 
In addition, almost all of the decisions undertaken during sport occur under time 
pressure that do not allow for the slow deliberations of System 2.   Athletes have 
also been shown to adopt a number of heuristics that they then apply to their 
decision-making.  These heuristics are characteristic of type 1 processing and 
discussed in more detail below (Raab, 2012).  
 
Others have highlighted the over emphasis of intuitive processes in athletes’ 
decision-making, instead proposing the use of both modes of thinking during 
sporting performance (Furley et al., 2015). In line with this, elite athletes have 
reported the use of System 2 to allow conscious monitoring and deliberation in 
the decision to modify overt behaviours.  For example, Nyberg (2015) reports 
interviews of expert skiers, in which they describe explicit attentional monitoring 
(of rotational velocity) as a means to inform the decision to adjust positioning 
when attempting a trick (Nyberg, 2015). Interestingly, Breivik (2007) puts forward 
the idea that the key to expertise lies in counteracting automaticity, with even elite 
athletes relentlessly adapting and improving their techniques (Furley et al., 2015). 
 
In addition, the processes of System 2 are thought to be essential in allowing an 
athlete to make appropriate decisions in the presence of conflict.  Athletes with 
higher working memories (and therefore greater System 2 processing resources) 
make better decisions in the presence of choice conflict (Furley & Memmert, 
2015).  For example, Ice hockey players were presented with a tactical decision-
making task, whereby either valid or invalid tactical instructions were given prior 
to each trial. When the information was valid, the situation did not require the 
reflections of System 2 and players with high and low working memories 
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performed comparably.  When the information was not valid, the players with high 
working memories showed an increased ability to adjust their decisions 
appropriately and make optimal choices.  The authors concluded that this 
highlighted the usefulness of deliberative processing in responding to decision-
making conflict in sport (Furley & Memmert, 2015).    
 
A further role of type 2 processing in sporting decision-making is in applying and 
maintaining appropriate sets of behaviour where habitual responses need to be 
overcome (Furley et al., 2015).  In sport, one example of this is when a previously 
decided tactic needs to be implemented, such as during a rugby center kick 
remembering to pass to a specific player. Together these findings suggest that 
the roles allocated to System 2 in decision-making in sport is to adjust the default 
processes of System 1 so that they are appropriate to the context (Furley et al., 
2015).  This perspective is in line with the default interventionist approach (Evans, 
2007; Newell et al., 2015) described in section 1.21.  In summary, the dual 
process theories can be successfully applied to decision-making in sport, it acts 
as a useful meta-theory allowing disparate lines of work to be organized under 
this framework. 
 
 
2.5.2. Heuristics in Sport   
It has been proposed that athletes apply heuristic strategies to allow for efficient 
processing of the dynamic sporting environment.  Two examples of heuristics that 
have been examined in relation to decision-making in sport are ‘take-the-first 
heuristic’ and ‘take-the-best heuristic’ (Raab, 2012).  In addition, gain and loss 
framing implicit to the sporting scenario has been proposed to influence players’ 
decision-making (Jordet & Hartman, 2008).  
 
The ‘take-the-first heuristic’ outlines that when decision options are generated in 
a sequential order, the earlier options tend to represent better choices.  
Application of this heuristic means that a person should choose the first solution 
that comes to mind (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  This has been shown in a 
sporting context.  For example, when professional handball players watched 
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video sequences of a match and were asked to list the potential moves they could 
perform, they opted more frequently for the first option generated.  In addition the 
earlier options were (independently) rated as most appropriate and of better 
quality (Johnson & Raab, 2003; Raab & Johnson, 2007).  
 
The ‘take-the-best’ heuristic is a rule describing how one choses from a number 
of alternate options.  It outlines that one good reason is used to discriminate 
between alternatives, rather than weighing up different alternatives across 
various indicators of value. Cues are searched through in order of importance, 
when a chosen cue discriminates between the alternatives the search is stopped 
and the option with the highest value is chosen (Bennis & Pachur, 2006; Hardman 
& Hardman, 2009). This has been applied to a sporting context in terms of an 
athlete’s decision of whom to pass to in a game setting. There are a number of 
different cues that an athlete could base this decision on, such as the distance 
the other players to the goal, the number and proximity of defenders surrounding 
a player or the player’s recent performance. A player’s recent performance is an 
important cue in this decision which is ranked highly (Raab, 2012).  The recent 
performance of an athlete is interpreted by team mates (and others) according to 
the ‘hot hand’ phenomena, this refers to the assumption that if a player has 
scored more than two times in recent matches then there is a higher likelihood 
they will score again compared to if they have scored only once (Gilovich, 
Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). 
 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) highlights that heuristics are used 
to encode and simplify information relating to a decision.  One example of a 
heuristic used in this process is the editing of information according to reference 
points, therefore how a decision is framed has been shown to influence the 
decision maker (Kahneman, 2013).  In particular people are more risk seeking in 
relation to gains and more risk adverse in relation to loses which is known as the 
loss aversion (Kahneman, 2013). There is support for contextual features 
influencing decision-making in sport, and it has been shown that gain and loss 
framing implicit to the sporting situation influence players’ decisions. For instance, 
analysis from football penalty shootouts has revealed that the valence of a shot 
influences players’ success.   When taking a shot that has a negative valence, 
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i.e. a shot that if the player misses the team will instantly lose the match, players 
perform worse  (62% success rate).  This is in comparison to shots with positive 
valence, i.e. those that if the player scores the team will instantly produce a win 
(92% success rate) (Jordet & Hartman, 2008).  In line with loss aversion, the 
performance decrements associated with playing to not lose were associated 
with increased avoidance behaviours in line with reduced risk taking, whereby 
players took less time to prepare shots and avoided eye contact with the keeper 
(Jordet & Hartman, 2008). 
 
2.5.3. Attributes Linked to Optimal Decision-Making in Sport   
A further line of research has examined the skills required for optimal decision-
making in sport by exploring differences between expert and novice athletes. Two 
features that have been discussed in this context are pattern recognition and 
visual attention.  
 
Pattern recognition refers to the superior memory processing that occurs with 
expertise.  Experts are more efficiently able to recognize sequences and encode 
disparate elements to memory as ‘chunks’ (Farrow & Raab, 2008).   Indeed it has 
been reported that elite players have enhanced abilities to recognize and recall 
sequences of play in their given sport in comparison to non elite players 
(Abernethy, Baker, & Côté, 2005).  Interestingly these pattern recognition abilities 
have also been shown to generalize, to some extent, across sports.  In particular, 
a study comparing basketball, netball and hockey, players reported elite players 
retain superior memory of sequences of different sports, in comparison to non 
elite players of the same sport (Abernethy, Baker, & Côté, 2005).  
 
Differences in visual attention have also been noted to vary according to 
expertise.  For example football players who make faster and more accurate 
decisions were found to fixate longer on players with the ball and attacking 
players, and less time fixating on the ball in comparison to players with less 
experience (Vaeyens, Lenoir, Williams, Mazyn, & Philippaerts, 2007).  It is 
thought that differences in visual attention allow elite athletes to draw upon more 
appropriate environmental cues from which to base their decisions.  Together, 
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these abilities and the superior pattern recognition skills of elite athletes are 
thought to improve decision-making by reducing working memory demands and 
allowing for an increased ability for anticipation of other players.  As such athletes 
with higher levels of expertise will expend more time and resources to choose 
and prepare appropriate responses (Farrow & Raab, 2008).   
 
While an examination of expertise in sporting decision-making has proved 
informative, one criticism is that almost all of this work has examined differences 
between elite (usually undergraduate students participating in university sport 
teams) and non-elite athletes, rather than considering the spectrum of elite 
athletes.  Within sports psychology there is a remarkably broad definition of elite 
athlete status, encompassing Olympic champions, to regional or university sports 
team players who have had as little as 2 years experience (Swann, Moran, & 
Piggott, 2015).  
 
Swann et al., (2015) recently proposed a categorization system to distinguish 
across the spectrum of sporting expertise at an elite sporting level, defining a 
taxonomy from semi-elite, successful-elite, competitive-elite and world-class elite 
athletes.   The world-class elite athlete category refers to those achieving the 
highest accolades for prolonged durations.  In particular they have frequent 
appearances and sustained success in globally recognized competition.  Athletes 
within the successful elite category also compete at the highest levels but have 
infrequent success.  The competitive elite category describes those who play at 
a divisional or national level, and while they may have participated, have had no 
success at an international level. Those in the lowest category of the taxonomy 
are the semi elite players who may belong to talent development programs and 
had success at regional or university levels (Swann et al., 2015). In future 
research it is important to distinguish between these levels of elite athletes, in 
order to provide a more nuanced view of expertise and to allow insight into the 
abilities of top athletes.    
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2.6. Decision-Making Under Pressure In Sport 
A further significant factor overlooked in much of the previous work on decision-
making in sport is the context in which decisions are undertaken (Hepler, 2015).  
This is especially relevant for the elite athlete, as the context in which they 
perform is far from the usual laboratory settings of psychological experiments 
(Johnson, 2006).  The next section considers the performance pressures that an 
athlete is exposed to and describes the handful of studies that have taken into 
account the impact of pressure on athletes’ decision-making. Laboratory studies 
that have examined the influence of stress (increased cortisol) on the cognitive 
processes underlying decision-making will then be discussed, to highlight some 
of the ways athletes may be influenced during competition. Lastly the proposed 
mechanisms by which pressure may influence performance are examined.  
 
2.6.1. Types of Performance Pressure in Sport 
The elite athlete routinely undertakes impressive cognitive feats, this not only 
includes complex decision-making, but performed under conditions of intense 
pressure, limited time and restricted resources (Walsh, 2014).  For example, 
imagine a situation where there is five minutes remaining for a goal to be scored. 
The goal will determine whether a team wins a competition title - an accolade a 
player may have dedicated their lives trying to achieve and upon which the fans, 
media, employers and sponsors will judge them. At this moment, players are 
battling with physical exhaustion while surrounded by crowds of noisy 
spectators.  Such conditions are an innate part of the sporting experience, and 
for the elite athlete success is often shaped by their ability to cope or even thrive 
under these conditions (Bronson & Merryman, 2013). By definition, stress arises 
when the demands of a situation outweigh one’s capacity (or perceived capacity) 
to respond (McGrath, 1970) and as described, at any one time a plethora of 
demands are placed on the athlete.  
 
These demands can be broadly classed as mental or physical pressure (Anshel 
& Wells, 2000). Commonly cited sources of mental stress include the 
psychological impact of the desire to perform at one’s best, often exacerbated by 
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the importance of the competition, one’s own expectations and the expectations 
of teammates, coaches, parents and the media. Other sources include the impact 
of errors, requirements for sustained attention in a dynamic environment, 
interpersonal conflicts and rivalry, as well as intimidation from the crowd.  Sources 
of physical stress include sustained physical exertion, fatigue, injuries, 
dehydration and crowd noise (Anshel & Wells, 2000; Mellalieu, Neil, Hanton, & 
Fletcher, 2009).  In addition to this, the decisions in question must be made often 
within fractions of seconds under the intense time pressure of competition 
(Johnson, 2006).    
 
This ability to perform under pressure is integral to the elite athlete.  Reports from 
elite coaches describe the technical and physical differences between elite as 
minimal, yet the distinguishing feature is one’s ability to consistently make 
optional choices on the day under the pressure of competition (Thelwell, 
Harwood, & Greenlees, 2016). Indeed, in elite athletes when the pressure to 
perform is at its highest this has been noted to lead to performance decrements 
(Jordet & Hartman, 2008; Wells & Skowronski, 2012).  One example is from 
analysis of Professional Golfing Association tournament scores (from 1983-2010) 
which revealed that professional golfers score worse on the 4th round – where 
the outcomes of the tournament is decided- in comparison to the 3rd round (Wells 
& Skowronski, 2012). Given such demanding environments, it is not uncommon 
for athletes to perform significantly below expectation despite high levels of 
motivation; this phenomenon has been termed ‘choking’ (Jackson, Beilcok & 
Kinrade, 2013).   
 
2.6.2. The Influence of Pressure on Sport Specific Decision-Making 
Such sources of pressure, as discussed above, are factors not captured in the 
majority of the laboratory experiments on decision-making (Walsh, 2014), and 
the intricacies of why, when and how different performance pressures influence 
athletes and their decision-making is still under question (Hepler, 2015; Johnson, 
2006).  A small number of studies that have explored decision-making under 
conditions of high pressure have operationalized pressure in a variety of ways. 
These tend to assess decision quality and reaction times in response to sport 
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specific decision-making tasks (in comparison to examining the cognitive 
processes underlying decision-making). 
 
Psychological performance pressures have been shown to significantly impair 
decision quality on sport specific decision-making tasks. Smith et al., (2016) 
examined the influence of mental fatigue (induced by performing the Stroop task 
for 30 minutes) on the ability to decide the best course of action following a video 
clip of a football match.  Mental fatigue was found to reduce players’ decision 
accuracy and response times. Further work by Kinrade, Jackson, & Ashford, 
(2015) found psychological performance pressure  (operationalized as conditions 
of elevated social evaluation) to reduce the quality of basketball players’ decision-
making but only for highly complex game scenarios, which presented a large 
number of possible outcomes to the athlete. In this study, levels of self report 
rumination predicted decision-making accuracy decrements, suggesting that 
these may arise from consuming working memory resources (Kinrade et al., 
2015).    
 
However, one study that compared the effects of mental and physical 
performance pressures on the ability to generate sporting decision outcomes 
reported that neither mental nor physical pressure affected the accuracy of 
decision-making.  Under conditions of mental pressure (performance of a dual 
subtraction task) athletes were slower to generate their first response and make 
their final decision. Physical pressure (exertion protocol at 70% of maximal 
capacity) was found to have no effect on athletes’ responses (Hepler, 2015). 
 
Other work examining the effects of physical exertion on decision-making abilities 
have reported mixed results, which vary according to the characteristics of the 
sample.  One study has looked at how examining the influence of physical 
exertion on one’s propensity for risk-taking reported that physical exertion (60% 
maximal exertion) increased risk taking in decision-making under uncertainty for 
male athletes but reduced risk taking for non elite female athletes (Pighin, 
Savadori, & Bonini, 2015).  These findings are in line with the results of laboratory 
based studies that have examined how elevated cortisol levels affect decision-
making (Lighthall et al., 2009, 2012; Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 
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2007).   Other work has noted expertise influences the effects of physical 
pressure. In particular Schapschröer et al (2016), noted an inverted-U 
relationship of physical load and reaction times, with moderate exertion inducing 
a beneficial effect while intense exertion induces a detrimental effect on reaction 
times in the healthy controls. This was found to not extend to elite athletes who 
show a general facilitation in response time, measured on perceptual-cognitive 
tasks, under conditions of both moderate and intense physical pressure 
(Schapschröer, Lemez, Baker, & Schorer, 2016). This review is useful in 
highlighting that expertise is a factor when interpreting findings, especially as all 
the other studies discussed were undertaken using non-elite samples and may 
not generalize. 
  
2.6.3. The Influence of Cortisol on Laboratory Decision-Making 
Work that further highlights the importance of considering the high pressured 
context in which elite athletes compete are laboratory studies have shown that 
stress, in terms of elevated cortisol, has a significant impact on decision-making 
and its underlying cognitive processes. In these studies stress induction methods 
are employed. These include exposing the participant to physical challenges, 
social evaluative threats or cognitive demands.  There are two widely used 
techniques.  The Cold Pressor Test (Hines & Brown, 1932), whereby participants 
submerge their hands into ice cold water (0-3°C) for three minutes, and the Trier 
Social Stress Test (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993) where participants 
deliver a presentation in front of a despondent audience, and proceed to perform 
an arithmetic task under time pressure.  These methods have been found to 
consistently elicit a stress response, which can be detected by measuring 
changes in the physiological (heart rate, pulse, electrodermal activity and blood 
pressure) and endocrine (cortisol via saliva sampling) systems (Starcke & Brand, 
2012).  
 
Using these protocols, it has been shown that stress influences decision-making 
under situations of risk and uncertainty, as well as some of the underlying 
psychological mechanisms (for a review see Starcke & Brand, 2012).  Studies 
examining decision-making under uncertainty have reported a gender difference 
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of the effect that stress has on risk taking.  In particular Lighthall et al., (2009) 
reported that stress induced by the Cold Pressor Test made males more risk 
seeking and females more risk avoidant on the BART. In females, cortisol 
responses correlated with the shift to more conservative responses.  Later work 
by Lighthall et al., (2012) repeated this study with neuroimaging; a gender-by-
stress interaction was observed in the insula and the putamen whereby stress 
increased activity in these regions for males, but decreased it for females when 
participants were performing the task. Moreover, increased activation of the 
dorsal striatum was strongly associated with increased reward collection rate in 
stressed males but not in stressed females (Lighthall et al., 2012). 
 
Similar effects of gender have been observed in the Iowa Gambling Task, a 
further measure of decision-making under uncertainty (Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). Following a stress induction procedure, participants 
(both males and females) were slower to learn task contingencies (i.e. to avoid 
the high risk high reward cards which have low overall net gains).  In the latter 
half of the task, once task contingencies had been learnt, gender differences 
were noted such that, under stress, females had more explicit knowledge and 
showed advantageous performance by choosing decks that were less risky. 
Whereas under stress males had less explicit knowledge and showed poorer 
performance in that they chose decks that offered greater rewards at the cost of 
high losses (Preston et al., 2007)   
It has also been noted that stress influences the processes that underlie decision-
making under uncertainty, in particular feedback learning, i.e. the ability to make 
associations between decisions and their outcomes (Starcke & Brand, 2012).  
Using probabilistic reinforcement learning tasks, where participants are required 
to learn relationships between visual cues and feedback, it has been reported 
that stress enhances learning from positive feedback and reduces learning from 
negative feedback (Lighthall, Gorlick, Schoeke, 2013; Petzold, Plessow, 
Goschke, & Kirschbaum, 2008).  Using a similar task, Cavanagh & Frank, (2010) 
reported replicable findings of improved learning from rewards and reduced 
learning from punishment, but only in participants with low trait level punishment 
sensitivity.   The opposite pattern of results was evident in individuals with high 
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trait level punishment sensitivity.  Therefore, personality characteristics may be 
an additional factor that influences the relationship of stress on decision-making 
(Cavanagh & Frank, 2010).  
Elevated cortisol levels have also been reported to affect decision-making under 
risk, where explicit information is available regarding the choice outcomes.   
Stress was found to decrease performance on the Game of Dice Task, causing 
participants (of both genders) to choose more high-risk disadvantageous options.  
Additionally a positive correlation was reported between cortisol levels and the 
number of non-optimal risky choices (Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 
2008). In this task, the generation (calculating optimal choices) of optimal 
strategies is thought to rely on higher order executive functions. The authors 
suggest that stress may impair processes underlying task performance (Starcke 
et al., 2008), which is in line with work that has shown experimentally induced 
stress interferes with executive functions such as working memory (Schoofs, 
Preuß, & Wolf, 2008), and set shifting (McCormick, Lewis, Somley, & Kahan, 
2007).  
The influence of stress on decision-making under risk has been further explored 
by Porcelli & Delgado, (2009).  In this experiment, participants gambled with 
explicit probabilities in either loss (where participants could only lose money) or 
gain domains (where participants could win money).  Stress induced by the Cold 
Pressor Test made participants more likely to choose risky options on loss 
domain trials but less likely to choose risky options on gain domain trials.   
Therefore under stress the framing of decisions had a greater influence on the 
decision maker.  The authors proposed that stress may cause a greater reliance 
of heuristic processing and a decrease in the adjustments from our automatic 
biases (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; Starcke & Brand, 2012).    
Further support for this explanation comes from studies of anchoring and 
adjustment.  One strategy that is known to underlie estimating is to begin with 
information on what we do know (an anchor) and adjust until a plausible value is 
reached.  Adjustments, however, are usually inefficient and estimates are 
strongly guided by our automatic anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2001).  A study by 
Kassam, Koslov, & Mendes, (2009) found that when under stress of receiving 
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electric shocks, participants’ estimations showed less adjustment from anchor 
values.   
In summary, it has been widely reported that elevated cortisol levels influence 
decision-making, and modulate one’s propensity for risk taking.  Stress has also 
been reported to reduce executive functioning, alter the degree of learning from 
positive and negative feedback and cause inefficient adjustment from automatic 
processing.   The direction of the effect that stress has on risky decision-making 
is not conclusive.  However this is likely to be due to a myriad of factors 
influencing these effects such as gender, individual differences in punishment 
sensitivity and how a decision is framed.  There is also large variation in the study 
of decision-making and stress. Methodologies differ according to how they induce 
stress, both in their timing (prior to task or on-going) and in their operationalization 
(physical or social evaluative) (Starcke & Brand, 2012).  This body of research is 
useful in highlighting the importance of considering the influence of the stressful 
context of athletes’ decision-making, and provides a detailed examination of how 
such processes may be affected.  
2.6.4. Theories of Performance Decrements Under Pressure  
As highlighted during competition, athletes operate under psychological (e.g. 
desire to perform at ones best, high cognitive demands) and physical pressures 
(e.g. exhaustion, injury). There are three theoretical accounts proposed to explain 
how pressure may negatively impact performance. Performance pressure may 
a) divert focus away from a task (distraction account), b) increase the attention 
paid to a task and thereby disrupt the automaticity of performance (explicit- 
monitoring) or c) interfere via elevated arousal levels (the over-arousal account) 
(Beilock, 2011; Beilock & Gray, 2007). 
The distraction account predicts that interferences to working memory and 
attention are responsible for performance decrements.  In particular, pressure is 
thought to divert attention to irrelevant processes, such as worrying, that 
consume working memory resources and reduce those available for task 
execution. In support, Beilock, Kulp, & Holt, (2004) found that maths problems 
which placed high demands on working memory appeared to be selectively 
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impaired by pressure (social evaluation and monetary incentives).  This was not, 
however, the case for maths problems that placed low demands on working 
memory.  Additionally, for tasks that place high demands on working memory, 
individuals with high working memory capacities were most affected by 
performance pressures (Beilock & Carr, 2005). It is thought that these individuals 
employ cognitive demanding strategies that fail when working memory resources 
are consumed, in comparison to individuals with low working memory capacities 
who rely instead on heuristic processing to a larger extent (Beilock, 2011).  
An alternative account described by the explicit-monitoring theory proposes that 
pressure has the opposite effect on attention, causing an increase in self-
monitoring processes.  Focusing attention inward is thought to disrupt the 
automatic execution of tasks, in particular those tasks that require procedural 
skills that otherwise lie outside of conscious awareness (Beilock & Gray, 2007).  
Thus this explanation accounts for decrements on tasks that do not require 
working memory. In support, Gray (2004) reported that expert baseball players’ 
performance on a batting task was impaired when undertaking a concurrent task 
which required them to attend to their swing (increased skill focused condition), 
but impairments did not result when athletes undertook a concurrent task of 
judging tone frequency (which consumed working memory resources).  In this 
study, novice performers, whose batting skills were not automatized, showed the 
opposite pattern of performance decrements, which indicates that findings were 
not due to differences in attentional load in the two concurrent tasks (Gray, 2004; 
Beilock, 2011).   
Together these theories suggest that the way in which a task utilizes attentional 
resources contributes to the mechanisms of pressure-induced performance 
decrements. Therefore in sport, pressure may influence the tasks athletes 
perform in different ways.  It is possible that strategizing and tactical problem 
solving may be impaired due to the reductions in working memory resources, 
while a highly practiced motor skill, such as a golf swing, may be impaired 
because of disruption in the underlying automatic processes (DeCaro, Thomas, 
Albert, & Beilock, 2011 Beilock, 2011; Beilock & Gray, 2007).  Moreover decision-
making that taxes working memory, such as decision-making under risk may be 
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impaired under pressure due to distraction.   Whereas decision-making under 
uncertainty, which is more automatic, may be impaired due to increases in explicit 
monitoring (Beilock, 2011; Beilock & Gray, 2007; DeCaro et al., 2011).  
The type of pressure is an additional factor found to affect the mechanisms 
underlying pressure induced performance decrements.  Outcome pressures, 
arising from performance contingent incentives such as prizes, have been 
proposed to divert attention away from a task.  Whereas, monitoring pressures, 
arising from being evaluated by others, is thought to increase the inward focusing 
of attention.  In support, DeCaro, Thomas, Albert & Beilock (2011) revealed 
outcome pressure induced selective deficits on tasks that required working 
memory, while monitoring pressures induced impairments on tasks that were 
optimally performed in the absence of working memory (DeCaro et al., 2011).   
Although interesting, in the real world different types of performance pressures 
rarely act in isolation.   In the sporting arena, for example, it is currently unknown 
how different types of pressures may interact with one another.  Indeed, there 
are a number of possibilities; different pressures may act independently and in 
parallel, impairing both tasks reliant on working memory and automatic 
processing (Beilock & Gray, 2007).  Alternatively the impact of one type of 
pressure may serve to lessen the influence of the other, or it may be that the type 
of pressure most salient to the individual at any given moment may take 
precedence (Beilock & Gray, 2007).  
Following on from this, there have been interventions that have focused attempts 
on redirecting attention to mitigate the negative impacts of pressure.  DeCaro et 
al., (2011) reported that the impairments of outcome pressure on working 
memory dependent tasks could be decreased with concurrent performance of a 
secondary explicit monitoring task.  Thus when the performance situation 
distracts attention away from a task, a technique to redirect attention back proved 
beneficial.  Alternatively when the performance situation makes individuals prone 
to focusing on explicit component processes of a procedural skill, interventions 
to mildly distract performers have reported positive effects.  For instance mild 
distraction decreased the negative impacts of monitoring pressure on the 
information integration category learning (DeCaro et al., 2011).  Moreover, 
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instructing expert golfers to perform a putting task rapidly, limiting the opportunity 
for skill-focused explicit monitoring, increased performance (Beilock, Carr, 
MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002).  
Finally the over- arousal account posits that performance decrements arise as a 
result of excessive elevations in arousal (Yu, 2015).   The Yerkes-Dodson Model 
(Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) describes the optimal level of arousal for executing 
tasks.   For simple or well-learned tasks the relationship between arousal and 
performance is thought to be linear, with performance increasing with arousal.  
However for more difficult tasks the relationship between arousal and 
performance is inverted, and increases in arousal are thought to result in 
detrimental performance (Yu, 2015). The mechanistic account by which 
increases in arousal interferes with cognition are less well formalized in 
comparison to distraction theories (Yu, 2015).  A neuroimaging study reported 
that below optimal performance resulting from the pressure of high monetary 
rewards, activated the ventral midbrain, suggesting that excessive arousal may 
have its basis in the brain’s reward networks (Mobbs et al., 2009). 
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2.7. Conclusion: Decision-Making and this Thesis 
The data presented in the proceeding chapter has the translational goal of 
understanding and increasing insight into the decision-making of elite athletes.  
Firstly it builds on the work reviewed that has applied tDCS to modulate decision-
making in order to explore the proposed application of neuromodulatory 
techniques to sport. It does so by addressing some of the issues that relate to 
translating these techniques from the laboratory to the real world, across three 
experimental chapters.  In Chapter 3, the issue of replicability of initial findings in 
light of greater methodological rigor is examined with an attempted replication of 
a key study that found tDCS to modulate decision-making (Fecteau, Pascual-
leone, et al., 2007).  In particular. whether DLPFC tDCS can be used to reduce 
risk taking for decision-making under uncertainty is examined in an independent 
sample.   
 
The following two chapters aim to examine the assumptions that underpin many 
studies in the cognitive neuromodulation field, that the physiological effects of 
these techniques remain despite divergent parameters being employed.  In 
particular in Chapter 4 whether the anodal-excitatory/ cathodal-inhibitory effects 
of tDCS administered using bilateral electrode montages (at 1mA & 2mA) will be 
investigated via the assessment of corticospinal excitability. In Chapter 5 a 
similar approach is undertaken to discern the mechanistic basis of tRNS using 
parameters common in the application of this technique for cognitive 
neuromodulation. In particular, whether the excitatory effects of this technique 
remain when it is applied using bilateral montages and at durations of ten and 
twenty minutes.  
 
 Secondly, the work in this thesis addresses issues highlighted from examining 
decision-making in the sport literature, in particular that much of this work has 
ignored the pressure filled context in which athletes operate or has been 
undertaken using non elite athletes.  In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the influence that 
performance pressures have on decision-making is examined across three age 
groups spanning the developmental trajectory of elite sport.  Three categories of 
decision-making abilities were investigated, including reactive perceptual 
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decision-making, decision-making under risk, and under uncertainty.  The 
influence of physical exhaustion (completion of a maximal exertion exercise 
protocol) on decision-making was examined in world class elite athletes (chapter 
6) and in semi-elite athletes who are undergoing talent development training for 
possible Olympic competition in 4-8 years (chapter 7). In Chapter 8 the influence 
of mental pressure (distracting dual working memory task) on decision-making is 
explored in the youngest athletes within the elite development training pathways 
referred to as elite- junior athletes. The overarching goal of this work is to assess 
how insights into decision-making can be applied in elite sporting environment. 
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3.  Attempted Replication of Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 
(2007) ‘Activation of Prefrontal Cortex by tDCS Reduces 
Appetite for Risk During Ambiguous Decision-Making’ 
3.1. Abstract 
Background: TDCS has been shown to modulate risk-taking behaviours (for a 
review see Levasseur-Moreau & Fecteau, 2012). It’s real world application to 
decision-making outside of the laboratory (Beeli, Koeneke, Gasser, & Jancke, 
2008; Fecteau, Fregni, Boggio, Camprodon, & Pascual-Leone, 2010) and it’s 
potential use as a training tool in athletes have been proposed (Banissy & 
Muggleton, 2013; Okano et al., 2015; Reardon, 2016).  A seminal study in this 
area is that of Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) who revealed a decrease in 
risky decision-making on the BART following bilateral tDCS to the DLPFC.  
Subsequently, a number of heterogeneous findings within the field have been 
reported (eg. Cheng & Lee, 2016; Weber, Messing, Rao, Detre, & Thompson-
Schill, 2014), possibly arising from an inconsistency in experimental design, 
stimulation parameters, behavioural assays and sample groups.  Before 
exploring the application of this technique in the training of elite athletes, it is 
important to establish the reliability of these initial findings via direct replication. 
 
Objective: The aim of this study was to replicate the methodology and findings 
of Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) in a new population sample. It was 
hypothesized that bilateral DLPFC tDCS would decrease risk-taking on the BART 
as reported in the original study.  This study acts as an initial step in exploring the 
application of tDCS in decision-making training in sport.  
 
Method: A double blind, between subject design was used.  48 healthy 
participants were randomly assigned to receive either a) bilateral DLPFC tDCS 
(anode F4/ cathode F3) (replication condition); b) bilateral parietal cortex tDCS 
(anode P4/ cathode P3) (active control condition); or c) no stimulation (baseline 
condition). Participants completed both the BART (experimental task) and Stroop 
task (control task).  Methodological amendments were made to strengthen the 
design of the study. In particular, in Fecteau et al., (2007) the BART was 
undertaken during stimulation and the Stroop task undertaken post stimulation.  
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For both the control and experimental task to be subject to the same type of 
stimulation in the current study, both tasks were undertaken during tDCS.  
Additionally, the sample used in the current study was 60% larger, and double 
blinding was used.  Other than this close replication of the Fecteau et al., (2007) 
methodology was adhered to, including stimulation parameters, methods of 
localisation, behavioual task parameters and reimbursement.  
 
Results: The results of this study do not replicate Fecteau et al., (2007) original 
findings and there was no evidence for a reduction in risk taking on BART with 
DLPFC tDCS. 
 
Conclusion: The results raise concerns regarding the effectiveness of tDCS as 
a modulator of risky decision-making and, in doing so, it’s potential use as a 
training tool for elite athletes.  As a consequence, in the next chapter, the 
physiological underpinnings of tDCS and its failure to modulate decision-making 
are investigated.  
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3.2. Introduction 
TDCS, a method of altering neuronal excitability, has been used to induce 
changes in a wide spectrum of cognitive and motor behaviours for potential 
improvement or ‘neuroenhancement’ (Jacobson, Koslowsky, & Lavidor, 2012; 
Kuo & Nitsche, 2012). The ability to manipulate processes that underlie decision-
making, such as risk taking, have been the focus of a number of studies (for a 
review see Levasseur-Moreau & Fecteau, 2012).   The application of this 
methodology outside of the laboratory in modifying everyday decision-making 
has been proposed (Beeli et al., 2008; Fecteau et al., 2010), as has the potential 
use of tDCS in applied populations such as in the training of elite athletes  
(Banissy & Muggleton, 2013; Okano et al., 2015; Reardon, 2016). 
  
TDCS involves passing a direct current between two electrodes (anode and 
cathode) placed on the scalp (Tergau & Paulus, 2008). Current models purport 
that anodal stimulation has an excitatory effect, and cathodal stimulation an 
inhibitory effect, on the neurons underlying the electrode (Nitsche & Paulus, 
2001; Nitsche et al., 2003; Stagg & Nitsche, 2011; Tergau & Paulus, 2008).  A 
common target for stimulation is the DLPFC, a region of the brain that has been 
repeatedly associated with risky decision-making in both healthy individuals 
(Krain, Wilson, Arbuckle, Castellanos, & Milham, 2006; Paulus, Rogalsky, 
Simmons, & Feinstein, 2003; Rao, Korczykowski, Pluta, Hoang, & Detre, 2008; 
Rogers et al., 1999) and patients with lesions to this area (Clark, Manes, Antoun, 
Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Manes et al., 2002).  Studies have applied tDCS to 
the DLFPC and reported changes to risk-taking (Beeli et al., 2008; Boggio, 
Campanhã, et al., 2010; Boggio, Zaghi, et al., 2010; Cheng & Lee, 2016; Fecteau, 
Knoch, et al., 2007; Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 2007; Gorini, Lucchiari, 
Russell-Edu, & Pravettoni, 2014; Pripfl, Neumann, Köhler, & Lamm, 2013; Ye, 
Chen, Huang, Wang, & Luo, 2015). At present, however, there is a relative 
inconsistency in the modulatory effects across different tasks used to assess risk, 
direction of polarity required for an effect, and characteristics of the sample group. 
These issues affect how well the findings can be generalized outside of the 
laboratory.  
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Initial seminal work by Fecteau and colleagues explored decision-making under 
uncertainty, where information about the probability of decision outcomes are 
unknown and required to be deduced by the participant via trial and error learning.   
In this study, bilateral tDCS to the DLPFC (irrespective of the direction of polarity) 
was shown to decrease risk-taking  behaviours on the BART in comparison to 
those receiving unilateral anodal (with the cathodal electrode over contralateral 
orbit) or sham stimulation (Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 2007).  Similar findings 
were also reported by a later study in an independent sample of healthy 
participants, as well as in cocaine users experiencing withdrawal from the drug 
(Gorini et al., 2014). There are some inconsistent findings, however, with two 
further studies reporting no effect of DLPFC tDCS on BART performance (Cheng 
& Lee, 2016; Weber et al., 2014).  At present these discrepancies have been 
attributed to differences in methodology, including task parameters (such as a 
reduced number of trials) (Cheng & Lee, 2016) or whether tDCS was delivered 
during (online) or after (offline) task performance (Weber et al., 2014).  
Studies have also examined the effect of DLPFC tDCS in relation to decision-
making under risk, where information about outcome probabilities are explicit.  
Similarly Fecteau, Knoch, et al., (2007) reported DLPFC tDCS to reduce risk 
taking on these types of tasks. In this case, however, the direction of polarity was 
important for inducing the effects and reduced risk taking resulted from right 
anodal / left cathodal DLPFC tDCS, which was not the case for those receiving 
stimulation with the reverse polarity or sham.   A number of other studies have 
also reported a shift towards more cautious responding in decision-making under 
risk following right anodal / left cathodal DLPFC tDCS (Boggio, Zaghi, et al., 2010; 
Cheng & Lee, 2016; Gorini et al., 2014). 
Again, not all work in this area is conclusive, and a number of other studies have 
shown no effect of tDCS on decision-making under risk (Fecteau et al., 2014; 
Minati, Campanhã, & Critchley, 2012).  This includes a later study by the Fecteau 
group who reported a 5-day x 30-minute regime of right anodal / left cathodal 
DLPFC tDCS to have no effect on task performance on the Cambridge Risk Task 
(Fecteau et al., 2014). While other studies have found right anodal / left cathodal 
DLPFC tDCS to have the opposite effect and increase risk taking in older adults 
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(Boggio, Campanhã, et al., 2010) and chronic marijuana smokers (Boggio, Zaghi, 
et al., 2010). 
While these studies provide some evidence for the potential of DLPFC tDCS to 
manipulate risk taking, there are a number of heterogeneous findings within the 
literature. Discrepant findings in these studies may reflect the low reproducibility 
of original findings and a reduced efficacy of DLPFC tDCS to modulate risky 
decision-making (Ioannidis et al., 2005; Vannorsdall et al., 2016). 
In accordance with this, the claims made in many of these studies have come 
under criticism due to the lack of methodological rigor endemic to the field of 
cognitive neuroenhancement using TES approaches (Walsh, 2013).  In a recent 
review the minimum conditions for executing a TES experiment were laid out in 
an attempt to progress the field and discern the true reliability and validity of 
reported effects. These included the importance of active control sites as 
opposed to sham conditions, as well as the use of control tasks to understand 
the specificity of given effects (Filmer, Dux, & Mattingley, 2014; Parkin et al., 
2015). In the face of such diversity in findings, and concerns over lack of 
experimental practices leading to false positives, replication attempts are one of 
the best ways to clarify the reliability of DLPFC tDCS to reduce risk taking in 
healthy participants (Simons, 2014). 
With this in mind, the goal of the current study was to perform a replication of one 
of the key findings in the cognitive neuroenhancement and decision-making 
literature. In light of the current literature it was decided that this was a necessary 
first step in discerning the efficacy of these techniques as a training tool in elite 
athletes. The study chosen for replication is Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 
(2007) who showed decreased risk taking in a decision-making under uncertainty 
task (BART) during tDCS to the DLPFC. A decision-making under uncertainty 
task was chosen as this reflects the most common type of decision made in the 
real world (Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011), while modulations in risk taking 
have been proposed to contribute to a performance failures in athletes (Jordet & 
Hartman, 2008; Paserman, 2007).  Moreover, Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 
(2007) represents an example of a strong methodological design compared to 
many other studies in this field, with the inclusion of both an active control 
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stimulation condition and control task to determine whether the experimental 
effects were specific to both brain region and behavioral process. 
In the current study therefore participants were allocated to one of three 
conditions. A) The replication condition: tDCS to DLPFC (right anodal/ left 
cathodal), a replication of the condition in Fecteau et al (2007) that showed the 
largest behavioral effect.  B) An active control condition: tDCS to Parietal 
Cortex (PC) (right anodal/ left cathodal). C) A baseline condition where tDCS is 
not applied.  
The experimental design adhered closely to the methodology of Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) (a comparison of methodological parameters are 
summarized in Table 3.1).  Here a conceptual replication is undertaken as a 
number of amendments were made in order to strengthen the methodological 
design.  In Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007)  the control task (Stroop) was 
undertaken before and after stimulation, while performance on the experimental 
task (BART) was tested during stimulation. In order for the experimental and 
control task to be subject to the same conditions, in the current study both tasks 
will be performed during stimulation. Also, in the current experiment double 
blinding was used, where both the experimenter and participant were unaware of 
the type of stimulation administered. Lastly, bilateral PC stimulation (right anodal 
/left cathodal) was chosen as the active control condition. Fecteau et al (2007) 
proposed that their results were due to the concurrent excitation and inhibition of 
opposing DLPFC hemispheres. Bilateral stimulation to an alternate region also 
implicated in decision-making will allow further specificity regarding the location 
of stimulation to be deduced (Studer et al., 2015). 
A successful replication of Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) would reveal 
reduced risk taking on the BART in the replication condition (A) in comparison to 
the active control (B) and baseline condition (C), and no differences on 
performance of the control Stroop task.  A successful replication would indicate 
high reproducibility of tDCS to reduce risk taking in healthy adults and the 
possibility for further application of this in the training of elite athletes.  
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3.3. Methods 
3.3.1. Participants  
Power analysis using G * Power 3.0 (http://www.gpower.hhu.de/en.html) 
indicated that to have 90% power to detect an effect the same size as Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) (d=.76), at least 45 participants would be needed in 
each replication attempt.  
 
Forty-eight participants (24 female) aged between 18-37 (mean: 24.19) took part 
in the study. Participants within the DLPFC tDCS (n=16; mean age = 23; SD: 
3.52; range 18-30), PC tDCS (n=16; mean age= 24; SD = 4.62; range: 19-38) 
and baseline condition (n=16; mean age = 24.40; SD = 2.61; range = 20-28) did 
not differ in terms of age (F(2,45)= 0.778 p=0.465).  
 
All participants were recruited via the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience subject 
panel at UCL.   Participants adhered to inclusion criteria for studies using non-
invasive brain stimulation, including no metallic implants, previous history of 
neurological disorders, medication or substance abuse.  All participants were 
native English speakers (English was their first and main language), had normal 
or corrected-to normal vision and were right handed as assessed by the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971).   Participants were naïve in 
respect to the precise experimental hypothesis and those in the stimulation 
conditions were not explicitly informed as to the type of stimulation they received 
until the end of the experiment.   The study and consent procedures were 
approved by UCL ethical review board and were in accordance with the 
declaration of Helskini. Prior to inclusion written informed consent was obtained. 
Upon completion participants were reimbursed at a standard rate. 
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3.3.2. Experimental Protocol  
The study employed a between-subject double-blind design, whereby 
participants were randomized by gender to one of three conditions (see Figure 
3.1A). The experimental replication condition received anodal stimulation to 
the right and cathodal to the left DLFPC.  This was chosen to replicate the 
condition which showed the largest behavioural effect in Fecteau, Pascual-leone, 
et al., (2007).  The active control condition received anodal stimulation to the 
right and cathodal to the left PC.   This direction of polarity was chosen to mirror 
that used in the DLPFC condition. The active control condition will allow the 
specificity of stimulation to the DLPFC to be discerned.   The baseline condition 
did not receive stimulation.  All participants completed both the BART and Stroop 
task, the order of which was counterbalanced in each group (taking gender into 
consideration).  The main experimenter and participant were blinded according 
to stimulation condition.  To achieve this, the experimenter applied electrodes to 
both the frontal and parietal regions that were attached to two separate devices 
(see Figure 3.1B).  The main experimenter left the room briefly while a second 
experimenter, who was not blinded, began the appropriate stimulation and 
concealed the devices.  The conditions were revealed to the main experimenter 
once all data were collected.   Moreover, the participant was naïve to the precise 
hypotheses of the experiment until after the experiment when appropriate 
debriefing of participants were undertaken. 
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Figure 3.1 A) The experimental protocol;  Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions, tDCS-DLPFC, tDCS-PC, baseline. Participants 
performed the BART and the Stroop task in a counterbalanced order. In the 
stimulation conditions, tDCS was delivered 5 minutes prior to task onset and then 
throughout task performance for a maximum of 20 minutes. B) Displays electrode 
placement and stimulation delivery for the three conditions i) DLPFC-tDCS, ii) 
PC-tDCS iii) Baseline. Red represent anode, blue represents cathode and grey 
represents an attached electrode with no stimulation delivered. 
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3.3.3. TDCS  
tDCS was administered through a battery driven brain stimulator plus 
(Neuroconn, Germany), via standard sized rubber electrodes (5x7cm, 35cm2).  
Stimulation was applied according to the parameters outlined in Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007).  In short, a constant current of 2mA was used, 
producing current densities of 0.057mA/cm2.  Stimulation began five minutes 
prior to the onset and continued throughout the course of task completion. The 
duration of stimulation was set to not exceed 20 minutes. This initial period of 
stimulation prior to task onset was chosen by Fecteau to reflect previous studies 
which have shown the excitability effects of tDCS to not be observed until 3-5 
minutes into stimulation (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000).  In keeping with previous work 
a 20 second fade-in fade-out period was used. These parameters did not exceed 
safety guidelines in healthy volunteers (Bikson, Datta, Elwassif, 2009).   
 
The positioning of the electrodes was determined by the international 10-20 EEG 
system (Jasper, 1958), a method that has been shown to adequately target 
underlying structures (Herwig, Satrapi, & Schönfeldt-Lecuona, 2003), is standard 
in studies of neuromodulation  (DaSilva, Volz, Bikson, & Fregni, 2011; Nitsche et 
al., 2008) and was used by Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007).  For the 
DLPFC condition, the centre of the anodal electrode placed over F4 (right 
DLPFC) and cathode over F3 (left DLPFC).   For PC condition, the center of 
anode placed over P4 (right PC) and cathode over P3 (left PC). The electrodes 
were attached to the scalp with conductive paste and held in place with two 
rubber straps. This method differed from that used by Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et 
al., (2007) who applied electrodes via the saline soaked sponge method.  
Conductive paste was used to avoid problems of water leakiage in the saline 
soaked sponge method. To ensure double blinding all four electrodes (F3, F4, & 
P3, P4) connected to two separate devices were attached to the each participant 
in the stimulation conditions as shown in Figure 3.1b.  
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3.3.4. Decision-Making Tasks 
3.3.4.1. BART 
The BART (Lejuez et al., 2002) is a behavioural measure of risk taking under 
uncertainty.  This task presents a number of computerized balloons that can be 
inflated to accrue money.  If a balloon bursts before the money is transferred to 
a safe wallet, the winnings from the particular balloon are lost.  This task has 
been described as a ‘strong naturalistic metaphor’ (Schonberg et al., 2011), the 
exhilaration of increased inflation in the context of the bursting elicits a strong 
affective response akin to the subjective experience of risk taking.  As such the 
main dependent variable, the average adjusted number of pumps, has been 
shown to correlate with measures of real world risk taking.  This includes 
frequency of substance use, smoking, stealing, risky sexual and delinquent 
behaviours, as well as self-report measures of risk related constructs such as 
sensation seeking and impulsivity in healthy adults and adolescences (Aklin, 
Lejuez, Zvolensky, Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005; Crowley, Raymond, Mikulich-
Gilbertson, Thompson, & Lejuez, 2006; Lejuez, Aklin, Jones, et al., 2003; Lejuez, 
Aklin, Bornovalova, & Moolchan, 2005; Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 
2003).  
 
The task initially presents a balloon on screen that is small in size (Figure 3.2). 
A button below the balloon with the text “pump the balloon” inflates the balloon 
when clicked.  With each pump the balloon onscreen increases in size slightly 
and 5p is accumulated.  Located to the left of the screen is an additional button 
labeled “Collect $$$”, this button allows the participant to transfer the money 
gained on the current balloon to their total winnings. Additionally on screen is the 
text “Potential Earnings” which displays the money collected on the current 
balloon and the “Total Winnings” outlining the collective amount of winnings from 
all previous balloons.  After each pump participants are faced with the decision 
as to whether to continue inflating the balloon and risk explosion, or to stop 
pumping and transfer the money into their total winnings. When a balloon bursts, 
all the money accumulated on that balloon is lost, the partially inflated balloon 
disappears and the next balloon follows. 
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Each balloon has a unique randomly generated bursting point. The number of 
pumps that could be made before an explosion occurs ranges between 1-128, 
with the ‘average’ balloon bursting after 64 pumps.  The computer program works 
by random number generation, initially between 1/128.   If a 1 is drawn the balloon 
bursts, if not the number is removed and the algorithm continues.  Therefore on 
the second pump, as one number will have been removed, the probability that 
the balloon would explode is 1/127.  On the third pump, as two numbers will have 
been removed, the probability of bursting is 1/126, and so on. As a result, each 
pump is made in the context of increasing risk (increased probability of the 
balloon bursting).  Moreover the relative reward gain decreases as the number of 
pumps increase, i.e. the second pump has a potential gain of 100% (from 5p to 
10p) and the third a gain of 50% (from 10p to 15p).  As a result some risk taking 
is necessary to obtain winnings, but excessive risk is associated with decreased 
returns, like behaviours in the real world participants must balance potential gains 
against possible losses.  
 
Participants received written instructions to ensure consistency of task 
explanation across subjects as laid out by Lejuez et al., (2002). Importantly they 
were not given any specific information about the probability of explosion or the 
total amount of money possible to win. On this matter participants were 
instructed, “it is your choice to determine how much to pump up the balloon, but 
be aware that at some point the balloon will explode. The explosion point varies 
across balloons, ranging from the first pump to enough pumps to make the 
balloon fill the entire computer screen.” (Lejuez et al., 2002).  
 
In this version of the task there were 30 balloons in total.  In contrast to the method 
presented in Lejuez et al., (2002) whereby participants received the amount of 
money accumulated on the task, the participant with the highest winnings 
received an additional cash prize of £30 payment.  
 
The task was delivered via a laptop computer, with a 17-inch display screen, and 
was run via Inquisit software version 4.0.7.0 (Millisecond Software Seattle WA).  
Speakers or headphones were used to deliver sound effects from the task, 
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including a slot machine pay off noise when money was transferred, as well as 
inflating and balloon bursting sounds.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: BART: A) Participants are required to inflate a balloon presented on 
screen and do so by selecting the pump up the balloon button with the mouse. 
B) With each pump 5p is earnt, which is added to the potential earnings. C) If the 
balloon bursts the potential earnings collected are lost and the next balloon 
appears. D) Participants have to decide the optimal point at which to bank the 
potential earnings and move these to their total winnings.  They do so by clicking 
the collect button 
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3.3.4.2. Stroop Task  
The Stroop task (Stroop., 1935) is a classic measure of interference, the 
additional processing required to override automatic responses.  In this task 
participants were instructed to name the colour of items presented on screen.  
Colour words (red, blue, green and black) were presented in different colour text 
ink, thus the colour of the text was either congruent to the text (e.g. red written in 
red ink) or incongruent to the text (e.g. red written in blue, green or black ink). 
The Stroop interference effect refers to the increased amount of time it takes to 
name colours with incongruent text, compared to those with congruent text. This 
is because automatic access of word naming has to be overridden (Macleod, 
1993). 
 
The task had a total of 84 trials, the order of which were randomized (Figure 3.3). 
These consisted of 28 congruent trials and 28 incongruent trials, with each of the 
four colours being presented seven times.  For the incongruent trials, each colour 
word was presented twice in each different colour (i.e. red presented in blue ink, 
green ink and black ink), and one of the colour-word pairing (randomly selected) 
was presented an additional time.  There were also 28 control trials, which 
presented solid blocks of colour. Again each of the four colours were presented 
four times (the control trials were not used for the analysis of the task).  
 
The task was self-paced, whereby the stimuli remained on screen until 
participants responded.  Participants were required to identify the colour of the 
items via a button press; the d key for red, the f key for green, the j key for blue 
and the k key for black.  When performing the task participants were instructed 
to keep the middle and fore fingers of their left hand over the d and f key and the 
middle and fore finger of their right hand over j and k key, to ensure prompt 
responses. Additionally participants were instructed to make their responses as 
quickly and accurately as possible.   The task was run using a laptop computer 
with a 17inch screen via Inquisit software version 4.0.7.0 (Millisecond Software 
Seattle WA). Before commencing the task, participants undertook a short 
practice.  
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Figure 3.3: The Stroop task.  The figure presents the trial types and required 
button presses.  Participants are required to identify the colour of the word 
presented to them by a button press; d key for red, f key for green, j key for blue 
and the k key for black (highlighted on the keyboard).  A congruent trial is when 
the ink colour is the same as the word (i.e. green written in green ink) an 
incongruent trial is when the ink colour is different to the word (i.e. green written 
in red ink). 
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3.3.5.  Data Analysis 
The analyses of these two tasks were undertaken in accordance with Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007).  The outcome variable for the BART was the 
average adjusted number of pumps, this is the number of times the participants 
pumped the balloon excluding the balloons that burst (calculated as: total 
adjusted number of pumps/number of non exploded balloons). The average 
adjusted number pumps are used to avoid the constraints of individual 
differences arising from the random point at which explosions occur (removing 
trials where the number of potential pumps were limited).  
 
A mixed methods ANOVA was undertaken to compare the average adjusted 
pump count across the three experimental conditions (between subject factor: 
experimental condition: DLPFC-tDCS, PC-tDCS, baseline) broken down by time 
(within subjects factor of balloon number: 1-10, 11-20, 21-30).  Post hoc 
comparisons were made using Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
  
The outcome variable for the Stroop task was the interference effect.  This is the 
difference in the time taken to identify the colour of a word written in a congruent 
colour compared to one written in an incongruent colour (calculated as: response 
times for incongruent trials minus response times for congruent trials). Response 
times for correct trials were used in the analysis. A One Way ANOVA was 
performed comparing the interference effect across the three experimental 
conditions (DLPFC- tDCS, PC-tDCS, baseline).   
 
In the current replication both tasks were undertaken during stimulation (in a 
counterbalanced order). In comparison to Fecteau et al (2007) this meant that 
half the subjects in the stimulation conditions had undergone additional 
stimulation before commencing the BART.  To ensure that this did not influence 
the results an additional analysis was undertaken.  An independent samples t-
tests was performed to compare the average adjusted pump count of those whom 
undertook the BART followed by the Stroop (BART first) with those who 
undertook the Stroop followed by the BART (BART second) in the DLPFC and 
PC tDCS conditions. 
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As there were a different proportion of male and female participants in the current 
study compared to Fecteau et al (2007) an additional analysis was undertaken to 
examine the influence of gender on the mean adjusted number of pumps. In 
particular a mixed methods ANOVA was performed this had a within factor of 
balloon number (balloon number 1-10, 11-20, 21-30), a between subject factor of 
experimental group (DLPFC-tDCS, PC-tDCS & baseline) and a between factor 
of gender (two levels: male; female). Post hoc comparisons were made using 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.  
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Table 3.1: Summary comparison of methodological parameters used in the 
current study  & Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007). 
 
 Current study Fecteau, Pascual-leone, 
et al., (2007) 
Details  
SAMPLE 
Number 48 30 Larger sample size in the 
current study. 
Gender ratio DLPFC tDCS: 
50:50 
Baseline condition: 
50:50 
DLPFC tDCS: 90:10 
Baseline condition: 
73:27 
An equal ratio of males and 
females used in the current 
study to remove gender as a 
confounder. 
Handedness All right handed Right (n=28) and left 
handed (n=2) 
The sample of the current study 
included only right handed 
participants.  
Age (mean) 24 years 21 years 
Recruitment 
source 
Local University 
Heath status Healthy 
STIMULATION 
Device NeuroConn Plus The device used 
developed by the 
research group 
 
Electrode 
attachment 
method 
Electrode gel  Saline soaked sponges Electrode gel used to avoid 
problems with water leakage. 
Electrode size 35cm2 Identical 
Intensity / current 
density 
 
2mA/ 0.057mA/cm2 Identical 
Location of 
electode: 
replication 
condition 
Bilateral DLPFC: 
RH anode/ LH 
cathode 
Bilateral DLPFC: 
RH anode/ LH cathode 
Identical 
Location of 
electrodes: active 
control condition 
Bilateral PC: 
RH anode/ LH 
cathode 
Unilateral DLPFC: 
DLPFC/ contralateral 
mastoid  
An active control condition to 
examine whether behavioural 
effects were due to the 
concurrent excitation and 
inhibition of homotopic regions 
implicated in decision-making 
was included. 
Duration >20mins As the Stroop task was 
undertaken during stimulation, 
half of the participants in the 
current study will have received 
3 minutes more tDCS before 
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commencing the BART. The 
effect of this was determined 
for in additional analysis. 
Method of 
localizing 
EEG 10-20 system Identical 
Baseline No stimulation Sham  Sham stimulation has come 
under criticism as a baseline as 
stimulation is still applied to the 
cortex albeit for 30 seconds.    
Blinding Single  Double  Both the experimenter and 
participant were unaware of 
experimental condition in the 
current experiment. 
TASKS 
BART: Number of 
trials 
30 balloons Identical  
BART: 
Reimbursement  
Cash reward to the highest earner Identical 
Online/ Offline BART: Online 
Stroop:  Online 
BART: Online 
Stroop: Offline 
When comparing performance 
on different tasks it is important 
to subject them to the same 
type of stimulation. 
Analysis  Repeated measures ANOVA Identical 
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3.4. Results 
The total time taken to complete the tasks did not differ across the three 
experimental conditions (DLPFC-tDCS, PC-tDCS, baseline) (F(2,45)=0.16, 
p=0.86).  
 
3.4.1.  The Effect of tDCS on the BART 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed to examine the average adjusted 
number of pumps in the three conditions (DLPFC-tDCS, PC-tDCS & baseline) 
broken down by time (balloon number 1-10, 11-20, 21-30) (Figure 3.4).  This 
revealed that there were no significant differences in the average adjusted 
number of pumps between the three experimental groups (F(2,45)=0.32, p=0.73).  
There was a significant effect of balloon number of the adjusted number of pumps 
(F(1.44,64.78)=34.00, p<0.01) and no significant interaction of experimental condition 
and balloon number (F(2.88,64.78)=1.34, p=0.27). Post hoc pairwise comparisons 
revealed significant differences between all time categories, including balloons 1-
10 and 11-20, between balloons 11-20 and 21-30, and between balloon 1-10 and 
21-30 (All Bonferroni corrected, p<0.01; Figure 2.4).  Therefore, tDCS to the 
DLPFC does not appear to affect decision-making behavior under uncertainty, as 
assessed by the adjusted number of pumps on the BART.   
 
Task order effects: Independent t-tests revealed that there was no significant 
effect of task order on performance of the BART for either the DLPFC (t(14)=-0.97, 
p=0.35) or PC (t(14)=-0.10, p=0.92) condition.  Therefore the average adjusted 
pump count was not influenced by additional tDCS received as a result of prior 
Stroop task performance, in either stimulation condition.  
 
Gender effects: ANOVA analysis revealed that there were no significant effect of 
gender on the average adjusted number of pumps (F(1,42)=0.02 p=0.90) and no 
significant effect of experimental group (F(2,42)=0.32, p=0.73). As seen previously 
there was a significant effect of balloon number of the adjusted number of pumps 
(F(1.39,58.38)=32.97, p<0.01).  There were also no significant interactions of gender 
and the main effects, including balloon number and gender (F(2,58.378)=0.621, 
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p=0.484) or balloon number, gender and experimental group (F(2,70, 58.38)=0.51, 
p=0.66). 
 
3.4.2.  The Effect of tDCS on the Stroop Task   
All participants completed the task with a high level of accuracy (mean accuracy 
96.30% correct). A one way ANOVA revealed no significant differences in the 
interference effect across the different experimental conditions (F(2,47)=0.26, 
p=0.77; Figure 3.5)
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Figure 3.4: BART results; left; In the current study there were no significant differences in the average adjusted number of balloon 
pumps between conditions.  There was a significant effect of balloon number and the average adjusted number of pumps significantly 
increased as the task progresses.  Right: Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) showed a significant decrease in the average adjusted 
number of pumps following DLPFC tDCS.  There was also a significant interaction of condition and time. In the baseline condition 
there were significant increases over time, which was not observed in those receiving DLPFC tDCS. * denotes a statistically significant 
difference at p<0.05. Error bars represent SEM. 
 83 
 
Figure 3.5: Stroop task results: In accordance with Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et 
al., (2007) there were no significant differences in the interference effect across 
experimental conditions.  Interference effect was calculated as mean latency to 
incongruent words minus congruent words.  Error bars represent SEM. 
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3.5. Discussion  
The aim of the current study was to replicate the methodology of Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007), in order to determine the reliability of tDCS as a tool 
to modify risky decision-making.  Due to a number of subsequent discrepant 
findings (Cheng & Lee, 2016; Weber et al., 2014) a conceptual replication was 
thought necessary as an initial first step in exploring the potential application of 
tDCS in the training of athletes. The results of the current study reveal no 
significant reductions in risk taking behaviours following bilateral DLPFC tDCS 
analogous to those reported by Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) despite 
close adherence to the methodology of the original study.  As such this non-
replication result raises concerns over the effectiveness of tDCS as a modulator 
of decision-making under uncertainity and the potential for application outside the 
laboratory.  
 
In particular, the results of the current study showed no effect of experimental 
condition (tDCS-DLPFC, tDCS-PC or Baseline) on the average adjusted number 
of balloon pumps, the main measure of risky decision-making within the BART.  
This is in direct contradiction to the findings of Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 
(2007) who found that tDCS applied bilaterally to the DLPFC led to a reduction in 
the average adjusted number of balloon pumps.  Specifically, in the baseline 
condition there were significant increases in the average adjusted number of 
pumps over time not observed in those receiving DLPFC tDCS. Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) claimed that these reductions in risky decision-
making with bilateral DLPFC tDCS reflected the concurrent excitation and 
inhibition of alternate hemispheres. In the current study there was a main effect 
of time (but no time * condition interaction), indicating a general increase in the 
average adjusted number of balloon pumps as the participant progressed with 
the task.   This effect is documented in a number of other studies (Lejuez, Aklin, 
Zvolensky, et al., 2003; Weber et al., 2014) and is thought to be typical of the 
learning that participants undergo when performing the task. In both the current 
study and Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007), there were no effects of tDCS 
on performance of the Stroop task (as measured by the interference effect). The 
task was included in the study design as a control task to allow conclusions about 
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the specificity of cognitive effects.   
 
In addition to failing to replicate Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) the findings 
of the current study also stand in contrast to Gorini et al., (2014) who reported 
similar reductions in risk taking on the BART following DLPFC tDCS in healthy 
adults and participants experiencing withdrawal from cocaine.  The results do, 
however, align with two further studies that also failed to find behavioural 
differences on BART performance with DLPFC tDCS.  The first is Weber et al., 
(2014)  who additionally used fMRI to assess changes in task performance 
induced by tDCS.  In this study tDCS was applied offline prior to task and the task 
was modified to make it appropriate for fMRI analysis in that the balloons had a 
decreased average bursting point and no monetary rewards were awarded.  An 
additional study by Cheng & Lee, (2016) also failed to replicate the finding of 
Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007). This study reflected the original 
methodology more closely, however used a version of the BART that had a fewer 
number of balloons (20 instead of 30).  This may have been pertinent to the 
replication attempt as differences in risk taking reported by Fecteau, Pascual-
leone, et al., (2007) were largest in the last half of the task (Cheng & Lee, 2016).  
However this is not supported by the current study that used the same number of 
balloons and also failed to replicate initial findings.  The current study adds to 
these two findings raising doubt about the reliability of the original results.  
 
Indeed the absence of any consistent findings in our study is notable given the 
improvements made to the methodology used by Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., 
(2007).  Stimulation parameters, including onset, current density and methods of 
localization were identical in the two studies, as were the behavioural tasks used 
as indices of decision-making under uncertainty and reimbursement approaches 
(comparison parameters are outlined in Table 3.1).  What is more is that in the 
current study the sample size was larger than that used in Fecteau, Pascual-
leone, et al., (2007)  and a number of methodological improvements were 
implemented.  These are outlined below and where appropriate their possible 
contribution to the discrepant findings are considered.  
 
In the current study an apriori power analysis was undertaken to ensure the 
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sample size was adequate to detect an effect of similar magnitude as reported 
by Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007).  The sample was 60% larger in the 
current study in comparison to Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) indicating 
that the failure to replicate in the current instance is unlikely to be a reflection of 
a lack of power.  A further improvement in terms of the sample characteristics is 
that the current study consisted of an equal ratio of males and females that was 
the same across conditions (per condition: n=16, 8 males and 8 females).  This 
was not the case for Fecteau et al (2007) whose sample was predominantly 
female (90% in the DLPFC-tDCS right anodal left cathodal condition and 73% in 
the baseline condition) and of different gender ratios across conditions.  The 
difference between the two studies may be notable in light of work that has 
demonstrated gender differences in the cortical plasticity induced by tDCS (Kuo, 
Paulus & Nitsche et al 2006).  Additional analysis also showed that there was no 
effect of gender on the results of the current study.  Other than this, it is important 
to note the characteristics of these samples were similar in terms of demographic 
variables such as age (mean age, current study: 24 years; Fecteau: 21 years) 
and level of education (consisting of mainly undergraduate students).   
 
A further improvement made to the Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) 
experimental methodology was in terms of timing of stimulation in relation to 
tasks. In Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) the onset of stimulation occurred 
5 minutes prior to and throughout performance of the BART, whereas the Stroop 
task was performed pre and post stimulation.  The physiological effects induced 
during tDCS are different from those arising following stimulation, and thus the 
two tasks were subjected to different types of stimulation (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011). 
In order to improve on this, the current study was designed in a way to avoid 
comparing the effects of online stimulation on the BART with the effects of offline 
stimulation on the Stroop task.  In considering the short duration of the Stroop 
task (maximum 3 minutes), tDCS was administered for 5 minutes prior to tasks, 
and then continued throughout performance of both the BART and Stroop task, 
(with the order of these counterbalanced across participants).  This meant the 
comparison of tDCS effects on the BART and Stroop was more valid in the 
current study.  
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In the context of this amendment, it did mean that in the current study half of the 
sample performed the BART following an additional approximately 3 minutes of 
stimulation, in comparison to Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007).  However 
attempts were made to minimize discrepancies across the two studies, as 
duration of stimulation is known to be an important factor for inducing the effects 
of tDCS (Fricke et al., 2011; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Nitsche et al., 2005).  In 
both studies the total duration of tDCS did not exceed 20 minutes.   In the current 
study all participants completed the tasks within this duration, apart from one 
participant who took a total 22 minutes from the onset of stimulation.  For this 
participant the last two minutes of BART performance occurred with no 
stimulation. The results of the current study do not change when this participant 
was excluded from the analysis. Secondly additional analysis was undertaken to 
show that task order had no affect on performance of the BART in the stimulation 
conditions. Lastly double blinding was used in the current experiment whereby 
the experimenter and participant were unaware of the stimulation type, which was 
not the case for Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007). Therefore in the current 
study there was improved control of confounding variables relating to 
experimenter expectation biases.  
 
Given the current findings, in light of a larger sample size and a number of 
methodological improvements, there is room to suggest that the original findings 
of Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) may simply not be valid, and represent 
an example of a type 1 error.  Type 1 errors, or false positives, result in the 
incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis. They can arise from a lack of 
methodological rigor and as a result of p value statistical approaches (i.e. with a 
p value of 0.05 – the accepted approach in psychology- there is at least 5% 
probability of a type 1 error) (Ioannidis et al., 2005). The prevalence of type 1 
errors maybe further inflated as the published literature in a given field is likely to 
be an inaccurate representation of all the data collected due to the bias of journals 
and researchers to publish positive results (Rosenthal & Robert, 1979).   
 
Replicability is the cornerstone of scientific research and as such independent 
verification of results in different laboratories important for a field to progress 
(Simons, 2014).  While the findings of the current study relate to a specific 
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measure of risk taking and method of applying tDCS, concerns of non- 
replicability have been widely discussed in the cognitive neuroenhancement 
literature (Horvath et al., 2015; Parkin et al., 2015; Riggall et al., 2015; Sahlem et 
al., 2015; Vannorsdall et al., 2016).  In particular a recent study into researchers 
perspectives in this area (Riggall et al., 2015) highlight an overemphasis of 
positive results, non-reporting of negative findings, as well as weak 
methodological rigor as some of the main issues facing the application of TES 
techniques.  Moreover, in a recent quantitative meta-analysis of the literature 
there was found to be no evidence of cognitive effects in healthy populations from 
single-session tDCS (Horvath et al., 2015), and thus the findings of the current 
study may not be entirely surprising. However it should be noted that the selection 
criteria of the aforementioned meta-analysis in question has been criticized (Price 
et al., 2015).  It is important to have consistent replicable findings if one was to 
attempt application outside of the laboratory especially in samples groups whose 
time and access is limited like elite athletes.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results of the current study failed to replicate findings from 
Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007), and DLPFC tDCS was shown to have no 
effect on decision-making under uncertainty as assessed by BART performance.  
This work raises concerns about the effectiveness of DLPFC tDCS in modifying 
risk taking during decision-making under uncertainty.  While the findings of the 
current study relate to one behavioural target and method of applying tDCS, they 
do echo a number of inconsistent results within the field (Cheng & Lee, 2016; 
Fecteau et al., 2014; Minati, Grisoli, et al., 2012; Weber et al., 2014) and draw 
attention to recent criticisms relating to the efficacy of single session tDCS in 
cognitive neuroenhancement (Horvath et al., 2015).  Furthermore these results 
undermine the proposed progression towards applying tDCS to decision-making 
training in elite athletes.   In the subsequent chapters the physiological 
underpinnings of tDCS and its failure in decision-making is explored, before 
returning to sport and decision-making.  
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4.   Do the Physiological Effects of tDCS Transfer to Bilateral 
Montages at 1mA and 2mA  
4.1. Abstract 
Background: In this chapter the physiological basis of the failure to replicate 
Fecteau, Pascual-Leone et al., (2007) is explored.  tDCS has been shown to 
induce polarity dependent shifts in cortical excitability, with anodal stimulation 
exerting an excitatory influence, and cathodal an inhibitory influence, on 
underlying neurons (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003).  Our 
knowledge of these effects is based on work that applies stimulation of 1mA, with 
current densities of 0.029mA/cm2, via the target electrode over M1 and the 
reference electrode over the contralateral orbit (known as a unilateral electrode 
montage; for a summary see Stagg & Nitsche, 2011).  In Fecteau, Pascual- 
Leone et al. (2007), however, stimulation was applied using a bilateral electrode 
montage, where both electrodes are situated over the same cortical region on 
opposing hemispheres, at an intensity of 2mA and current densities of 
0.057mA/cm2. These divergent parameters are common among studies in the 
cognitive neuromodulation field, as is the assumption that the induced anodal-
excitatory /cathodal-inhibitory effects remain unchanged.   There are a number of 
reasons to question this assumption.  Bilateral montages change the location, 
amount and depth of current flow through the cortex (Bestmann et al., 2015; 
Bikson et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2010; Datta, Elwassif, Battaglia, & Bikson, 2008; 
Miranda, Lomarev, & Hallett, 2006), and give rise to the possibility of inter-
hemispheric interactions (Kimura, 1967).  Moreover, research has shown that 
increasing cathodal stimulation intensity/current density from 1mA/0.029mA/cm2 
to 2mA/ 0.057mA/cm2 induces excitatory effects (Batsikadze, Moliadze, Paulus, 
Kuo, & Nitsche, 2013).    Empirically testing whether the anodal excitatory 
cathodal inhibitory effects of tDCS extend to bilateral montages and increased 
stimulation intensities will shed light on the validity of the physiological 
explanation of findings in Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007).  Moreover it will 
provide a necessary basis from which to interpret the tDCS and decision-making 
literature in light of potential application to elite athletes.  
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Objective: To assess the influence of electrode montage (unilateral and 
bilateral), and current intensities (1mA and 2mA) on the anodal and cathodal 
effects of tDCS. 
 
Method: Anodal and cathodal tDCS was applied using either the traditional 
unilateral M1/ contralateral orbit montage at 1mA (experiment 1), or a bilateral 
electrode montage (left and right M1) at 1mA (experiment 2) or 2mA 
(experiment3).  In each case stimulation was delivered for 10 minutes. Changes 
in cortical excitability were measured using MEP amplitude, at 5 minute intervals 
for 30 minutes post stimulation.  
 
Results: In experiment 1, when tDCS was applied using the unilateral 
M1/contralateral orbit montage at 1mA, the classic effects of anodal-excitation/ 
cathodal-inhibition were found. Thus, unilateral anodal stimulation induced 
elevations in MEP amplitude, in comparison to cathodal stimulation that induced 
decreases in MEP amplitude.  In experiments 2 & 3, when tDCS was applied with 
a bilateral electrode arrangement, these opposing polarity dependent shifts were 
not retained (for neither 1 nor 2mA) and there were no significant modulations of 
MEP amplitude. 
 
Conclusion:  These findings highlight that the anodal or cathodal nature of an 
electrode does not directly dictate its effect as either excitatory or inhibitory. As 
such, the physiological effects of tDCS should not be taken for granted, unless 
based on previous physiological work that has used similar parameters. These 
results also provide an explanation for the failure to replicate Fecteau, Pascual- 
Leone et al (2007), and raise concerns over the assumptions of anodal-
excitation/cathodal-inhibition that underpin the rationale and justification of 
results in this study. Such concerns also extend to the wider literature, as many 
other studies in the decision-making and neuromodulation field have used similar 
stimulation parameters.  Together, the results of chapters 3 and 4 suggest that 
the modulation of decision-making with tDCS is unreliable, and studies in this 
field lack an understanding of the physiological underpinning of their results.  This 
undermines the original proposal of applying tDCS for decision-making training 
in elite athletes.  
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4.2. Introduction  
A cornerstone of our understanding of the effects of tDCS on the human cortex 
is that it induces polarity dependent shifts in cortical excitability, with anodal 
stimulation exerting an excitatory effect and cathodal stimulation an inhibitory 
effect on the neuronal tissue underlying the electrodes (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; 
Nitsche et al., 2003). The physiological basis of these effects has been widely 
explored through the study of motor cortex plasticity (for a summary see Stagg & 
Nitsche, 2011). 
 
The classical studies of Nitsche & Paulus (2001) and Nitsche et al (2003), which 
originally demonstrated anodal-excitation/ cathodal-inhibition, examined 
modulation of the MEP amplitudes induced by single pulse TMS (see Figure 
2.4a).  MEPs are a global parameter of corticospinal excitability and changes in 
their amplitude are thought to reflect a sub-threshold depolarization (anodal) or 
hyperpolarization (cathodal) of resting membrane potentials (Tergau & Paulus, 
2008).  At a conceptual level, such modifications make it more (anodal) or less 
(cathodal) likely that stimulation of a neuron will produce an action potential 
(Bestmann et al., 2015; Kuo & Nitsche, 2012). The work that provided the 
groundwork of the anodal-excitatory/ cathodal inhibitory model of tDCS has 
applied stimulation using precise and consistent parameters.  In particular, as 
studies aim to investigate anodal and cathodal effects in isolation, a unilateral 
electrode array is almost always applied.  This is where the ‘active’ electrode, the 
one that is the focus of study, is placed over M1.  The alternate ‘reference’ 
electrode is placed over the contralateral orbit, a region conceptualized as a dead 
spot unimportant to inducing effects.  Other common reference positions are 
away from the head (e.g. the upper arm).  In addition to this, almost all of this 
work has delivered tDCS at an intensity of 1mA and density of 0.029mA/cm2.  
There is a much more limited understanding of the physiological effects of tDCS 
outside of these parameters (Lindenberg et al., 2016). 
 
In line with the capacity to modulate neuronal excitability, tDCS has been widely 
applied to modify human brain function in healthy controls (Jacobson, Koslowsky, 
& Lavidor, 2012) and clinical populations (Flöel, 2014).  These studies use the 
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anodal-excitation/ cathodal-inhibition model of tDCS to guide the mechanistic 
rationale for application and to explain findings.  The majority of studies within the 
field, however, have applied tDCS using parameters that differ from those used 
to induce the classical effects of anodal-excitation/ cathodal-inhibition, yet have 
assumed these effects remain.  This is true for Fecteau, Pascual- Leone et al 
(2007) here instead using a unilateral montage at 1mA/ 0.029mA/cm2, stimulation 
was applied bilaterally to the DLPFC at an increased intensity of 2mA/ 
0.057mA/cm2.  The behavioural findings of reduced risk taking were proposed to 
arise from the concurrent excitation and inhibition of the opposing hemispheres, 
while the possible influence that modifying electrode positioning and stimulation 
intensity were not considered. 
There are a number of reasons to suggest changes to electrode montage, from 
unilateral arrangement, used in studies of motor physiology, to bilateral 
arrangement, used in cognitive neuromodulatory studies, may influence the 
effects of tDCS.  In particular the position of the return electrode governs the 
current flow throughout the cortex. Computational modeling studies have 
suggested that there is likely to be changes in the amount and depth of current 
entering the brain due to differences in interelectrode distances between the two 
montages (Bestmann et al., 2015; Bikson et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2010; Datta, 
Elwassif, Battaglia, & Bikson, 2008;  Faria et al., 2012; Miranda, Lomarev, & 
Hallett, 2006).  Moreover there is the possibility that inter-hemispheric 
interactions may occur with bilateral stimulation which might modify the effects of 
tDCS (Kimura, 1967). 
 
In spite of this, there is some evidence that the anodal-excitatory/ cathodal-
inhibitory effects of tDCS may be retained with bilateral electrode placement.  
This issue has been the focus of two previous studies. Mordillo-Mateos et al., 
(2012) reported bilateral anodal stimulation at 2 mA, (with a current density of 
0.057mA/cm2), delivered for 5 minutes, to cause an initial increase in MEP 
amplitude, and bilateral cathodal to cause an initial decrease in MEP amplitude, 
results that were not sustained for the second time point taken at 20 minutes. 
Moreover Kidgell et al., (2013) also reported anodal-excitatory and cathodal-
inhibitory effects on MEP amplitude following bilateral motor cortex stimulation at 
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1mA, with a current density of 0.040mA/cm2. In this case stimulation was 
delivered for 13 minutes. Despite these initial studies, further explorations are 
warranted, especially in the case of 2mA/ 0.057mA/cm2 stimulation where 
duration is likely to be a further parameter that dictates the physiological effects 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003; Paulus, Antal & Nitsche., 2013). 
When applying tDCS to modify cognitive functioning stimulation intensities of 
2mA (current densities of 0.057mA/cm2) are routinely used, predicated on the 
assumption that increasing stimulation intensities will enhance the efficacy of the 
anodal and cathodal effects.  There is some evidence to support the assumption 
that increasing intensities enhances the effect of stimulation for intensities from 
0.2mA-1mA (current densities of 0.005mA/cm2 - 0.029mA/cm2) (Nitsche & 
Paulus, 2000).  However, when stimulating at intensities akin to those used in the 
cognitive neuromodulatory literature this linear relationship has been shown to 
break down.  In particular, work by Batsikadze et al., (2013) revealed that when 
increasing stimulation intensity from 1mA/0.029mA/cm2 to 2mA/0.057mA/cm2 
(using a unilateral electrode array) tDCS loses its opposing polarities and 
cathodal stimulation induces excitatory effects (for stimulation duration of 5 
minutes).  Moreover, Wiethoff, Hamada, & Rothwell, (2014) reported no cathodal 
inhibitory effects following tDCS delivered at 2mA (stimulation duration of 10 
minutes) (Wiethoff et al., 2014).  These findings are problematic for studies that 
have stimulated at 2mA and assumed anodal and cathodal polarity dependent 
shifts in cortical excitability.  
 
The current study is motivated by concerns over the generalization of the anodal-
excitatory/ cathodal-inhibitory model of tDCS. Findings from the physiological 
sciences have been extrapolated to all studies that employ tDCS, despite 
differences in stimulation protocols.  Thus the aim of the study is to explore the 
effects of tDCS using parameters that have become standard in an increasing 
number of studies (Wiethoff et al., 2014)  including those employed by Fecteau 
et al., (2007) - in particular, bilateral electrode montages with increased 
stimulation intensities.  This will allow an examination of the underlying 
assumptions that guide the mechanistic rationale for application, and that are 
used to interpret findings cognitive neuromodulatory studies.  In particular, the 
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results will shed light on the validity of the physiological explanation provided for 
the results described in Fecteau et al., (2007) and form a basis from which to 
evaluate the wider tDCS and decision-making literature in light of potential 
application to elite athletes. 
 
In order to investigate this, three experiments were performed, each of which 
assess the anodal and cathodal effects of tDCS protocols through the 
measurement of corticospinal excitability via modulation of MEP amplitude.  In 
the first experiment, a replication of the parameters used in classical studies of 
motor physiology is performed.   Unilateral-anodal and unilateral-cathodal tDCS 
was applied where electrodes were positioned with the target (e.g. in the 
unilateral anode condition this is the anodal electrode) over left M1 and reference 
over the contralateral orbit (e.g. in the unilateral anode condition this was the 
cathode) at 1mA.  In the second experiment bilateral-anodal and bilateral-
cathodal electrode montages at 1mA were studied, and in the third experiment 
these same montages at 2mA.   In these bilateral stimulation conditions, 
electrodes were placed with the target over left M1 (e.g. in bilateral anode 
condition this was the anode) and reference over right M1 (e.g. in the bilateral 
anode condition this was the cathode).  Modulations in MEP amplitude were 
assessed up to 30 minutes post stimulation, at 5-minute intervals. 
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4.3. Methods 
4.3.1. Participants  
4.3.1.1. Experiment 1 - Unilateral 1mA 
Twelve subjects participated in experiment 1 (6 female, mean age = 20; age 
range 18-27), eight of whom undertook both unilateral-anodal and unilateral-
cathodal conditions.  The remaining four participants undertook either the 
unilateral-anodal or unilateral-cathodal condition and were excluded from the 
analysis.  
 
4.3.1.2. Experiment 2 - Bilateral 1mA 
Eleven subjects participated in experiment 2 (6 female, mean = age 21; age 
range 18-21). Nine subjects undertook both bilateral-anodal 1mA and bilateral-
cathodal 1mA stimulation.  Two subjects undertook either bilateral-anode 1mA or 
bilateral-cathodal 1mA stimulation and were excluded from the final analysis.   
 
4.3.1.3. Experiment 3 - Bilateral 2mA 
Eleven subjects undertook experiment 3 (6 female, mean age = 21; age range 
18-21), nine of which undertook both bilateral-anodal 2mA and bilateral-cathodal 
2mA stimulation.  A further two subjects undertook either bilateral-anode or 
bilateral-cathodal stimulation and were excluded from the final analysis.  
 
Upon expressing an interest in taking part in the study, participants were 
screened to determine their eligibility to participate in brain stimulation research 
(no history of acute or chronic medical, neurological or psychiatric diseases, not 
currently taking any medication and no problematic metallic implants). Those with 
any contraindications were not recruited.   All participants were right hand 
dominant and in accordance with previous work (eg. Jo et al., 2009; Nilsson, 
Lebedev, & Lövdén, 2015) there was a wash out period of at least three days 
prior to the experiment during which participants must not have received brain 
stimulation. All participants gave their written informed consent and were 
financially compensated for their participation at a standard rate. The study and 
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consent procedures were approved by UCL ethics committee in accordance the 
declaration of Helsinki. 
 
4.3.2. Experimental Protocol  
For each experiment a within subject design was used, participants were 
randomly assigned to anodal or cathodal stimulation conditions and the order of 
these session were counterbalanced across subjects. Each experimental session 
followed the same procedure, regardless of condition (Figure 4.1).  Following 
consent procedures and study explanation, participants were seated in a chair 
with their hands resting on a pillow.  Participants were instructed to keep their 
arms still but relaxed throughout the experiment. First, the site for TMS 
assessment was identified using single pulse TMS (the coil position that 
produced the largest MEP amplitude in the FDI muscle) and marked with a pen. 
The coil orientation was also identified by drawing a line on the scalp that outlined 
the contour of the coil, these marks were used to ensure consistency in the 
placement throughout the experiment.  In experiments 2 and 3, the motor hotspot 
was also located on alternate hemisphere, which was used to ensure precise 
placement of the bilateral tDCS electrode. 
 
Once the site for TMS assessment was located, the TMS intensity was adjusted 
to elicit MEPs with peak-to-peak amplitudes of approximately 1mV, and baseline 
MEPs were then recorded. Following this, tDCS was administered for 10 minutes, 
the placement of the electrodes and intensity were determined according to 
condition. Immediately after stimulation the electrodes were removed and the 
participant’s scalp briefly cleaned.   MEPs were then recorded at five-minute 
intervals for thirty minutes post stimulation (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 minutes post). In 
all experiments, a single-blind design was used where participants did not know 
what type of stimulation (anodal or cathodal) they were receiving, at the end of 
the experiment the participant was appropriately debriefed and paid for their 
participation. 
 
 
4.3.3. TDCS 
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tDCS was delivered by a battery-driven constant current stimulator (Neuroconn, 
Germany) via a standard pair of rubber conductive electrodes (5x7cm, surface 
area of 35cm2 each).  The electrodes were attached to the scalp with conductive 
paste and held in place with two rubber straps. This method was used to ensure 
precise stimulation of the intended region and avoid the potential problems of 
water leakage with the saline soaked sponge method. In all conditions, 
stimulation was applied for 10 minutes, with a 15 second phase in / phase out 
period.  The stimulation parameters employed did not exceed safety limits 
(Bikson, Datta, & Elwassif, 2009). Two types of electrode montage, unilateral and 
bilateral, were examined across the three experiments (Figure 4.1).   
 
4.3.3.1. Experiment 1- Unilateral 1mA 
In experiment 1, tDCS was applied using a unilateral montage.  Here, the active 
electrode was fixed over left M1, with the centre of the electrode positioned over 
the site identified for TMS assessment.  The reference electrode was placed 
horizontally over the right contralateral orbit.  For unilateral-anodal stimulation the 
anode was placed over left M1 and the cathode over the contralateral orbit. For 
unilateral-cathodal stimulation the cathode was placed over left M1 and the 
anode over the contralateral orbit. Unilateral stimulation was delivered at 1mA, 
creating a current density of 0.029mA/cm2.  
 
4.3.3.2. Experiment 2- Bilateral 1mA 
In experiment 2, tDCS was applied using a bilateral montage where the active 
electrode was fixed over left M1 and the reference electrode over right M1. For 
bilateral-anodal stimulation the anode was positioned over left M1 and cathodal 
over right M1 and for bilateral-cathodal stimulation the electrode polarity was 
reversed.  In each case electrodes were centered over the motor hotspot 
identified by TMS.  Stimulation was delivered at 1mA creating a current density 
of 0.029mA/cm2. 
 
4.3.3.3. Experiment 3- Bilateral 2mA 
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In experiment 3 stimulation was applied using the same electrode montage as 
described in experiment 2, but with an increased current of 2mA to create a 
current density of 0.057mA/cm2.    
 
4.3.4. Measurement of Motor Cortex Excitability 
In all experiments, to detect changes in corticospinal excitability, MEPs elicited 
by single pulse TMS were recorded in the right First Dorsal Interosseous muscle 
(FDI).  
 
TMS was delivered to the left M1 using a Magstim Rapid 200 Stimulator (Magstim 
Company, Whitland, Dyfed, Uk) and a 70 mm figure of eight shaped coil. The coil 
was held tangentially over the scalp positioned laterally at 45° from the midline, 
such that the current flowed in a posterior anterior direction in the brain. The 
optimum stimulus location, marked as the site for TMS assessment, was defined 
as the region that consistently elicited the largest MEP. This was determined by 
first identifying the C3 position of the EEG 10-20 grid (Jasper, 1958), and then 
moving the coil in 0.5 cm steps around the region to locate the motor ‘hotspot’. 
All TMS safety guidelines were adhered to (Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-
Leone, 2009). In the bilateral tDCS conditions the same procedure was also 
implemented to locate the motor hotspot on the right hemisphere, using the EEG 
10-20 C4 position (Jasper, 1958) as an initial starting point.  This was used to 
guide placement of the bilateral reference electrode. 
 
Surface electromyography (EMG) was recorded with disposable adhesive disc 
electrodes (Ag-AgCl) placed in a belly tendon montage on the right hand. To 
ensure good surface contact and reduce skin resistance, a standard skin 
preparation procedure of cleaning and abrading was performed at each electrode 
site. Peak-to-peak MEP amplitude was acquired with a sampling rate of 3kHz via 
an automatic acquisition system (Brainsight, Rogue Research, Montréal, 
Québec, Canada).  The TMS intensity was adjusted per subject to elicit a MEP 
with amplitudes of approximately 1mV, the intensity was recorded and then used 
throughout the testing session.  An MEP height of 1mV was used as this is 
moderate amplitude that allows for possible enhancements or reductions without 
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ceiling or floor effects (Wiethoff, Hamada, & Rothwell, 2014).  Fifteen consecutive 
MEPs where collected as baseline measurements prior to tDCS.  Post tDCS, 
blocks of 10 consecutive MEPs were recorded at each timepoint. Similar 
paradigms of identifying and measuring MEP amplitude have been used by 
several experiments in this field (for example by, Batsikadze et al., 2013; Nitsche 
& Paulus, 2000; Nitsche et al., 2003). 
 
4.3.5.  Data Analysis 
For evaluation of corticospinal excitability, the peak-to-peak amplitude of MEPs 
was measured in the 15-50 ms window after the TMS trigger.  This was carried 
out automatically using BrainSight 3.10b software (Brainsight, Rogue Research, 
Montréal, Québec, Canada).  The mean peak-to-peak amplitudes were 
calculated for each time point per subject. These included the first 10 (post 
stimulation) or 15 (baseline) consecutive MEPs that were recorded.  Trials with 
more than 15 microvolts background EMG activity for 100ms pre-stimulation were 
discarded.  The mean peak-to-peak amplitudes recorded post stimulation were 
then normalized to baseline and expressed as the ratio of MEP amplitude 
obtained after tDCS compared to the MEP amplitude obtained before tDCS 
(amplitude after/ amplitude before).   
   
In order to assess the opposing anodal and cathodal polarity dependent shifts in 
cortical excitability, repeated measures ANOVA were undertaken for each 
experiment (using normalized values), with two within subject factors, polarity (2 
levels: anodal, cathodal) and time (6 levels: 5, 10, 15, 20,25, 30 minutes). Post 
hoc comparisons were undertaken using paired t-tests.  Additionally, in order to 
determine whether there were significant shifts from baseline, paired t-tests (one-
tailed) were undertaken for each stimulation type (using the un-normalized 
values).  The t-tests were not corrected for multiple comparisons as this is 
equivalent to Fishers LSD correction which is used as standard use in studies in 
this field (Batsikadze et al., 2013; Kidgell, Goodwill, Frazer, & Daly, 2013; 
Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 2010; Nitsche et al., 2003; Nitsche & Paulus, 2001)
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Figure 4.1:Top image; The tDCS parameters used in each experimental condition.  Bottom image; The experimental protocol: The 
motor hotspot was identified and the TMS threshold intensity was adjusted per subject to give a peak-to-peak amplitude of 
approximately 1mA. 15 baseline MEPs of the right FDI muscle were recorded. tDCS was then applied for 10 minutes. Post 
stimulation MEPs were recorded to determine changes in corticospinal excitability, 10 measurements were taken at 5-minute 
intervals for half an hour.
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4.4. Results  
4.4.1. Experiment 1 - Unilateral 1mA 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of polarity 
(F(1,7)=22.03, p<0.01), a non significant effect of time (F(5,35)=1.47, p=0.22), and 
no significant interaction of time and polarity (F(5,35)=0.46, p=0.80). Post hoc 
paired t-tests revealed that unilateral-anodal stimulation induced an increase in 
MEP amplitude in comparison to unilateral-cathodal stimulation at each timepoint 
post stimulation; 5 minutes (t(7)=4.12 p<0.01); 10 minutes (t(7)=3.41 p<0.01); 15 
minutes (t(7)=2.30 p<0.05); 20 minutes (t(7)= 3.78 p<0.01); 25 minutes (t(7)=3.70 
p<0.01) and 30 minute (t(7)=5.88 p<0.01) (Figure 4.2). 
 
Paired t-tests comparing baseline (i.e. unadjusted) MEP amplitude values to each 
timepoint post stimulation revealed that, for unilateral anodal stimulation, MEP 
amplitude values were significantly higher than baseline at all timepoints post-
stimulation stimulation.  This includes at 5 minutes (t(7)=-5.12 p<0.01) 10 minutes 
(t(7)=-3.65, p<0.01), 15 minutes (t(7)=-2.54, p<0.05), 20 minutes (t(7)=-3.87, 
p<0.01), 25 minutes (t(7)=-3.58, p<0.01) and 30 minutes (t(7)=-3.10, p<0.01) post 
stimulation.   These results suggest that corticospinal excitability is increased by 
unilateral anodal stimulation of M1, which is consistent with previous studies. 
 
For unilateral cathodal stimulation, MEP amplitude was significantly lower than 
baseline at 5 minutes (t(7)=2.62, p<0.05), 10 minutes (t(7)=3.04 p<0.01), 20 
minutes (t(7)=1.80, p<0.05) and 25 minutes (t(7)=1.90, p<0.05). These results 
suggest that, in accordance with previous studies, corticospinal excitability is 
reduced by unilateral cathodal stimulation of M1.  
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Figure 4.2: Results for experiment 1- unilateral 1mA; Timecourse of 
normalised MEP amplitude following 10 minutes of unilateral-anodal (anode left 
M1/ cathode right contralateral orbit) and unilateral-cathodal stimulation (cathode 
left M1/ anode right contralateral orbit) at 1mA intensity. Unilateral-anodal 
stimulation induced elevations in the MEP amplitude in comparison to unilateral-
cathodal stimulation at each time point. There were also significant shifts in 
comparison to baseline for unilateral-anodal at all timepoints. There were 
significant shifts in comparison to baseline for the unilateral-cathodal stimulation 
at 5, 10, 20 and 25 minutes post stimulation. * denotes significant differences of 
MEP amplitudes between unilateral-anodal compared to unilateral-cathodal at 
each time point.  Solid circles = timepoints which were significantly different from 
baseline. Red line= anodal; blue line = cathodal. 
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4.4.2.  Experiment 2- Bilateral 1mA 
One dataset, which was 3 SD above the mean, was excluded from analysis. 
Repeated measures ANOVA analysis revealed no significant effect of stimulation 
polarity (F(1,7)=0.11, p=0.75), no effect of time (F(5,35)= 1.24, p=0.31), and no 
significant interaction of stimulation polarity * time (F(5,35)=1.53, p=0.21) on MEP 
amplitude (Figure 4.3).  Therefore, the opposing anodal and cathode polarity 
dependent shifts in MEP amplitude described above were not retained following 
bilateral stimulation at 1mA.  
 
Paired t-tests comparing baseline (i.e. unadjusted) MEP amplitude values to each 
those collected post stimulation revealed, no significant differences between 
baseline values at any timepoint post stimulation following bilateral-anodal or 
bilateral-cathodal stimulation at 1mA. Therefore there were no changes in MEP 
amplitude as a result of bilateral 1mA tDCS. 
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Figure 4.3: Results for experiment 2- bilateral 1mA: Timecourse of normalized 
MEP amplitudes following 10 minutes of 1mA bilateral-anodal (anode left M1/ 
cathode right M1) and bilateral-cathodal stimulation (cathode left M1/ anode right 
M1).  There was no significant effect of stimulation polarity on MEP amplitude, 
indicating that the opposing anodal and cathode polarity dependent shifts in 
corticospinal excitability were not retained.  Error bars represent SEM; red line= 
anodal; blue line= cathodal  
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4.4.3.  Experiment 3- Bilateral 2mA 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant effect of stimulation polarity 
(F(1,8)=0.17 p=0.30), no effect of time (F(5,40)=0.61, p=0.69), and no interaction of 
stimulation polarity and time (F(5,40)=0.44, p=0.81) on MEP amplitude.  The 
opposing anodal and cathodal polarity dependent shifts in MEP amplitude were 
therefore not retained when stimulation is applied using bilateral montages at 
2mA (Figure 4.4). 
 
Paired t-test comparing post stimulation values to baseline, revealed a significant 
difference at 15 minutes (t(8)= -2.38, p<0.05). There were no other significant 
excitatory or inhibitory shifts from baseline for any timepoint post stimulation 
following bilateral-anodal or bilateral-cathodal stimulation at 2mA.  
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Figure 4.4: Results for experiment 3 – bilateral 2mA: Timecourse of 
normalized MEP amplitude following 10 minutes of 2mA bilateral-anodal (anode 
left M1/ cathode right M1) and bilateral-cathodal stimulation (cathode left M1/ 
anode right M1).  There were no significant effects of stimulation polarity on MEP 
amplitude. Indicating that the opposing anodal and cathode polarity dependent 
shifts in coritcospinal excitability were not retained following bilateral stimulation 
at 2mA. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Red line= anodal; blue 
line= cathodal.  
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4.5. Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to examine whether anodal-excitatory/ cathodal-
inhibitory effects of tDCS extend to protocols applying stimulation using bilateral 
electrode montages at intensities of 1 and 2mA. Experiment 1 replicated the 
parameters used in classical studies of motor physiology (e.g. Batsikadze et al., 
2013; Moliadze et al., 2010; Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003; Stagg 
& Nitsche, 2011) on which our knowledge of the effects of tDCS is based and 
delivered stimulation with a unilateral electrode array (M1/ contralateral orbit) at 
1mA intensity (and densities of 0.029mA/cm2).  The results showed that 
unilateral-anodal and unilateral-cathodal stimulation induced polarity dependent 
shifts in corticospinal excitability (as evidence by respective elevations and 
diminutions in MEP amplitude) these were significantly different both from one 
another, and from baseline.  The results of experiment 2 and 3 showed that when 
departing from this typical unilateral arrangement, these polarity dependent shifts 
in cortical excitability were not induced.  In particular, anodal and cathodal 
stimulation delivered via bilateral electrode montages (left and right M1) at 1mA 
(experiment 2) and at 2mA (experiment 3) did not induce significantly opposing 
effects on MEP amplitudes, nor did these protocols induce changes to the MEP 
amplitude in comparison to baseline values.   
 
The bilateral stimulation parameters were chosen for investigation due to their 
use in the Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) study, and in an increasing 
number of cognitive, behavioral and clinical studies including the majority of the 
neuromodulatory decision-making literature (Boggio, Campanhã, et al., 2010; 
Boggio, Zaghi, et al., 2010; Cheng & Lee, 2016; Fecteau et al., 2014; Fecteau, 
Knoch, et al., 2007; Gorini et al., 2014; Minati et al., 2012; Weber et al., 2014; Ye 
et al., 2015). These studies have based their understanding of the effects of tDCS 
on work using unilateral electrode positioning, assuming that the effects are 
consistent despite differing parameters.  The findings from the current study do 
not support this premise and raise concerns over the assumptions of polarity 
dependent shifts in excitation and inhibition underlying studies that stimulate 
bilaterally at 1mA/0.029mA/cm2 or 2mA/0.057mA/cm2 (e.g: Fecteau et al, 2007a, 
2007b; Hecht et al 2010; Boggio et al 2009, 2010a 2010b; Chi et al 2010; Cohen 
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Kadosh et al 2010).   In particular, Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) reported 
decreased risk taking during bilateral tDCS (2mA/ 0.057mA/cm2) over the 
DLPFC, regardless of whether the anodal electrode was placed over the left and 
cathodal over right DLFPC, or vice versa.  It was claimed that these results were 
a result of the concurrent excitation and inhibition of alternate hemispheres, 
based on the assumption that anodal is exerting an excitatory and cathodal an 
inhibitory influence. In addition to failing to replicate the behavioural findings of 
Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) (chapter 3), the results of the current study 
does not support the physiological evidence underpinning this explanation.   
 
In support of the importance of electrode positioning on determining the effects 
of tDCS, the initial use of unilateral electrode montages came from one of the 
earliest studies in the tDCS field.  Nitsche & Paulus (2000) explored five different 
electrode arrays when assessing the rapid induced effect of weak DC stimulation 
(stimulation applied for 4 seconds at 1mA/ producing current densities of 
0.029mA/cm2).   It was only the unilateral M1/ contralateral orbit arrangement that 
produced significant excitability changes (as measured by MEPs), while for other 
electrode placements including bilateral M1 no effects of stimulation were 
evident.  As the most robust arrangement the unilateral array persisted as 
convention in future studies exploring the physiology of tDCS.  
 
There have been two previous studies that have similarly examined the after- 
effects of bilateral tDCS of motor cortex corticospinal excitability.  Mordillo-
Mateos et al., (2012), reported bilateral anodal stimulation at 2 mA (current 
density 0.057mA/cm2) to cause an initial increase in MEP amplitude, and bilateral 
cathodal to cause an initial decrease in MEP amplitude, results that were not 
sustained for the second time point taken at 20 minutes. While these findings are 
not in line with the current study that found no such shifts in corticospinal 
excitability following bilateral tDCS of 2mA, Mordillo-Mateos et al., (2012) did 
report the effects of bilateral electrode montages to be less robust in comparison 
to the unilateral stimulation condition. It is difficult to make direct comparisons 
due to differences in the stimulation protocol used, for example Mordillo-Mateos 
et al., (2012) stimulated for 5 minutes, while in the current study stimulation was 
applied for 10 minutes (a duration closer to those used in cognitive enhancement 
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studies).  Comparing the current study to Mordillo-Mateos et al., (2012), it may 
be that stimulation duration interacts with montage and intensity, making 
assumptions of transferability between studies more different again.  
 
An additional study by Kidgell, Goodwill, Frazer, & Daly, (2013) examined the 
after-effects of bilateral tDCS delivered at 1mA with current densities of 
0.04mA/cm2 (stimulation was applied with smaller electrodes that used in the 
current study).  Stimulation was delivered for durations of 13 minutes.  The study 
reported excitatory effects of anodal stimulation and inhibitory effects of cathodal 
stimulation on MEP amplitude, findings which differ to the current study.  In the 
current study current densities of 0.029mA/cm2 (1mA experiment 2) and 
0.057mA/cm2 (2mA experiment 3) were explored, and in comparing these two 
studies it may be with bilateral montages there is a critical intensity needed for 
corticospinal modulations to occur.  
 
With unilateral electrode arrays, there have been reports that at increased 
intensities cathodal stimulation loses its opposing polarity and no longer exerts 
inhibitory effects. A study by Batsikadze et al., (2013) revealed that at 2mA, with 
a current density of 0.057mA/cm2, cathodal stimulation delivered at 20 minutes 
induced excitatory after effects of stimulation.  While Wiethoff et al., (2014) 
reported 10 minutes of cathodal stimulation delivered at 2mA/ 0.057mA/cm2 to 
not produce any excitatory shifts from baseline.  The findings of the current study 
show that for bilateral electrode array at 2mA/ 0.057mA/cm2 cathodal stimulation 
(10 minutes) similarly does not produce inhibitory effects. 
 
When comparing the current study to others in the field, it is important to 
acknowledge the many factors that may influence the effects of tDCS, including 
duration, montage and intensity, and these may interact with each other, making 
assumptions of transferability between studies more different again. This 
reiterates one of the key messages of the study, that the excitatory or inhibitory 
effects of tDCS should not be taken for granted unless based on previous 
physiological research that has used the same parameters.   
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There have been two studies which have examined the effects of electrode 
montage using fMRI, these have reported differences in the effects induced when 
tDCS was applied using bilateral in comparison to unilateral montages. Sehm, 
Kipping, Schäfer, Villringer, & Ragert, (2013) assessed functional connectivity 
analysis across and within M1, and found that tDCS applied with both bilateral 
and unilateral montages resulted in decreased interhemispheric functional 
connectivity during stimulation, yet bilateral tDCS was unique in that it increased 
intracortical functional connectivity within the stimulated M1 after stimulation. 
Additionally Lindenberg et al., (2016) revealed that bilateral stimulation exerted 
widespread bihemspheric changes to functional connectivity to regions including 
those outside of the motor and supplementary motor areas. In comparison 
unilateral stimulation exerted effects more locally within the primary and 
secondary motor cortices.  This is in keeping with the results of the current study 
which show a greater influence of unilateral stimulation on the motor cortices.   
 
There are a number of reasons that have been proposed to account for why 
bilateral electrode arrays may produce differing after-effects than unilateral 
montages.  These include differences in, the amount of current reaching the 
cortex, the position (location and depth) of current flow (Faria, Hallett, & Miranda, 
2011), and the possibility of interhemispheric interactions from concurrent 
stimulation of monosynpatically connected brain regions (Kimura, 1967). Recent 
computational studies have noted inter-electrode distance as an important factor 
in determining efficacy of tDCS (Faria, Hallett, & Miranda, 2011).  Due to the 
increased conductivity of the scalp and cerebral spinal fluid relative to the skull 
and brain, a large portion of the applied current has been calculated to flow 
through these tissues rather than reaching the brain.  Studies have calculated 
that electrodes which are further apart on the scalp are optimal, with 60% of 
current calculated to reach the brain when the electrodes are more than 20cm 
apart, as compared to 35% when electrodes are at a distance of 8cm (Faria et 
al., 2011). For unilateral montages there are larger inter-electrode distances 
compared to bilateral arrangements, thus with unilateral arrangements the 
amount of current entering the brain relative to that shunted across the scalp 
maybe higher.  The absence of significant modulations in cortical excitability from 
bilateral montages may simply arise from less stimulation reaching the cortex.  
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Inter-electrode distance has also been calculated to influence the position of 
maximum current density within the brain and depth of current flow which may 
also contribute to differences in the effects produced with unilateral and bilateral 
electrode montages (Bikson, Datta, Rahman, & Scaturro, 2010; Faria, Hallett, 
Miranda, et al., 2011).  When electrodes are placed closer together, which is the 
case for bilateral montages in comparison to unilateral montages, the maximum 
current density is shifted between the two electrodes and depth of current flow 
more superficial (i.e. the magnitude of current density decreases more rapidly 
with depth) (Faria, Hallett, Miranda, et al., 2011).  It may be that, in order to 
produce shifts in the corticospinal neurons that contribute to the MEP, sufficient 
depth of stimulation is needed which does not occur with bilateral application.   In 
addition to changes in the depth of current flow, changing the position of the 
‘return’ electrode will influence the location of current flow through the brain. The 
unilateral montage, with the reference electrode placed over the contralateral 
orbit, directs the current in an anterior orientation, in comparison to the bilateral 
montage where the reference electrode guides the current in a more lateral 
orientation towards the alternate hemisphere (Kidgell, Goodwill, et al., 2013). 
 
A further difference proposed between the unilateral and bilateral electrode 
montages is the issue of possible interactions between two brain regions that 
have monosynaptic connections.  Previous work has hypothesized that the 
prominently inhibitory transcallosal connections between the motor cortices may 
act to enhance the excitatory and inhibitory effects of bilateral stimulation (Fusco 
et al., 2013; Mordillo-mateos et al., 2012).  According to this line of thought the 
cathode electrode over the contralateral M1 may lead to a decrease in 
transcallosal inhibition, accentuating the anodal effects of the ‘active’ electrode.  
And the opposite is expected for the anode electrode placed over the alternate 
M1, acting to increase transcallosal inhibition and further inhibiting the action of 
the ‘active’ cathodal electrode (Fusco et al., 2013; Sehm et al., 2013). This 
explanation is not supported by the current data, and such push-pull accounts of 
tDCS function have been criticized as highly over simplistic (Bestmann, de 
Berker,  Bonaiuto, 2015b). 
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On a wider note the current study highlights the premature acceptance present 
in the cognitive tDCS literature that anodal electrode is always excitatory and 
cathodal inhibitory, highlighting a failure to consider the importance of stimulation 
parameters in producing the effects of tDCS.  When considering the tDCS and 
decision-making literature, stimulation has been applied using bilateral montages 
(at 1 and 2mA) in all but one of the studies to date (Beeli, Koeneke, Gasser, & 
Jancke, 2008), yet all these studies used the assumption of anodal-excitation/ 
cathodal-inhibition to guide both study design and to explain the effects.  
Stimulation is applied to brain regions thought to be responsible for behaviour, 
with the anodal electrode being placed where increased excitation is 
hypothesized as beneficial, or the cathodal where increased inhibition is desired 
(Bestmann et al., 2015a).  In the case of Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) 
the DLPFC was chosen as the site of stimulation due to its role in the estimations 
of risk-taking during decision-making. In this study the assumption of anodal-
excitation/ cathodal- inhibition producing concurrent excitation and inhibition of 
bilateral DLPFC was used to explain the behavioural findings of reduced risk 
taking.  This explanation is not supported by results of the current study,  
examining the physiological effects of the type of stimulation applied in Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) (bilateral montage 2mA) does however offer an 
explanation for the non-replication findings in the previous chapter.  Importantly 
these concerns are not unique to Fecteau, Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) and 
extend to the wider decision-making and tDCS literature. 
 
In order for tDCS to be utilized to it’s full potential, the lesson to be learnt from 
the current study is that inferences about the effects of tDCS should only be made 
between studies that have used similar stimulation parameters. That being said 
it is important to note that the physiology in studies of cognitive neuromodulation 
should always be interpreted cautiously. Electrode positioning is an inherently 
difficult issue as the effects of montages other than those applied to the motor 
cortex can only be inferred indirectly. Although it is likely that the underlying 
mechanism are similar it is not clear to what extent these findings translate to 
other areas of the cortex, especially as poor correlations between visual and 
motor thresholds have been reported (Stewart, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2001).  
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Together, the results of the current study, the non- replication finding from the 
previous chapter and the broader context of a number of inconsistent findings 
within the decision-making and tDCS literature, question the validity of tDCS as 
a tool for modulating decision-making.  As such the original proposal of applying 
tDCS to the training of elite athletes is undermined.   
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4.6. Conclusion 
In sum, the findings of the current study show that the polarity dependent shifts 
in cortical excitability induced by unilateral electrode montages (experiment 1), 
were not evident using bilateral electrode montages and stimulating at either 1mA 
(experiment 2) or 2mA (experiment 3). This highlights that the effects of tDCS 
should not be taken for granted in the literature unless based on previous 
physiological work that has used similar parameters.  
 
These findings provide an explanation for the non-replication of Fecteau, 
Pascual-leone, et al., (2007) in Chapter 3, where tDCS was found to have no 
effect on risky decision-making.  Moreover they raise important concerns 
regarding the physiological assumptions of anodal-excitation/ cathodal- inhibition 
that underpin the rationale and justification of results in this study.  Bilateral 
montages are common in studies of cognitive neuromodulation and therefore 
these concerns extend to the wider decision-making and tDCS literature.  In 
combination, the results of Chapters 3 and 4 undermine the reliability of tDCS as 
a modulator of decision-making, and highlight that many studies in this field lack 
a physiological understanding of their effects.   As such the proposal to apply 
tDCS to decision-making in elite athletes is not supported.  In the following 
chapter the efficacy of a novel neuromodulatory method, tRNS, is assessed as 
possible alternative for decision-making training in elite athletes.  
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5.  Do the Physiological Effects of tRNS Transfer to Bilateral 
Montages and Increased Durations?  
5.1. Abstract 
Background: Previous chapters reported the modulation of decision-making by 
tDCS to be unreliable, with studies in this area lacking an understanding of their 
physiological effects.  These findings undermined tDCS as a potential candiate 
for application in elite athletes.  Instead, in the current chapter the eligibiltiy of an 
emerging neuromodulatory technique, hf-tRNS, is explored. hf-tRNS induces 
elevations in cortical excitability, via application of an alternating current at 
random frequencies (between 101-640 Hz).  Born out of the tDCS literature, our 
knowledge of these effects is based on work that applied stimulation for 10 
minutes applied with unilateral electrode montages (target over the M1 and 
reference over the contralateral orbit) (Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, Antal, & 
Paulus, 2008). There are a small number of studies that have applied hf-tRNS for 
cognitive neuromodulation.  Many of these studies have applied stimulation with 
parameters which differ from those used to produce the effects of increased 
excitation, in particular increased durations (20 minutes) and bilateral electrode 
montages.  Taking lessons from the previous chapter, here the underlying 
physiology of tRNS is explored.  Assessing the validity of the assumptions of 
excitation underpinning work in this field is an efficient way of establishing 
confidence in tRNS as a potential candidate for application in elite athletes.  
Moreover it will provide increased knowledge of the effects of this technique that 
may help guide subsequent application if this path is chosen.  
 
Objective:  To assess the influence of electrode montage (unilateral and 
bilateral) and stimulation durations (10 and 20 minutes) on the physiological 
effects of hf-tRNS.  
 
Method: In experiment 1, the effects of hf-tRNS applied using traditional 
parameters unilateral electrode montage (M1/contralateral orbit montage) and 
bilateral montages (left and right M1) were examined. Stimulation was applied for 
the standard duration of 10 minutes. In experiment 2, hf-tRNS was applied for 20 
minutes (using the traditional M1/contralateral orbit montage). Changes to 
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cortical excitability were measured using MEP amplitude, at 5 minute intervals for 
up to 30 minutes post stimulation.  
 
Results: In experiment 1, there was a significant effect of electrode montage 
(unilateral or bilateral) of hf-tRNS on MEP amplitudes. hf-tRNS delivered with 
unilateral montages was found to increase MEP amplitudes in comparison to 
baseline, indicative of induced elevations in cortical excitation.  This was not the 
case for hf-tRNS delivered with bilateral montages. In experiment 2, there was a 
significant effect of stimulation duration on MEP amplitude, there were no 
significant modulations of MEP amplitudes, pre and post stimulation. In both 
cases there is the assumption in the literature that despite changing these 
parameters the effects of stimulation are identical.  
 
Conclusion: These findings highlight that the neuroplastic - inducing 
mechanisms that underpin hf-tRNS are time dependent and sensitive to electrode 
montage.  Again, the findings highlight the importance for the cognitive 
neuromodulatory literature to not extrapolate the effects of these techniques 
beyond those that have been tested physiologically. The results of this chapter 
undermine the physiological assumption of excitation that is used to guide 
methodological design and interpret effects in many prior studies using this 
technique; therefore there is reduced confidence in tRNS as a candidate for 
application outside the laboratory. Together the findings of chapter 3, 4 and 5 led 
to the conculsion that tES are not robust enough to proceed with in investigations 
in elite athletes at this time. In the following chapter behavioural work with elite 
athletes is pursued in order to address the original goal of exploring decision-
making in elite sport.  
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5.2. Introduction  
One initial aim of the thesis was to explore the potential application of tES as a 
tool for improving decision-making in elite athletes. Findings from the previous 
chapters revealed the application of tDCS to decision-making to be unreliable, 
with studies in this field lacking an understanding of their physiological effects. In 
the preceeding chapter tRNS, a novel neuromodulatory approach is explored as 
a possible alternative.  
 
TRNS applies alternating currents, at random frequencies, via electrodes placed 
on the scalp.   The amplitude and frequency of oscillations are generated at 
random, within a range set by the experimenter.  Frequencies from a spectrum 
of 0.1-640 Hz can be selected, with narrower bands within this range routinely 
applied, namely 0.1-100Hz for low frequency tRNS (lf-tRNS), or 100-640 for high 
frequency tRNS (hf-tRNS) (Moreno-Duarte et al., 2014).   Using standard 
stimulation parameters (electrode position, intensity and duration) imported from 
the direct current literature, hf- tRNS has been shown to increase corticospinal 
excitability (Chaieb, Antal, & Paulus, 2015; Chaieb, Paulus, & Antal, 2011; Inukai 
et al., 2016; Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 2010b; Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, Antal, 
& Paulus, 2008). The classical study revealing the excitatory effects of hf-tRNS 
was Terney et al., (2008) who applied hf-tRNS  using an M1/contralateral orbit 
montage for a duration of ten minutes. Here sustained elevations in MEP 
amplitude lasting up to ninety minutes post stimulation were demonstrated (see 
Figure 2.4b).  
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While still in its infancy, the adoption of tRNS as a tool for cognitive 
neuromodulation is evident (Figure 2.1c). As with tDCS, work in this field has 
applied tRNS to modify cognitive functions by attempting to manipulate excitation 
in regions underpinning these abilities.  tRNS is often chosen for its bidirectional 
current which means it does not have the polarity constraints of tDCS.  In healthy 
participants, tRNS has been reported to facilitate motor (Terney et al., 2008) and 
perceptual learning (Fertonani, Pirulli, & Miniussi, 2011), to enhance abilities in 
mental arithmetic (Snowball et al., 2013), numerosity (Cappelletti et al., 2013) and 
face perception (Romanska, Rezlescu, Susilo, Duchaine, & Banissy, 2015). 
Modifications to political beliefs have also been reported (Chawke & Kanai, 
2015), as well as decrements on a probabilistic classification task (Ambrus et al., 
2011).  There are also initial investigations in its clinical utility to treat tinnitus 
symptoms (Vanneste, Fregni, & De Ridder, 2013),  and schizophrenia (Palm, 
Hasan, Keeser, Falkai, & Padberg, 2013).  In reviewing this literature, it is evident 
that the parameters used in the application of tRNS have deviated from which the 
original effects of increased motor cortex excitability were induced (Terney et al., 
2008), as seen previously with tDCS.   Yet the assumption of corticospinal 
excitation has guided the methodological design and interpretation of findings in 
these studies.  Two such parameters of divergence are duration of stimulation 
and electrode montage. In light of findings from the previous chapter it seems 
important to examine these core assumptions in order to evaluate the technique’s 
potential.  
 
Adapted from the tDCS literature durations of 10 minutes were used to establish 
the physiological effects of tRNS on the motor cortex (Terney et al., 2008). The 
standard duration employed by cognitive neuromodulatory studies of tRNS 
however is one twice this length of twenty minutes.  Previous studies have shown 
that duration is an important factor for determining the after-effects of brain 
stimulation.  With tDCS there is a minimal length of stimulation needed to induce 
after-effects (at 1mA this is 3 minutes) (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000), and a linear 
relationship between the length of application (5-13 minutes) and duration of after 
effects (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003).  However, this relationship 
does not extend indefinitely and in unpublished work by Paulus, Antal & Nitsche, 
(2013) it has been reported that increasing anodal stimulation from 13 to 26 
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minutes, changes the induced effect from excitation to inhibition.  Moreover, 
similar results have been reported for theta burst stimulation (TBS), when the 
duration of the TBS protocol is doubled there is a reversal of the effects from 
cortical excitation to inhibition (Gamboa, Antal, Moliadze, & Paulus, 2010).  The 
influence that stimulation duration has on the effects of tRNS is less well 
characterized. There has been one published study that has investigated 
stimulation duration with hf-tRNS, this focused upon the minimum duration 
needed to induce after-effects (Chaieb et al., 2011).  Induced elevations in 
corticospinal excitability were reported following 5 and 6 minutes yet after-effects 
were short lived compared to those induced after 10 minutes of stimulation.  
Despite tRNS commonly being applied for durations of 20 minutes, work 
documenting its effects for durations exceeding 10 minutes is lacking.   
 
Electrode placement is a further parameter of divergence. The physiological 
effects of hf-tRNS have been explored using the traditional unilateral montage 
with electrodes placed over the motor cortex (M1) and contralateral orbit (Chaieb 
et al., 2015, 2011; Inukai et al., 2016; Terney et al., 2008). Despite this bilateral 
electrode arrays, where electrodes are placed on the same region over opposing 
hemispheres, are commonly used in studies applying hf-tRNS to modulate 
cognition. Target sites are similar to those used with tDCS including the left and 
right PC (Cappelletti et al., 2013), and left and right DLFPC (Chawke & Kanai, 
2015; Snowball et al., 2013). The influence of electrode montage on the effects 
of tRNS has been investigated by one study which explored extra-cephalic 
montages, whereby one electrode is placed off the skull (Moliadze, Antal, & 
Paulus, 2010a).  The shifts in cortical excitability induced when hf-tRNS was 
applied using a unilateral montage were not present when stimulation was 
applied using a M1/contralateral upper arm montage.  If nothing else, this finding 
shows that the effects of hf-tRNS are dependent on electrode placement, which 
in itself is problematic for the assumption that hf-tRNS applied with unilateral and 
bilateral montages will produce identical effects.  Moreover, in light of the findings 
from the previous chapter whereby the effects of tDCS did not translate to 
bilateral montages, further investigations on this topic are warranted, especially 
before behavioural replication of findings using hf-tRNS are attempted.  
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The current study is motivated by concerns over the assumption that the effects 
of hf-tRNS, as demonstrated by studies of motor physiology, apply to all work 
employing this technique despite differing stimulation parameters.   An 
assumption implicitly imported from the tDCS literature and one which has been 
undermined by work in Chapter 3.  In order to investigate this the current study 
explores the underlying physiological effects of tRNS using parameters 
commonly applied in studies of cognitive neuromodulation, namely bilateral 
electrode placement and increased durations (20 minutes).   Assessing the 
validity of the assumptions underpinning work in this field is an efficient way of 
establishing confidence in tRNS as a potential candidate for  application in elite 
athletes (in comparison to performing behavioural replications for example).  
Moreover given that hf-tRNS is an emerging technique, increased knowledge of 
the effects will be useful to help guide the subsequent application of the 
technique, if this path is chosen. 
 
In order to investigate this, two experiments were performed, each of which 
assess the effects of hf-tRNS protocols through the measurement of corticospinal 
excitability via modulation of MEP amplitude.  In the first experiment to examine 
the influence of electrode montage, the effects of unilateral (left M1/right 
contralateral orbit) and bilateral (left M1/ right M1) electrode montages are 
examined.  Unilateral electrode montages replicate the parameters used in 
classical studies of motor physiology (Chaieb, Antal, & Paulus, 2015; Chaieb, 
Paulus, & Antal, 2011; Inukai et al., 2016; Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, Antal, & 
Paulus, 2008) while bilateral placements were chosen due to their use in a 
number of studies of neuroenhancement to date (e.g. Cappelletti et al., 2013; 
Popescu et al., 2016; Romanska et al., 2015; Vanneste et al., 2013). In each 
case 10 minutes of stimulation were delivered.  In the second experiment the 
influence of stimulation duration is investigated.  Using a unilateral electrode 
montage, hf-tRNS is applied for 20 minutes, a duration common place in studies 
of cognitive neuroenhancement (e.g. Cappelletti et al., 2013; Chawke & Kanai, 
2015; Palm et al., 2013; Popescu et al., 2016; Romanska et al., 2015; Vanneste 
et al., 2013).  These effects will be compared to the unilateral condition in 
experiment 1 which applies stimulation for 10 minutes, this represents the 
duration that is used in classical studies of motor physiology.  
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5.3. Methods 
5.3.1. Participants  
5.3.1.1. Experiment 1: Electrode Montage  
There were ten datasets collected in the unilateral-tRNS (10mins) condition and 
eight datasets collected in the bilateral-tRNS (10mins) condition. One participant 
was was excluded from the bilateral-tRNS condition due to experimenter error. 
Therefore a total of seventeen participants took part in the experiment (10 female, 
mean age: 21 age range 19-25).  
 
5.3.1.2. Experiment 2:  Duration 
Ten participants took part in the unilateral-tRNS 20 minutes condition (5 female; 
mean age 20; age range 19-23).  Two of these participants were later excluded 
due to experimental error. These data was compared to the unilateral-tRNS 10 
minutes condition collected in experiment 1. 
 
Upon expressing an interest in participating, subjects were screened to determine 
their eligibility to take part in brain stimulation research (no history of acute or 
chronic medical, neurological or psychiatric diseases, not currently taking any 
medication and no problematic metallic implants). Those with any 
contraindications were not recruited.  All participants were right hand dominant 
as indicated by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). In 
accordance with previous work there was a wash out period of at 3 days where 
participants must not have taken part in brain stimulation research for this 
duration to avoid carry over effects (Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 
2008).  All participants gave written informed consent and were financially 
compensated at the standard rate for cognitive neuroscience studies.  The study 
and consent procedures were approved by UCL ethics committee in accordance 
with the declaration of Helskini. 
 
 
 
 124 
5.3.2. Experimental Protocol  
A between subjects design was used. In experiment 1 the participants were 
randomized by gender to one of two conditions (unilateral or bilateral tRNS). In 
experiment 1 & 2 each condition followed a similar procedure (Figure 5.1). 
Following consent and study explanation, participants were seated in a chair, with 
their hands resting on a pillow. Surface EMG electrodes were attached to the 
right  hand, following a skin abrasive procedure. The site for TMS assessment 
was identified, i.e. the coil location which produced the largest MEP amplitude in 
the right hand.  Once located, this was marked, as was the coil orientation  used 
to produce it, in order to ensure consistency of placement.  The TMS intensity 
was adjusted to elicit MEPs with peak-to-peak amplitudes of approximately 1mV, 
which was used throughout the study.   15 MEP baseline measurement were 
recorded.  Following this hf-tRNS was adminstered, the precise stimulation 
parameters depended on experimental condition (Figure 5.1). Immediately 
following hf-tRNS, electrodes were removed and the scalp was cleaned.  Post 
stimulation 10 MEPs were recorded at five- minute intervals for a duration of thirty 
minutes (5,10,15,20,25,30 minutes post stimulation). While participants knew 
what type of stimulation they were receiving, they were not made of aware of the 
precise experimental hypothesis until after the experiment, when they were 
appropiately debriefed and paid at the standard rate for participation.  
 
5.3.3. TRNS 
TRNS was delivered by a battery-driven constant current stimulator (Neuroconn, 
Germany) and administered via a standard pair of rubber conductive electrodes 
(size 5x7 cm, surface area of 35cm2).  The electrode size replicated that used by 
cognitive neuromodulatory studies in this field, but differed from those used in 
Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, (2008) -  where the stimulation 
electrode over the M1 was 4x4 cm and the reference electrode over the 
contralateral orbit was 6x14 cm.  To avoid potential problems of water leakage 
with the saline soaked sponge method (Woods et al., 2016) the electrodes were 
attached to the scalp with conductive paste and held in place with two rubber 
straps.   
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In all conditions high frequency random noise was selected with alternating 
currents randomly selected from 101-640 Hz and an offset of 0. The current 
intensity was 1mA peak-to peak, with each sample being drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean 0 μA, and with 99% of all generated amplitude values lying 
between −500 μA and +500 μA.  A 20 second fade in/ fade out period was used. 
Two different electrode montages were examined in experiment 1, and an 
extended duration was examined in experiment 2.  
5.3.3.1. Experiment 1: Electrode Montage 
hf-tRNS was applied using either a unilateral montage or bilateral montage.  In 
the unilateral montage condition, one electrode was fixed over the left M1, the 
other was placed horizontally over the right contralateral orbit.  This montage was 
used to replicate the electrode positioning used in previous work of motor 
physiology. For the bilateral montage the electrodes were placed over the left and 
right M1. M1 electrodes were located with the center of the electrode positioned 
over the site for TMS assessment. In both conditions stimulation was delievered 
for a duration of ten minutes. 
 
5.3.3.2. Experiment 2: Duration  
In experiment two, hf-tRNS was applied using a unilateral montage, where the 
electrodes were fixed over the left M1 (placed over the site located for TMS 
assessment), and over the right contralateral orbit.  In this experiment stimulation 
was delivered for 20 minutes.  This was compared to the unilateral condition of 
experiment 1 that delivered stimulation for 10 minutes.   
 
5.3.4. Measurement of Motor Cortex Excitability 
To detect changes in the corticospinal excitability, MEPs elicted by single pulse 
TMS were recorded in the FDI muscle.  This method is described in detail Section 
4.3.4.  In short TMS was delivered to the left M1 (using a Magstim Rapid 200 
Stimulator (Magstim Company, Whitland, Dyfed, UK), at a site identified as the 
‘motor hotspot’ the location which elicited the largest MEP amplitude.  The 
intenisty of the TMS stimulus was adjusted to elicit an MEP of approximately 1 
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MV. The intensity was recorded and then used throughout the testing session.  
An MEP amplitude of 1mA was used as this is moderate amplitude that allows 
for possible enhancements or reductions without ceiling or floor effects (Wiethoff, 
Hamada, & Rothwell, 2014). Surface EMG was used to measure changes in the 
right FDI hand muscles, via disposable adhesive disc electrodes (Ag-AgCl) which 
were placed in a belly tendon montage.  Peak-to-peak MEP amplitude were 
recorded with a sampling rate of 3kHz using an automatic acquisition system 
(Brainsight, Rogue Research, Montréal, Québec, Canada).  Fifteen consecutive 
MEPs where collected as baseline measurements prior to hf-tRNS. Post hf-tRNS 
blocks of 10 consecutive MEPs were recorded at each timepoint. 
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Figure 5.1: Top image: The tRNS parameters used in each experimental condition.  Bottom image:  The experimental procedure: 
The motor hotspot was identified and TMS threshold intensity was adjusted per subject to give a peak-to-peak amplitude of approx 
1mA. 15 baseline MEPs of the right FDI muscle were recorded.  tRNS was applied, the parameters used were determined by 
experimental condition.  Post stimulation MEPs were recorded to determine changes in corticospinal excitability, 10 measurements 
were taken at 5-minute intervals for half an hour 
 
5.3.5.  Data Analysis  
For evaluation of corticospinal excitability, the peak-to-peak amplitude of MEPs 
was measured in the 15-50ms window after the TMS trigger.  This was carried 
out automatically using BrainSight 3.10b software (Brainsight, Rogue Research, 
Montréal, Québec, Canada).  The mean peak-to-peak amplitudes were 
calculated for each time point per subject. These included the first 10 (post 
stimulation) or 15 (baseline) consecutive MEPs that were recorded.  Trials with 
more than 15 microvolts background EMG activity for 100ms pre-stimulation were 
discarded.  The mean peak-to-peak amplitudes recorded post stimulation were 
then normalized to baseline and expressed as the ratio of MEP amplitude 
obtained after tDCS compared to the MEP amplitude obtained before tDCS 
(amplitude after/ amplitude before).   
 
5.3.5.1. Experiment 1: Electrode Montage  
In order to assess the influence of electrode montage, the shifts in cortical 
excitability induced by hf-tRNS with unilateral and bilateral electrode montages 
were compared. A mixed model ANOVA was undertaken on normalized MEP 
amplitudes, this had a between subject factor of montage (2 levels: unilateral, 
bilateral electrode placement) and a within subject factor of time (6 levels: 
5,10,15,20,25,30 minutes). The Machley’s test of Sphericity was performed and 
Greenhouse Geisser correction applied where necessary.   Post hoc 
comparisons were undertaken using independent samples t-tests (one sample). 
Additionally, in order to determine whether there were significant shifts from 
baseline, paired t-tests (one sample) were undertaken for each stimulation 
condition (using un- normalized values). The t-tests were not corrected for 
multiple comparisons as this is equivalent to Fishers LSD correction which is 
standard use in studies in this field (Batsikadze et al., 2013; Kidgell, Goodwill, 
Frazer, & Daly, 2013; Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 2010; Nitsche et al., 2003; 
Nitsche & Paulus, 2001).  
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5.3.5.2. Experiment 2: Duration  
In order to assess the influence of stimulation duration, the shifts in cortical 
excitability induced by hf-tRNS applied for 10 and 20 minutes were compared. As 
described in experiment 1, a mixed model ANOVA were undertaken on 
normalized MEP amplitudes.  This had a between subject factor of stimulation 
duration (2 levels: 10 or 20 minutes) and within factor of time post stimulation (6 
levels: 5,10,15,20,25,30 minutes).  As described previously, post hoc tests were 
undertaken using independent samples t-tests.  In order to determine whether 
there were significant shifts from baseline, paired t-tests were undertaken for 
each stimulation type (using un- normalized values). The t-tests were not 
corrected for multiple comparisons as this is equivalent to Fishers LSD which is 
standard use in similar studies.  
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Experiment 1:Electrode Montage 
 The ANOVA analysis revealed a significant effect of electrode montage 
(F(1,15)=6.23, p<0.05), no significant effect of timepoint post stimulation 
(F(5,75)=0.95, p=0.46), and no significant interaction of time and polarity 
(F(5,75)=0.58, p=0.72) (Figure 4.3).    
 
Post hoc independent samples t-tests revealed that there were significant 
differences in MEP amplitudes following unilateral and bilateral stimulation at 5 
(t(15)=2.37, p<0.05), 15 (t(15)=2.84, p<0.01) 25 (t(15)=2.13, p<0.05) 30 (t(15)=2.04, 
p<0.05) minutes post stimulation.  
 
Paired t-tests comparing baseline (i.e. unadjusted) MEP amplitude values to each 
timepoint post stimulation revealed that, for unilateral hf-tRNS MEP amplitude 
was significantly higher than baseline at timepoints 5 (t(9)=-2.05, p<0.05), 10 (t(9)=-
1.95, p<0.05), 15 (t(9)=-2.84, p<0.01), 20 (t(9)=-2.08, p<0.05) and 30 (t(9)=-1.98, 
p<0.05) minutes post stimulation. These results suggest that, in accordance with 
previous studies, corticospinal excitability is increased by unilateral hf-tRNS to 
the M1.  
 
For bilateral hf-tRNS, paired t-tests revealed that MEP amplitudes did not 
significantly differ from baseline at the majority of timepoint post stimulation. At 
25 minutes post stimulation there was a significant decrease in MEP amplitude 
in relation to baseline (t(6)=2.05, p<0.05).  
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Figure 5.2: Results for experiment 1- electrode montage: Timecourse of 
normalised MEP amplitude following 10 minutes of hf-tRNS applied with 
unilateral (left M1/ right contralateral orbit montage; green line) and bilateral (left 
M1/ right M1; purple line) electrode montages. Electrode montage had a 
significant effect on normalised MEP amplitude. * denotes  significant differences 
between the after effects of unilateral and bilateral electrode montages at a 
particular timepoint (p<0.05).  MEPs amplitudes were significantly larger relative 
to baseline (indicated by solid circles) at 5, 10,15,20 and 30 minutes post 
stimulation for unilateral montages, which was not the case for bilateral 
montages.  
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5.4.2. Experiment 2: Duration  
The ANOVA analysis revealed a significant effect of stimulation duration 
(F(1,16)=5.50, p<0.05), no significant effect of timepoint post stimulation 
(F(5,80)=1.20, p=0.32) and a no significant interaction of stimulation duration and 
time post stimulation (F(5,80)=0.50, p=0.98) (Figure 4.4).  
 
Post hoc independent samples t-test revealed there were significant differences 
in MEP amplitudes 10 and 20 minutes of tRNS, at 5 minutes (t(16)=1.97, p<0.05), 
10 (t(16)=2.02, p<0.05), 15 (t(16)=2.31, p<0.05), 20 (t(16)=2.24, p<0.05), 25 minutes 
(t(16)=1.85, p<0.05) and 30 (t(16)=1.81, p<0.05) minutes post stimulation. 
 
Paired t-tests comparing baseline (i.e. unadjusted) MEP amplitude values to each 
timepoint post stimulation revealed that, following 20 minutes of  hf-tRNS, MEP 
amplitudes did not significantly differ from baseline at any of the timepoints. This 
was not the case for hf-tRNS delivered for 10 minutes, for which the  data is 
presented in experiment 1. 
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Figure 5.3: Results for experiment 2- duration: Timecourse of normalised 
MEP amplitude following 10 (green) and 20 minutes (orange) of hf-tRNS applied 
with a unilateral montage (left M1/ right contralateral orbit montage).  Stimulation 
duration had a significant effect on normalised MEP amplitudes and 10 minutes 
of tRNS induced elevations in the MEP amplitude in comparison to 20 minutes of 
tRNS at all timepoints post stimulation.  *Denotes a  significant difference 
between the after effects of 10 and 20 minutes of hf-tRNS at a particular 
timepoint.  Hf-tRNS delivered for 20 minutes did not induce significant shifts in 
MEP amplitudes relative to baseline. 
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5.5. Discussion  
In order to establish confidence in hf-tRNS as a potential candidate for application 
in elite athletes, it was necessary to investigate the influence of stimulation 
parameters, electrode montage (experiment 1) and duration (experiment 2), on 
the after effects of tRNS. Findings from the current study demonstrate that the 
assumptions of increased corticospinal excitation were not evident for bilateral 
electrode montages (experiment 1) and increased stimulation durations of 20 
minutes (experiment 2), parameters that are routine in the application of tRNS for 
cognitive enhancement.  These findings raise concerns regarding the 
physiological assumptions that underpin the rationale for application in many 
studies applying this technique.   
The findings from experiment 1 reveal that electrode montage influences the 
effects of hf-tRNS. In particular, hf-tRNS delivered via a unilateral montage were 
shown to significantly differ from those induced via bilateral montage for the 
majority of timepoints post stimulation.  Using parameters similar to those which 
have established the physiological effects of tRNS, namely unilateral montages 
for 10 minutes, a replication of increased corticospinal excitability (as evidenced 
by elevations in MEP amplitude in comparison to baseline) was observed 
(Chaieb, Paulus, & Antal, 2011; Inukai et al., 2016; Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 
2010; Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 2008).  In these studies the 
excitatory after-effects were observed using an active electrode (over M1) of 
4x4cm and reference electrode of 6x14cm.  Computational modeling (Faria, 
Hallett, & Miranda, 2012) and experimental work (Bastani & Jaberzadeh, 2013) 
suggest smaller electrodes produce more focal, effective and localized neuronal 
modulation than larger ones.  In the current study both electrodes were sized 5x7 
(35 cm2) to replicate conditions in studies of cognitive neuromodulation (e.g. 
Cappelletti et al., 2013; Chawke & Kanai, 2015; Palm, Hasan, Keeser, Falkai, & 
Padberg, 2013; Popescu et al., 2016), the observation that increases in 
corticospinal excitability extends to this electrode size is useful.  
When stimulation was delivered via bilateral electrode montages (for durations of 
10 minutes) there were no significant elevations in MEP amplitudes in 
comparison to baseline, for the majority of timepoints post stimulation. The 
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findings that bilateral M1 montages are less effective at inducing elevations in 
corticospinal excitability replicates those from the previous chapter which applied 
tDCS, as well as those from a number of other studies that have demonstrated 
the importance of the positioning of the return electrode in inducing the effects 
TES (Moliadze et al., 2010; Mordillo-Mateos et al., 2012; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000).  
There are now two alternate electrode montages explored in the tRNS literature, 
other than the conventional M1/contralateral orbit montage.  The other is 
M1/contralateral upper arm, which has additionally been shown to not be effective 
at inducing increases in corticospinal excitation (Moliadze et al., 2010).  The 
explanation proposed as to why electrode montage may be a crucial factor in 
inducing shifts in corticospinal excitability, is that this changes the spatial locality 
and depth of current flow, as well as the degree to which current may be shunted 
across the cortex (Bestmann, de Berker, & Bonaiuto, 2015; Bikson, Rahman, & 
Datta, 2012; Datta et al., 2010; Faria et al., 2012; Miranda, Faria, & Hallett, 2009). 
Moreover with bilateral montages there is the possibility of interactions with 
regions that are monosynaptically connected (Kimura, 1967). 
Experiment 2 examined the influence of increased stimulation duration on the 
effects of hf-tRNS.  The findings demonstrate duration of stimulation to influence 
the after-effects of hf-tRNS, in particular hf-tRNS delivered for 10 minutes 
produced significantly elevated corticospinal excitability in comparison to that 
delivered at all timepoints measured. Moreover there were no significant changes 
in MEP amplitude following 20 minutes of tRNS, in comparison to baseline, at 
any timepoint post stimulation.  Therefore the classical effects of increased 
corticospinal excitation were not observed using stimulation with a duration of 20 
minutes.  
Previous work has shown that durations of five minutes of hf-tRNS stimulation 
are necessary to induce elevations in corticospinal excitability. Stimulation for 5 
minutes induced a significant increase in MEP amplitude at one timepoint – 10 
minutes post stimulation only (Chaieb et al., 2011). With 10 minutes of hf-tRNS 
these after-effects are much more robust (Terney et al., 2008).  The results of the 
current study show that at longer durations of 20 minutes, this linear relationship 
of duration of stimulation and magnitude of after effects breaks down and hf-tRNS 
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becomes less effective at increasing cortical excitability.   As tRNS is a novel 
technique its mechanism of action is not yet well defined (possible mechanisms 
are outlined by Antal & Herrmann, 2016), the results of the current study suggest 
however that this mechanism is time dependent. The reason for the reduction in 
MEP amplitude at longer durations is not clear, although with other 
neuromodulatory techniques, namely anodal tDCS (Paulus, Antal & Nitsche, 
2013), TBS and TMS (Gamboa, Antal, Moliadze, & Paulus, 2010), longer 
stimulation durations have been reported to change the induced effects on 
cortical excitability from excitation to inhibition.  These findings indicate that there 
are neuronal inhibitory mechanisms that have a delayed onset when exposed to 
excitatory protocols, and similar mechanisms may be at play with tRNS.  
Together these findings illustrate the importance of stimulation parameters, 
duration and electrode montage in the application of hf-tRNS, which has 
implications for studies of cognitive neuromodulation. Stimulation durations of 20 
minutes (e.g. Cappelletti et al., 2013; Chawke & Kanai, 2015; Palm, Hasan, 
Keeser, Falkai, & Padberg, 2013; Popescu et al., 2016; Romanska, Rezlescu, 
Susilo, Duchaine, & Banissy, 2015; Vanneste, Fregni, & De Ridder, 2013) and 
bilateral electrode placement (e.g. Cappelletti et al., 2013; Popescu et al., 2016; 
Romanska et al., 2015; Vanneste et al., 2013) are common in the application of 
tRNS to produce cognitive enhancement. The use of tRNS in such studies is 
predicated on the assumption of increased cortical excitation, in particular this 
premise is used to guide study design and interpret effects.  For example tRNS 
is often chosen to induce shifts in cortical excitation that are comparable, if not 
enhanced, and without polarity constraints of tDCS (Inukai et al., 2016; Paulus, 
Nitsche, & Antal, 2016).   The results here highlight that neither a duration of 20 
minutes nor bilateral placements are adequate for this goal.  Moreover the 
principle of increased corticospinal excitation is applied in the interpretation of 
results and while the findings of the current study do not dispute the behavioural 
effects, they do question the validity of the physiological explanations based on 
increased cortical excitation.  Notably the application of tRNS is in it infancy in 
comparison to the other neuromodulatory techniques (Paulus et al., 2016), 
however in order for the field to progress in a way that is useful to understanding 
underlying neural mechanisms (and not just inducing behavioural effects) it is 
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important for tRNS to be applied using parameters for which the physiological 
effects have been observed.   
The reliability of behavioural findings induced by tES, as well as an understanding 
of why these effects occur, have been highlighted as issues that need to be 
addressed in order to assess the use of these techniques outside of the 
laboratory (Parkin et al., 2015; Walsh, 2013).  As seen in the tDCS literature, the 
findings from the current study undermine the physiological assumptions that 
guide work that has applied tRNS for cognitive neuromodulation.  As such the 
use of tRNS as a possible candidate for application in elite athletes is 
undermined. Together the findings from chapter 2, 3 and 4 suggest that, despite 
the potential suggested and a small number of studies highlighting tES as a tool 
to modulate abilities underlying performance in athletes (Alves et al., 2013; 
Banissy & Muggleton, 2013; Okano et al., 2015; Reardon, 2016), these 
techniques are not robust enough to continue with use in elite-athletes at this 
time.  As a result behavioural work in elite athletes is pursued in the following 
chapters. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the findings of the current study show that duration of stimulation 
and electrode montage are important factors in determining the excitatory effects 
of hf-tRNS.  The assumptions of corticospinal excitation may not extend to 
stimulation parameters that are common in the application of this technique, 
namely bilateral montages and 20 minutes of stimulation. Yet studies applying 
tRNS have used the assumption of corticospinal excitation to guide 
methodological design and interpret effects.   The results of this chapter highlight 
that any understanding of the physiological underpinning of behavioural effects 
is lacking, therefore there is reduced confidence in tRNS as a candidate for 
application outside of the laboratory.  Together the findings from chapter 3, 4 and 
5 highlight that the behavioural findings, and physiological understanding of the 
results of studies employing tES for cognitive neuromodulation are not robust 
enough to continue with application to elite athletes at this time.  
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6.  Decision-making Under Physical Pressure in Elite 
Athletes 
6.1. Abstract 
Background: The cognitive skills required during sport are highly demanding; 
accurate decisions based on the processing of dynamic environments are made 
in a fraction of a second (Walsh, 2014). Optimal decision-making abilities are 
crucial for success in sporting competition (Bar-Eli, Plessner, & Raab, 2011; 
Kaya, 2014). Moreover, for the elite athlete, decision-making occurs under 
conditions of intense mental and physical pressure (Anshel & Wells, 2000), yet 
much of the work in this area has largely ignored the highly stressful context in 
which athletes operate (Hepler, 2015). A number of studies have shown that 
conditions of elevated pressure influence athletes decision quality (Kinrade, 
Jackson, & Ashford, 2015; Smith et al., 2016), response times (Hepler, 2015; 
Smith et al., 2016), as well as risk-taking (Pighin, Savadori, & Bonini, 2015). 
However almost all of this work has been undertaken in non-elite athletes and 
participants that do not routinely operate under conditions of high stress. Thus, 
there is very little known about the influence of pressure on decision-making in 
elite athletes. 
 
Objective: A key aim of this chapter was to examine how to apply and develop 
psychological insights useful to elite sport. The current study investigated the 
influence of physical performance pressure on decision-making in a sample of 
world-class elite athletes. This allowed an examination of whether findings from 
previous work in non-elite athletes extend to those who routinely operate under 
conditions of high stress. How this work could be applied to improve insight and 
understanding of decision-making among sport professionals is examined.  
 
Method: 23 elite athletes, classified as ‘world-class’ and ‘successful-elite’ 
(Swann et al., 2015), took part in the study. These athletes compete and have 
frequent success at an international level, and include 6 Olympic medal winners. 
Tasks relating to three categories of decision-making were undertaken under 
conditions of low and high physical pressure.  Decision-making under risk was 
measured with performance on the CGT (Rogers et al., 1999), decision-making 
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under uncertainty with the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002), and fast reactive 
responses and interference with the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). Performance 
pressures of physical exhaustion were induced via an exercise protocol 
consisting of intervals of maximal exertion undertaken on a watt bike.  
 
Results: At a group level, under physical pressure elite athletes were faster to 
respond to control trials on the Stroop task and to simple probabilistic choices on 
the CGT. Physical pressure was also found to increase risk-taking for decisions 
where probability outcomes were explicit (on the CGT), but did not affect risk-
taking when probability outcomes were unknown (on the BART). There were no 
significant correlations in the degree to which individuals’ responses changed 
under pressure across the three tasks, suggesting that individual elite athletes 
did not show consistent responses to physical pressure across measures of 
decision-making. When assessing the applicability of results based on group 
averages to individual athletes, none of the sample showed an ‘average’ 
response (within 1SD of the mean) to pressure across all three decision-making 
tasks. 
 
Conclusion: There are three points of conclusion. First, an immediate scientific 
point that highlights a failure of transfer evidence reported from non-elite athletes 
to elite athletes in the area of decision-making under pressure. Second, a 
practical conclusion with respect to the application of this work to the elite sporting 
environment, which highlights the limitations of statistical approaches based on 
group averages and thus the beneficial use of individualized profiling in feedback 
sessions. Third, the application of this work in a sports setting is described, in 
particular the development and implementation of a decision-making taxonomy 
as a framework to conceptualize and communicate psychological skills among 
elite sporting professionals 
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6.2. Introduction 
Optimal decision-making is a crucial component of successful performance in 
sporting competition (Bar-Eli, Plessner, & Raab, 2011; Kaya, 2014). A significant 
factor often overlooked in previous work in this area is the context in which 
decisions are made (Hepler, 2015). In particular, elite athletes routinely operate 
under a diverse array of mental and physical pressure. Commonly cited sources 
of acute stress include physical exhaustion, crowd noise and physical injury, as 
well as the psychological impact of errors, negative feedback from the crowd, 
coaches and teammates, interpersonal conflict, rivalry and the pressure to obtain 
highly valued awards (Anshel & Wells, 2000; Mellalieu, Neil, Hanton, & Fletcher, 
2009). Given such a demanding environment, it is not uncommon for athletes to 
perform significantly below expectation despite high levels of motivation, a 
phenomenon termed ‘choking’ (Beilock & Gray, 2007). Indeed, reduced 
performance when pressure is at its greatest has been shown even at an elite 
level. For instance, analysis of European Championship football penalty 
shootouts (from 1976-2004) revealed significant differences in performance 
under high versus low pressure. Players perform worse (62% success rate) for 
penalty shots which would cost the team winning the game (high pressure) when 
compared to penalty shots which would secure the team the win (lower pressure, 
92% success rate) (Jordet & Hartman, 2008). Similarly, analysis of Professional 
Golfing Association tournaments scores (from 1983-2010) showed that 
professional golfers played worse on the final round, when pressure is at its 
highest, compared to the penultimate round of a tournament (Wells & 
Skowronski, 2012). 
 
There are a handful of studies that have explored decision-making in the sporting 
domain under conditions of high pressure. These studies tend to examine non-
elite athlete’s decision quality and reaction times to sport specific decision-
making tasks (rather than the cognitive processes underlying decision-making 
such as risk-taking).   In these studies performance pressure is operationalized 
in a variety of ways that fall into broad categories of psychological and physical.  
Psychological performance pressure has been shown to impair task performance 
in non-elite athletes. For example  (conditions of elevated social evaluation) was 
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reported to negatively impact the decision quality of novice basketball players but 
only in highly complex game scenarios (Kinrade et al., 2015). Moreover, mental 
exhaustion (induced by performance of the Stroop task for 30 minutes) was 
shown to impair decision accuracy and response times of non elite athletes on a 
football specific decision-making task (Smith et al., 2016). Hepler (2015) 
compared mental and physical pressure in non elite athletes and found that the 
time taken to generate decision outcomes was longer under conditions of mental 
stress (performance on a dual subtraction task), while conditions of physical 
exertion had no effect. 
 
Other studies have focused on the physical performance pressure of intense 
physical exertion. A recent review paper examined the influence of physical load 
on perceptual- cognitive tasks in athletes of differing levels of expertise.  This 
revealed that the inverted-U relationship between physical exertion and reaction 
times established in non-athletic samples - with moderate exertion inducing a 
facilitatory effect while high intensity exertion inducing a detrimental effect on 
reaction times – did not extend to expert athletes. Expert athletes were found to 
show a general facilitation in response time measures under conditions of both 
moderate and intense physical pressure, and were more positively affected than 
novice athletes. (Schapschröer, Lemez, Baker, & Schorer, 2016).  While, the 
review had a broad inclusion criterion of an expert athlete including all those 
competing at a national level, it importantly highlighted athletic expertise as an 
important factor in determining the influence of physical pressure on indicators of 
performance.   
 
There have been two studies to date that examined the influence of physical 
pressure on risk-taking both undertaken in non elite athletes. One found physical 
exertion to increase risk taking on the BART in a sample of male adolescent 
athletes (Black et al., 2012).  The other reported physical exertion to induce an 
increase in risk taking in male and decrease in risk-taking in female athletes on 
the BART (Pighin et al., 2015).   
 
These results are similar to that found in laboratory studies that have examined 
the precise influence that stress (operationalized as elevated cortisol levels) has 
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on decision-making (for a review see Starcke & Brand, 2012). The majority of 
these studies report increased risk-taking under conditions of elevated stress for 
both decisions made under uncertainty, (similar to those reported previously) 
(Lighthall et al., 2009; Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007; van den 
Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 2009), and also for decisions made under risk where 
probability outcomes are known (Pabst, Schoofs, Pawlikowski, Brand, & Wolf, 
2013; Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008). In line with Pighin et al., 
(2015) a number have additionally reported an interaction with gender, where 
males show increased risk-taking, while females show decreased risk-taking, 
under conditions of acute stress (Lighthall et al., 2009, 2012; Preston et al., 2007).  
Possible mechanisms proposed to explain modulations to risk taking include the 
detrimental influence of cortisol on higher order cognitive processes that supports 
decision-making such as inhibition (Starcke, Wiesen, Trotzke, & Brand, 2016) 
and working memory (Schoofs, Preuß, & Wolf, 2008). It is thought that this results 
in a loss of top-down control and increased stimulus-driven behaviours (Buckert, 
Schwieren, Kudielka, & Fiebach, 2014b). Moreover increased cortisol has been 
proposed to alter reward and loss processing possibly leading to increased 
dopaminergic signaling in the striatum (Buckert et al., 2014b; Starcke & Brand, 
2012). 
 
Due to the difficulties of access to elite populations, most of the research 
examining decision-making under pressure in sport has been undertaken with 
undergraduate students or non-elite athletes. By the very nature of training and 
selection of ‘world class’ abilities, elite athletes may perform differently. 
Unsurprisingly, expertise has been shown to affect decision-making, with elite 
athletes making faster, more accurate decisions (Vaeyens, Lenoir, Williams, 
Mazyn, & Philippaerts, 2007) and showing greater knowledge of possible 
decision outcomes than those with less experience (Williams, Davids, & Williams, 
1999). Furthermore, skilled athletes show faster responses on simple choice 
reaction time tasks compared to novices following acute physical exertion 
(Schapschröer et al., 2016). Therefore elite athletes may show more resilience to 
the effects of performance pressure than is evident in the literature, as they are 
well equipped and practiced at operating under conditions of limited resources. 
On the other hand, elite athletes may also be subject to the detrimental effects of 
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performance pressure, along with their more inexperienced counterparts. Indeed 
the presence of ‘choking’ is well documented in elite athletic performances 
(Jordet & Hartman, 2008; Wells & Skowronski, 2012). In addition, highly skilled 
athletes have been found to verbalize more technical rules under competitive 
stress, suggesting a possible regression to earlier stage of learning (Whitehead, 
Taylor, & Polman, 2015).  
 
In light of previous work which a) explored decision-making in sport which has 
largely ignored the context in which decisions occur, and b) has been mostly 
studied in non-elite participants, the aim of the current study is to investigate how 
decision-making is influenced by performance pressure in a sample of elite 
athletes. A key motivation of this research is to examine how it can be useful for 
applied populations, namely the internationally elite athletes included in the 
sample.  
 
In the current study, world class elite athletes undertook tasks assessing three 
categories of decision-making under low and high physical performance 
pressure. Decision-making under risk was examined via performance of the CGT 
(Rogers et al., 1999), decision-making under uncertainty via the BART (Lejuez, 
Read, et al., 2003) and fast reactive responses and interference via the Stroop 
task (Stroop, 1935). Performance pressure was induced by a physical exhaustion 
protocol consisting of intervals of maximal exertion exercise on an wattbike. This 
was chosen to mimic one of the most pertinent pressures that elite athletes are 
routinely exposed to. decision-making in the elite sporting environment. The 
results of the study will shed light on whether these different categories of 
decision-making are influenced by physical pressure in elite athletes, and 
therefore examine whether findings in the current literature transfer from non-elite 
to elite athletes. Additionally, the study will examine whether individual responses 
to pressure were consistent across the three types of decision-making. Lastly, 
the study will discuss the application of this work in a sports setting. 
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6.3. Methods 
6.3.1. Participants  
The sample consisted of 23 elite athletes (12 males) aged 23-36 years (mean 
age: 28).  All athletes belonged to a national training program for competition in 
the upcoming Olympic Games (Rio 2016). They all fell within the ‘world-class’ 
and ‘successful-elite’ expertise categories defined by Swann et al (2015). To 
emphasize the international caliber of the athletes, all had represented the UK at 
world-class championships and six were medal winners at London 2012 or 
Beijing 2008. All athletes included in the sample were from the same sport and 
enrolled on the same Team GB training program. The approximate average age 
of entry to this sport was 8 years, thus these elite athletes had approximately 20 
years experience in their given domain.  
 
Recruitment occurred with the assistance of Team GB Sport Psychologists and 
Coaches during a 7- day residential training camp. The squad was initially 
informed of the aims and procedures of the study during a group meeting. Upon 
expressing interest, a testing session was scheduled, during which the aims and 
procedures were re-explained and written informed consent obtained from each 
athlete. While there was no financial compensation for participation, a cash prize 
was awarded to the top three performers on the BART to add a competitive 
element into task performance. Upon completion, in conjunction with a Team GB 
Sports Psychologists, each athlete received a detailed debrief. The study and 
consent procedures were approved by the UCL ethics board in compliance with 
the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.  
 
6.3.2. Experimental Protocol  
A within-subject design was used, whereby the decision-making of elite athletes 
was assessed under conditions of low and high physical pressure (Figure 6.1). 
Each participant was tested within a single session, at a Team GB training facility. 
Performance on three tasks was recorded namely the BART (Lejuez, Read, et 
al., 2003), the CGT (Rogers et al., 1999) and the Stroop task (Stroop., 1935).  
Initially participants were presented with instructions and undertook a short 
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practice of each task. Participants then performed the decision-making tasks ‘at 
rest’, i.e. in the absence of any additional performance pressure. Under 
conditions of physical performance pressure, participants performed these tasks 
immediately following a protocol of intense physical exertion on a watt bike 
(further description of the protocol below). Performance of CGT always followed 
one of the physical exertion sessions, and performance of the BART and Stroop 
proceeded the other session (the latter two tasks being paired together as they 
were of shorter duration), the order in which the decision-making tasks were 
undertaken was counterbalanced across participants. All responses were made 
via a button press (for the Stroop) or a mouse click (for the BART and CGT), 
which were recorded automatically and entered into subsequent analyses. After 
completion of the experimental procedures participants were debriefed during a 
one-to-one session with the Sports Psychologist, Coach and member of the 
research team. Here psychological concepts relating to decision-making were 
discussed and applied to the sporting context, athletes were also provided with a 
profile of their individual performance. 
   
 147 
Figure 6.1: The experimental protocol; Upon enrolment, participants undertook a short practice followed by performance of the 
BART, the Stroop task and CGT (in a counterbalanced order) at rest, i.e. in the absence on any additional performance pressure. 
Physical pressure was induced via two sessions of eight-x 30 seconds maximal exertion sprints and 30 second recovery on the 
ergometer. Immediately following one session the BART and Stroop were performed and following the other session the CGT was 
performed, the order counterbalanced across participants. Upon completion participants were debriefed and received feedback and 
discussion of their performance.
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6.3.3. Physical Pressure Induction 
Physical pressure was induced via a protocol of maximal intensity exertion on an 
ergometer. Athletes completed two sessions of 8 repetitions of 30 seconds at 
maximal exertion (i.e. an all out sprint), followed by a 30 seconds of recovery. 
Maximal exertion was derived from self-report, athletes were given the following 
instruction:  “You are required to cycle for 8 sequences of 30 second on and 30 
second rest.  We ask that you give maximum effort for each of the 30 second 
periods and recover afterwards”.  During these intense sprints, verbal 
encouragement was provided to help motivate the participant and ensure effort 
did not fall below maximal exertion. Before each repetition of maximal exertion, 
the participant was given a 5 second countdown. During the protocol participants 
pedaled a watt bike, with the resistance set by the individual athlete to a level that 
allowed maximal exertion. At the end of each session, participants immediately 
proceeded to perform the decision-making tasks. Two separate exercise 
sessions were undertaken to ensure that physical exhaustion was maintained 
across all decision-making tasks.  
 
As a warm up, athletes completed 5 minutes of low resistance exercise, which 
included at least two maximal intensity exertion sprints, prior to this protocol. This 
was to ensure they were adequately prepared for the exercise regime to minimize 
the risk of injury. The 30-second duration of maximal intensity exertion was based 
on the Wingate Test (Vandewalle, Péerès, & Monod, 1987), a protocol devised 
to measure anaerobic capacity. In developing this test it was noted that 
participants were reluctant to endure protocols longer than 30 seconds at a time 
and when required to do so would initially reduce their maximal effort to save 
energy for the latter part of the test (Vandewalle et al., 1987). The number of 
repetitions was decided upon after discussion with Team GB Coaches and Sports 
Physiologists. The intent was to induce physical exhaustion in line with the type 
of physical exertion that the athlete endures during competition in order to 
promote ecological validity of this experiment. 
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6.3.4. Decision-making Tasks  
All decision-making tasks were delivered via a laptop computer, with a 17-inch 
display screen, and run via Inquisit software version 4.0.7.0 (Millisecond 
Software, Seattle WA). Responses were made through mouse click or button 
press, and the software automatically recorded choice outcomes and response 
times for subsequent analysis. 
 
6.3.4.1. BART 
The BART (Lejuez, Read, et al., 2002) (Figure 3.2) is a standardized measure of 
risk taking under uncertainty. The task requires participants to inflate a series of 
computerized balloons for which the participant accrues money (5p per pump). 
However, the winnings from each balloon can only be kept if they are ‘banked’ 
before the balloon bursts. Participants are faced with the decision, in light of not 
knowing the bursting point, when the optimal point is to stop inflating the balloon 
and transfer the winnings into a safe wallet. While participants did not receive 
cash equating to the final sum accumulated in the safe wallet, the top three 
highest scorers on the task (average of low and high pressure performance) 
received a cash prize. The participants’ objective was therefore to obtain the 
largest amount of money on the task in order to win the cash prize. This method 
of reimbursement has been used in previous studies (Fecteau et al., 2007; Sela, 
Kilim, & Lavidor, 2012). 
 
Further details of task parameters and delivery are outlined in Section 3.3.4.1. 
While in chapter 3, participants completed the standard version of the task which 
consists of accumulate as much money as possible over a total of 30 balloons, 
in the current study there were only 20 balloons in total. This shortened version 
of the task has been employed by a number of studies to date (e.g. Cheng & Lee, 
2016; Derefinko et al., 2014; Ryan, MacKillop, & Carpenter, 2013; Vaca et al., 
2013), following the observation that there is no overall change is the 
measurements acquired. It was beneficial in this case to make the testing 
    
150 
procedure as efficient as possible in an elite sample whose availability was 
limited.  
 
The average adjusted number of pumps is the standard measure of risky 
decision-making on the BART, which was used for the analysis in the current 
study. This is the number of pumps for the balloons that did not burst, and thus 
removes the variation that occurs as a result of the computer generated random 
explosion point. In previous work this variable was shown to be a strong predictor 
of real-world risk taking behaviours in healthy adults and adolescence (Aklin, 
Lejuez, Zvolensky, Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005; Crowley, Raymond, Mikulich-
Gilbertson, Thompson, & Lejuez, 2006; Lejuez, Aklin, Jones, et al., 2003; Lejuez, 
Aklin, Bornovalova, & Moolchan, 2005; Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 
2003). There are other indices of performance on this task such as the amount 
of money accumulated and the number of balloons burst, these have also been 
shown to be adequate measures of risk taking, however were not additionally 
analyzed to avoid inflating type 1 error rates (as recommended by Lejuez, Read, 
et al., 2002).  
 
6.3.4.2. CGT 
The CGT (Rogers et al., 1999) (Figure 6.2) was used to assess decision-making 
under risk, where information relating to the probability of different outcomes is 
explicit. The task displays a simple probabilistic decision where the participant is 
required to guess the location of a yellow token hidden in one of ten boxes 
presented on screen. The boxes are coloured either blue or red and in any given 
trial the proportion of these vary across ratios of 9:1, 8:2, 7:2 and 6:4. Participants 
are required to choose where they think the token is hidden, in the red or the blue 
boxes, by clicking on rectangles at the bottom of the screen labeled red or blue. 
The participant is then given the opportunity to select the number of points they 
wish to gamble. The amounts that can be bet appear as a number on screen, 
they are always a proportion of the participant’s total points and are presented in 
a sequence. There are two types of bet presentation, the ascending version, 
whereby the amount of points one can gamble starts small and increases in 
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magnitude (from 5%, 25%, 75% to 95% of total points). Conversely, in the 
descending version the bets start large and decrease in magnitude (from 95%, 
75%, 25% to 5%). There was an interval between the presentations of each point 
score of 3 seconds. The participant is required to select the number on screen 
when it represents the amount of points they wish to gamble on each trial. 
Following this, the location of the token is then displayed to the participant, if the 
participant is correct in their choice, the text “You Won” appears and the amount 
of points are added to their total. If the participant is incorrect, the text “You Lost” 
appears and the amount of points gambled are deducted from their total. Sound 
effects from the task were delivered via headphones, including beeps for each 
bet presentation, with a high pitch beep for an increasing bet, and lower pitch 
sound for a decreasing bet.  
 
The task consisted of a total of 48 trials, whereby the four different probability 
types (1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6) were presented twelve times in a predefined pseudo-
randomised order, half the time there were more red, and half the time more blue, 
boxes. The trials were presented in blocks, with eight blocks in total each 
containing six trials. In each block, participants began with 100 points, and the 
points accumulated were reset at the end of each block. The location of the token 
was pseudo-randomly determined, whereby 1 in every 6 trials the better choice 
(the colour with the highest probability) led to a loss. There were four blocks with 
ascending points (a total of 24 trials, with each trial type being presented 6 times) 
presented consecutively and three blocks with descending points. The order of 
ascending or descending blocks were counterbalanced across participants, but 
kept the same within participants across repetition of the task. Due to time 
constraints when testing with a specialized sample, the task used in this instance 
consisted of fewer number of trials than presented in the standard version of the 
task, which has a total of 72 trials (Rogers et al., 1999).- 
 
The task is administered via standardized instructions (outlined in Manes et al., 
2002; Rogers et al., 1999). In short, the task procedures were outlined to the 
participant, along with the instruction to collect as many points as possible. There 
were four practice trials for participants to familiarize themselves with the task, 
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two of these consisted of the decision phase only, and the other two mimicked 
the task. 
 
There are four indices of task performance that were used in the analysis. In the 
initial decision-making phase the response time is measured as the duration 
between when the trial is presented and when the participants indicate their 
choice to look in the red or blue box via a mouse click. This measure is expected 
to interact with the probability ratio of the trial, in particular deliberation time is 
likely to be less in trials with 9:1 ratios, in comparison to 6:4 trials. The error rates 
represent the quality of the decision, measured by the proportion of trials where 
participants chose the most likely box colour. A winning choice of blue is only 
counted as a correct decision if blue represents the most number of boxes in the 
trial.  
 
In the second phase, the performance measure the mean percentage points 
gambled, represents the degree of risk taking on the task, with high-risk takers 
gambling a larger number of points. The task allows the disassociation of risk-
taking and motor impulsivity. Motor impulsivity can be derived by examining the 
difference between the amount bet on ascending trials to that bet on descending 
trials. In ascending trials participants have to patiently wait for the appearance of 
a more risky bet, whereas in the descending trials participants can make risky 
bets immediately. Therefore participants high in impulsivity will bet an amount 
that occurs early in the sequence, for ascending trials bets will be small and for 
descending trials bets will be large. There was a decreased duration in point 
presentation in this version of the task (3 second) compared to that developed by 
Rogers et al., (1999) (5 second) it may be easier for participants not to display 
impulsivity in comparison to other studies.  
 
Lastly, a measure of risk adjustment can be deduced from the amount gambled 
across different trial ratios and quantifies a participant’s ability to vary their risk 
taking in response to task contingencies. Optimal behavior on the task is where 
larger bets are made on trials where there is a higher likelihood of winning (i.e. 
those with the odds ratio 9:1), in comparison to trials where the likelihood of 
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winning is lower (i.e. those with the odds ratio 6:4). Risk adjustment is calculated 
as the degree to which risk taking differed between ratios, and is calculated in a 
manner designed to be independent from the total amount gambled (Rogers et 
al., 1999). It is calculated using the following equation: (2* % bet at 9:1)+ (% bet 
at 8:2)- (% bet at 7:3) – (2* % bet at 6:4) / average % bet. A score of 0 represents 
no risk adjustment, whereby participants do not adjust their bets according to the 
different betting ratios. This is thought to indicate a failure to use information 
relating to the decision (Manes et al., 2002; Rogers et al., 1999).  
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Figure 6.2: The CGT: A) The task displays a simple probabilistic decision 
whereby participants choose whether to look either the red or blue box for the 
yellow token.  The proportions of red or blue boxes vary across ratios of 9:1, 8:2, 
7:2 and 6:4.  The participant click on the red or blue icon to indicate their 
response. B) A number appears in the white box representing the amount 
possible to gamble on their decision. C) In the ascending trial this amount 
increases every 3 seconds. D) When the number in the box represents the value 
the participant would like to gamble they are required to click on it. E) The position 
of the yellow token is revealed, if correct the value is added to the total points, if 
incorrect the value is subtracted. 
 
6.3.4.3. Stroop Task  
The Stroop task is a widely researched measure of interference and processing 
speed (for a review see MacLeod, 1991). In this task participants were instructed 
to name the colour of items presented on screen by pressing a corresponding 
key on the keyboard (d for red, f for green, j for blue and k for black).  
 
The stimuli presented consisted of colour words (red, blue, green and black) 
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presented in red, blue, green and black ink, as well as solid rectangle blocks in 
these same colours on a white background. There were three trial types: 
congruent trials, where the word and the ink colour are the same (i.e. the word 
‘red’ written in red ink); incongruent trials, where the word and ink colour are 
different (i.e. the word ‘red’ written in blue ink); and control trials, which simply 
measure reaction times to identify a solid block of colour. The Stroop interference 
effect refers to the increased amount of time it takes to name the colour of a word 
when the ink colour and word are incongruent, compared to when the ink colour 
and word are congruent. This is thought to result from the automatic access of 
word naming being overridden in incongruent trials (MacLeod, 1991).  
 
The task consisted of a total of 84 trials, the order of which was randomized. 
There were 28 congruent trials and 28 incongruent trials, with each of the four 
colour words being presented seven times. For the incongruent trials, each colour 
word was presented in the three different colours twice (i.e. red presented in blue 
ink, green ink and black ink), and one of the colour-word pairing (randomly 
selected) was presented an additional time. There were also 28 control trials, 
which presented solid blocks of colour, again each of the four colours were 
presented seven times.  
 
The task was self-paced, whereby the stimuli remained on screen until 
participants made a response. Participants were instructed to make their 
responses as quickly and accurately as possible and to place their fingers over 
the response keys to ensure prompt responses. There were two measures used 
in the analysis of this task: reaction times to control trials and the interference 
effect, measured as the reaction time to incongruent minus the reaction time to 
congruent stimuli. Before starting, participants undertook a short practice 
consisting of 12 trials (four of each trial type) to familiarize themselves with the 
task (see Figure 3.3).  
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6.3.5. Data Analysis  
To explore whether decision-making on the three tasks is influenced by 
performance pressure, ANOVA and paired t-tests (two tailed) were undertaken 
to compare task performance under conditions of low and high physical pressure. 
Where relevant, Mauchly's test of sphericity was performed and Greenhouse-
Geisser correction applied. Bonferroni correction was used to correct for multiple 
comparisons. For each task, the dependent variables used in this analysis are 
laid out below.  
 
BART: The mean adjusted number of pumps (the average pump count for 
balloons that did not burst) was analyzed as a measure of risk taking under 
uncertainty. A three way mixed ANOVA was undertaken to compare performance 
of the task under conditions of low and high physical pressure (within subjects 
factor of pressure: low pressure, high pressure) broken down by time (within 
subject factor of balloon number: 1-10, 11-20). A between subject factor of 
gender was also included (male, female). 
 
CGT: The response times (the duration from the trial appearing on screen and 
the participant choosing to look in a red or blue box) and the error rates (the 
percentage of trials in which the participant chose the most likely box colour) were 
analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA. This was undertaken to compare 
the dependent variable (response time or error rates) under conditions of low and 
high physical pressure (within subjects factor of pressure: low pressure, high 
pressure) with the dependent variables broken down by the odd ratios presented 
in the trial (within subject factor of odds ratio: 1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6). This part of the 
analysis was collapsed across the ascending and descending trials as the 
presentation and selection of bets occurred after these variables were recorded.  
 
In order to explore gambling behaviour in decision-making under risk the mean 
percentage number of points bet on the task were analyzed. This analysis 
included trials in which participants chose the most likely outcome in order to not 
confuse betting behavior and decision-making. A three way mixed ANOVA was 
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used to compare the amount of points bet for ascending and descending trials 
(within subject factor point presentation: ascending, descending) under 
conditions of high and low physical performance pressure (within subjects factor 
of pressure: low performance pressure, high performance pressure). A between 
subject factor of gender was included (male, female).  
 
Lastly, a measure of risk adjustment was derived from the data and a paired t-
test was performed to compare the degree of risk adjustment under conditions of 
low and high physical pressure.  
 
Stroop Task: One participant was not included in the analysis due to 
experimenter error during data collection. Therefore 22 participants were 
included in the analysis. Paired t-tests were undertaken to compare reaction 
times on control trials and the Stroop interference effect (difference between 
reaction times on incongruent trials versus on congruent trials) under conditions 
of low and high physical pressure. Reaction times of correct responses only were 
included in the analysis.  
 
Correlational analysis assessing response to pressure across tasks: It was 
also of interest to examine whether an individual’s responses to pressure were 
consistent across the three decision-making tasks. The difference under pressure 
score was calculated for key indicators of task performance, by subtracting the 
score under high pressure from baseline. The variables chosen for indicators of 
task performance are the average adjusted number of pumps on the BART (a 
positive score represents better performance under pressure), the reaction time 
to control trials on the Stroop task (a negative score represents better 
performance under pressure) and the risk adjustment score on the CGT (a 
positive score represents better performance under pressure). The difference 
under pressure scores for each task were compared, using the Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient, in order to examine whether participants showed a 
consistent response to pressure across tasks. The participant who did not 
complete the Stroop task was excluded due to incomplete data, therefore 22 
participants were included in this analysis. 
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Applicability of group data to individuals: In order to explore the degree to 
which group data applies to individuals the number of athletes whose change 
under pressure showed an ‘average’ response to pressure across the three tasks 
were assessed. In accordance with previous work an average response was 
calculated as a score that fell within 1 standard deviation of the mean (0.5 SD 
above and below) (Daniel, 1952; Rose, 2016) for the average adjusted number 
of pumps on the BART, the reaction time to control trials on the Stroop task and 
the risk adjustment score on the CGT. Again, the participant who did not complete 
the Stroop task was excluded due to incomplete data, therefore 22 participants 
were included in this analysis 
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6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Effect of Physical Pressure on the BART 
In order to examine whether decision-making changes under conditions of low 
and high physical pressure performance on the BART, CGT and the Stroop task 
were examined.  For the BART the mean adjusted number of pumps was 
analyzed as a measure of risk taking under uncertainty (Figure 6.3).  The ANOVA 
revealed no effect of gender (F(1,21)=1.33, p=0.26) or no effect of performance 
pressure (F(1,21)=3.65, p=0.07), while there was a significant effect of balloon 
number (F(1,21)=43.90, p>0.01).  In addition, there was no significant interactions 
between performance pressure and balloon number (F(1,21)=0.13, p=0.71), 
performance pressure and gender (F(1,21)=2.17, p=0.15), or balloon number and 
gender (F(1,21)=0.22, p=0.64). Finally, there was no three-way interaction between 
balloon number, gender and performance pressure (F(1,21)=0.01, p=0.91). Hence, 
in this sample of elite athletes, physical exhaustion did not induce any significant 
changes in the degree of risk-taking, although this is significant if the statistical 
threshold is reduced to a trend level  (p=0.1). In this case the elite athletes present 
a higher degree of risk-taking under physical pressure (mean: low pressure: 
38.63 pumps: high pressure: 42.62 pumps). However, it was found that the 
average adjusted number of pumps was higher for the later part of the task 
(mean: balloon number 1-10: 37.38 pumps, balloon number 11-20: 43.87 
pumps), this reflects the usual learning effects found on this task. 
   
 
 
 
    
160 
 
Figure 6.3: BART results: In elite athletes there was no significant effect of 
physical pressure on the mean adjusted number of pumps, a measure of risk 
taking under uncertainty. There was a significant effect of balloon number, with 
the mean adjusted number of pumps was higher for the last half of the task. * 
denotes statistical significance at p<0.05. Error bars represent SEM. 
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6.4.2. Effect of Physical Pressure on the CGT 
Response Times: Having examined the influence of physical exhaustion on the 
BART, the following analysis examines the CGT and in this case, a number of 
different performance measures were examined. First, a repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed on the response times (duration between trial onset and 
participants response) (Figure 6.4a) revealed a significant effect of physical 
pressure (F(1,22)=5.63, p<0.05), with the mean deliberation time being less under 
conditions of high physical pressure (Mean: low pressure= 1470.71 ms; high 
pressure= 1377.45 ms).  In addition, we found a significant effect of trial ratio 
(F(2.12,46.70)=8.66, p<0.01).  Pairwise comparisons revealed that the response time 
to trials with 1:9 ratios were significantly quicker than those with 4:6 (p<0.01), 3:7 
(p<0.01) and 2:8 ratios (p<0.01). There was no significant interaction of trial ratio 
and physical pressure (F(1.91,42.02)=1.34, p=0.27). This indicates that elite athletes 
tend to respond faster under physical pressure, and when the trial odds ratios 
were higher. 
 
 Error rates: A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the error rates (% 
number of trials in which the participant chose the most likely box colour) (Figure 
6.4b), this revealed, a non significant effect of physical pressure (F(1,22)=0.95, 
p=0.34) and a significant effect of trial ratio (F(1.30,28.53)=8.56, p<0.01).  There was 
a no significant interaction of ratio and stress (F(1.54,33.80)=0.18, p=0.77).  Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that participants made more errors on trials with 4:6 ratios 
compared to those with 3:7 (p<0.05), 2:87 (p<0.05), and 1:9 ratios (p<0.05).  Elite 
athletes were less accurate, and opted for the most likely box colour on fewer 
occasions, when the odds ratios were lower.  
 
Number of points gambled: A mixed ANOVA on the mean percentage points 
gambled was analysed as the main measure of risk-taking (Figure 6.4c).  This 
revealed an effect of physical pressure (F(1,21)=9.08, p<0.01), as well as an effect 
of point presentation (ascending or descending F(1,21)= 8.98 p<0.01), but no effect 
of gender (F(1,21)=0.89, p=0.36).  In addition, there was a significant interaction 
between physical pressure and point presentation (F(1,21)=9.45, p<0.01), but 
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neither between physical pressure and gender (F(1,21)=0.15, p=0.70), nor 
between gender and points presentation (F(1,21)= 4.02, p=0.53). The three-way 
interaction between  pressure, points presentation and gender was also non 
significant (F(1,21)=0.03, p=0.87).  Post hoc t-tests revealed that for ascending 
trials there were a significantly higher number of points gambled under conditions 
of high physical pressure compared to low physical pressure (t(22)=-3.69, p<0.01; 
Mean: low pressure: 57.13%; high pressure: 65.86%).  On descending trials there 
were no significant differences in the number of points gambled under conditions 
of high and low physical pressure (t(22)=-0.43, p=0.67; Mean: low pressure: 
70.62%; high pressure: 71.32%). Hence, athletes made significantly higher bets 
on ascending trials under physical pressure, indicating a significant increase in 
risk-taking under physical pressure.  On ascending trials the participant has to 
wait patiently for the number of points to increase, therefore this increase in risk-
taking is unlikely to be due to increased motor impulsivity. Male and female elite 
athletes did not differ in terms of the effect that physical pressure has on the 
number of points bet on the CGT.  
 
Risk Adjustment  
A paired t-test revealed there were no significant differences in the measure of 
risk adjustment between conditions of low and high physical pressure (t(22)=1.18, 
p=0.25) (Figure 6.4d), therefore the tendency for elite athletes to modify the 
amount bet according to the different reward and loss contingencies were not 
influenced by conditions of high physical pressure.  
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Figure 6.4: CGT results: A) The elite athletes showed significantly faster 
response times under physical pressure. B) Elite athletes were less accurate on 
trials with odds ratios 4:6 compared to 3:7, 2:8 and 1:9.: C) Physical pressure 
increased the amount of points gambled on ascending trials, indicating increased 
risk taking which is unlikely to be a result of increased impulsivity. D) Risk 
adjustment, was unaffected by. physical pressure. *denotes statistical 
significance at p<0.05. Error bars represent SEM. 
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6.4.3. Effect of Physical Pressure on the Stroop Task 
There were significant differences in the reaction times to identify the colour of 
control trials under conditions of low and high physical pressure (t(21)=5.85,  
p<0.01) (Figure 6.5). The elite athletes performed significantly faster under 
conditions of physical pressure (Mean: high physical pressure: 696.88 ms; low 
physical pressure: 883.62 ms). There was no significant difference in the Stroop 
interference effect under conditions of low and high performance pressure 
(t(21)=2.01, p=0.06). Therefore increased pressure did not influence the additional 
time taken to identify incongruent trials in comparison to congruent trials in elite 
athletes. The Stroop task was performed with a high degree of accuracy both 
under conditions of high (97.17% accuracy) and low physical pressure (97.03% 
accuracy). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Stroop task results: The elite athletes were significantly faster 
responding to control trials under physical performance pressure.  There were no 
significant differences under conditions of low and high pressure in the Stroop 
interference effect, i.e. the additional time taken to respond to incongruent trials 
compared to congruent trials. * denotes statistical significance at p<0.05. Error 
bars represent SEM. 
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6.4.4. Correlations of Performance Under Pressure Across Tasks  
To determine whether changes under pressure on key indicators of performance 
were consistent across the three decision-making tasks, correlation analyses 
were performed.  However, no significant correlations between the degree of 
change under pressure on performance of the BART and the CGT (r(22)=-0.12, 
p=0.59), BART and Stroop task (r(22)= -0.11  p=0.63), or CGT and Stroop task 
(r(22)= -0.06 p=0.80) were found.  Therefore, individual participants’ responses to 
pressure were not consistent across key indices of decision-making over the 
three tasks. This highlights the importance of individualize profiling of results 
especially in a setting where the performance of individual athletes is most 
important (see Figure 6.6) shows example results of two athletes and example 
feedback. It is evident that within this group there are individuals who showed 
very different patterns of responses to physical pressure. For example, Athlete 1 
ranked highly within the cohort on the BART and Stroop and made small 
improvements in their rankings under pressure. The athlete also improved their 
rank under pressure, from 12th to 4th place, on the CGT.  Athlete example 2, 
however, showed a much more variable response to physical pressure, on the 
BART task they decreased their ranking under pressure from 6th to 14th place, on 
the Stroop task they improved their ranking 16th to 7th ,while their ranking on the 
CGT remained stable.    
 
6.4.5. Representativeness of Group Data  
In order to explore the degree to which group data applies to individual athletes, 
an additional analysis was undertaken whereby the number of athletes who 
showed an average response (defined as falling within 0.5 SD above and below 
the mean) to pressure across the three tasks was assessed.  In line with previous 
work (Daniel, 1952; Rose, 2016), this categorization of an ‘average’ responder 
meant that at least the middle 35% of the group were categorized as falling within 
the ‘average’ on each variable. The results of this analysis revealed that there 
was not one participant who showed mean responses to pressure across all three 
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indices of decision-making which included the average adjusted number of 
pumps on the BART, the reaction time to control trials on the Stroop task and the 
risk adjustment score on the CGT.  As the group average scores were not 
representative of the behaviour of a single individual athlete across the three 
measures, this highlights the importance of feeding back individual results in an 
to elite setting where providing insight at an individual level is paramount.   
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Example athlete 1: 
 
Example athlete 2: 
 
Figure 6.6: Example of individual athlete feedback; Radar graph showing 
performance ranking within the squad on each task for an individual athlete. (1= 
top performer 22= bottom performer).   
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6.5. Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to further our understanding about decision-
making in elite sport, by investigating the influence of physical pressure on 
decision-making in a sample of world-class elite athletes.  The primary objective 
is to provide insights that has real-world application in the elite sport setting. The 
results revealed that under increased physical pressure, elite athletes showed 
faster response times.  They also displayed an increase in risk-taking for 
decisions where probability outcomes were explicit, while there were no 
significant differences in risk-taking when probability outcomes were unknown.   
 
In particular, reaction times were significantly faster following physical pressure 
on the Stroop and CGT. This observation coincides with the findings of a recent 
systematic review outlining the cognitive effects of physical exertion in athletes 
(Schapschröer et al., 2016).  Overall, athletes at an expert level were reported to 
show an increased facilitation in response time measures on perceptual-cognitive 
tasks under conditions of moderate and intense physical activity, in comparison 
to novices (Schapschröer et al., 2016).  In this work expert athletes were broadly 
defined as those competing at a national level.  One study included in the review 
similarly assessed the influence of physical exertion (up to 80% maximal 
exertion) on an elite sample (although of a younger age of 18 years old), revealed 
faster choice reaction times (Mouelhi et al., 2006).  Here it was proposed that the 
reaction time facilitation may be due to increases in exercise-induced arousal 
(Cooper et al., 1973). Schapschröer et al., (2016) highlights that sporting 
expertise is a significant factor in how one responds to physical performance 
pressure and the current study suggests that this may extend to those competing 
at the highest elite standard.  Although this conclusion is made in light of possible 
learning effects due to the experimental design in the current study.   
 
The decision-making of elite athletes showed an increase in risk taking under 
physical pressure in response to decisions where the reward and loss outcomes 
were explicit. In particular, there was a significant increase in the amount bet on 
the CGT under physical pressure on trials with ascending presentation of points. 
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This indicates that the increased propensity for risk was unlikely to be due to 
increased motor impulsivity as elite athletes were able to wait longer durations 
for the bet to increase. In line with this risk adjustment did not change under 
conditions of increased physical pressure. Thus despite an increase in risk-taking 
elite athletes retained the ability to bet appropriately according to outcome 
probabilities, and therefore use information relating to the decision scenario 
under physical pressure.  For decisions made under uncertainty there was no 
significant effect of physical pressure on risk-taking.   
 
Together these findings partially support work that have shown risky decision-
making to be modulated under conditions of elevated stress as previous literature 
has shown this to effect both decision-making under uncertainty (  and risk 
(Lighthall et al., 2009; Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007; van den 
Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 2009).  Study which examined the effect of physical 
exertion revealed that in non-elite athletes showed increased risk taking on the 
BART in males (Black et al., 2013; Pighin et al., 2015)  but decreased risk taking 
on the BART in females (Pighin et al., 2015).  In the current study there were no 
effects of gender on measures of risk taking under pressure on either the BART 
or the CGT.   In the case of elevated risk taking on the CGT, this was found to be 
similar for males and females, with the shift to more cautious responding under 
stress in females not evident in this sample of elite female athletes. Again, these 
discrepancies may allude to further differences between non-elite and elite 
athletes in terms of decision-making under pressure.  
 
On the one hand, the finding that elite athletes take more risks when the 
contingencies were known, but not unknown, could reflect differences in 
expertise in the two types of decision-making.  Decision-making under 
uncertainty scenarios are much more prevalent in everyday life, and the dynamic 
sporting environments is no exception (Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011).  As 
such, elite athletes are likely to have more experience in the specific coupling of 
decision-making under uncertainty and acute physical pressure which may 
account for the robustness in performance seen in the current study.  An alternate 
explanation for the increase in risk taking specifically in situations where 
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outcomes are explicit is one of calculable risk taking.  Under pressure the elite 
athletes may be more willing to take risks, but only when they can deduce 
favourable chances of that risk paying off. This is in line with increased risk taking 
on ascending trials, and a resilient ability of risk adjustment, under physical 
pressure.  Indeed a similar approach to risk-taking has been noted in previous 
research in females, notably that risk taking is prevalent but only when there is 
the estimation that risk taking will result in a win (Fox & Lawless 2004).  
 
Together the findings highlight two important points.  Firstly, that physical 
exhaustion has an influence on the performance of elite athletes and therefore it 
is important to consider the context when studying the decision-making of 
athletes. While on the whole elite performers decision-making was resilient to the 
effects of pressure, there was a speeding of reaction times and a increased 
propensity towards risk on decision-making under risk tasks.  Secondly, that 
previous work in this decision-making and sport may not extend to elite athletes 
or those with a high level of expertise in operating under conditions of high 
pressure.  For example, the results of the current study support the observation 
that quicker reaction times were observed in elite athletes under intense physical 
exertion, yet this was not the case in studies undertaken in healthy volunteers 
(Schapschröer et al., 2016).  Previous work in non-elite athletes have also shown 
an effect of gender on risk taking under physical pressure (Pighin et al., 2015), 
whereas we found no differences in performance between males and females. 
While direct comparisons are difficult due to divergent methodologies, together 
these findings raise concerns over the application of decision-making research 
undertaken in non-elite athletes or healthy controls to elite athletes.  
 
As this work was undertaken outside of a laboratory context in a specialized 
sample group it has high ecological validity.  However, with this there was less 
control over the experiment and a number of compromises were made in terms 
of scientific rigor. One limitation is that the order of low and high physical pressure 
conditions were not counterbalanced. This meant that all elite athletes performed 
the tasks under conditions of low physical pressure first, followed by the tasks 
under condition of increased physical pressure.  When performing tasks under 
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physical pressure, participants were also undertaking the tasks for the second 
time, and thus the changes observed may reflect learning effects.   Due to the 
time constraints of working with an elite population it was not possible to design 
the experiment with separate testing sessions.   In order to reduce possible 
learning effects in this study, attempts were made to choose appropriate tasks.  
For example, the BART has been shown to have high test-retest reliability, with 
small increases in risk taking (2 average adjusted number of pumps) when 
repeated testing occurred within a single day (White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008).  
Moreover the CGT was designed to assess decision-making in the absence of 
other learning processes, with trials reported to be relatively independent of one 
another (Rogers et al., 1999). 
 
A second issue is that completion of maximal effort during the physical exhaustion 
protocol was inferred via self-report and from observation of the athlete. One 
could argue that the lack of an objective measure of physical exertion was a 
limitation and would have been useful in determining that self-report was 
accurate.  In this case it was deemed reasonable to allow the elite athletes to 
exert themselves to the level they felt reflected the guidelines of maximal exertion.  
A key goal of the current work was to provide insights that would transfer to 
training and performance, and therefore keeping formalization of the testing 
procedure to a minimum was important. In particular, elite athletes exert 
themselves to their own recommendation because of their own investments and 
motivation and this is what we aimed to replicate in the current study.  It should 
be noted that this population is extremely driven and competitive in comparison 
to the usual cohort of volunteers in psychology experiments.     
 
A further interesting result of the current study is that the degree to which 
participants changed under pressure did not correlate across key indicators of 
decision-making over the three tasks. This indicates that the effects of physical 
pressure is not uniform across indices of decision-making in individuals, for 
example an athlete who improved on one task under pressure did not necessary 
show similar improvements under pressure on a different task. This highlights 
that responses to physical stress are specific to the type of decision-making, and 
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also specific to the individual.  This finding emphasizes a key issue when 
examining how one assesses and applies psychological data in an elite sporting 
environment- the central aim of this work, relating to the application of results 
based on group averages in a setting where understanding the behaviour of the 
individual athlete is most important. 
 
While statistical approaches based on group means used in this chapter are 
prevalent in almost all of psychology, and informative regarding the average 
response of a group of individuals, they may not be informative regarding any 
one individual (Rose, 2016).  Rose (2016) outlines the ‘fallacy of the average 
individual’. Gilbert (1945) studied 4063 pilots across 10 dimensions of size in 
order to design the optimal cockpit, and reported that within this sample no one 
individual was average on all 10 dimensions (average defined as scores which 
fell within the middle 30% of the range of values) and only 3.5% of the sample 
showed average characteristics on 3 dimensions of size.  Thus, if a cockpit were 
designed to fit the average individual, it would be a poor fit for any individual pilot. 
This has special relevance to elite sports psychology where understanding the 
behavior of the individual athlete is paramount. Indeed in the current study, there 
was no one athlete that presented a mean response to pressure across all three 
indices of decision-making.  It was important to measure different types of 
decision-making to get a more complete picture of decision-making.  This 
indicates that applying the results of this study based on group average to the 
individual one would be incorrect in the majority of cases.    
 
 Additionally applying statistical approaches based on averages disguises the 
unique profile of strength and weaknesses of an individual (Rose, 2016).  In the 
case of the elite athlete, it may be that this individuality provides them with their 
competitive edge. Along these lines, in the current work feedback sessions were 
undertaken, whereby data relating to individual performance, as well as group 
averages were provided for context (see figure 5.8).  Thus the usefulness of this 
profiling was in the insight it gave to the athletes and coaches, regarding the 
unique strengths and specific domains of improvements of the individual athlete.  
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The sports professionals used this knowledge to inform training interventions and 
tactical discussions. 
 
Furthermore, in order to facilitate insight into decision-making in elite sporting 
professionals a requirement of this work was to increase understanding of key 
psychological principles and examine how to apply these in a sporting context. In 
retrospect this was addressed by the current work in a number of ways. Firstly, 
undertaking the experiment itself provided the athlete with first hand experience 
of standardized measures of psychological concepts and an opportunity to reflect 
on their subjective experience of how their abilities to perform were modified by 
physical pressure. 
 
In order for these psychological concepts to have meaning in a sporting context, 
in debriefing discussions with athletes and coaches, examples of these types of 
decision-making within sport were developed.  In order to communicate the 
concepts to an audience with no prior psychological knowledge real world 
analogies were used.  For decisions which required fast reactive responses, such 
as responding to control trials on the Stroop task, this was described as ‘gun 
slinging’, with reference to a shooting match.  Decision-making under risk on the 
CGT was described as ‘poker playing’ to represent a scenario when one takes 
risks in the context of having information available to them.  Decision-making 
under uncertainty on the BART was described as playing ‘chicken’, with reference 
to a well-known game devised to test the nerve of each contender wherein two 
people drive straight towards each other, and the first car to swerve is named the 
chicken. This taxonomy was key in facilitating understanding that decision-
making isn’t a singular concept and of the different types of decision-making 
scenario.  Moreover the terms provided an easy and accessible shared language 
for the athlete to use to reflect on their own decision-making, as well as discussing 
the decision-making with other athletes, coaches and other sport professionals.  
 
6.6. Conclusion  
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The findings of the current study show that the decision-making of elite athletes 
were influenced by physical exhaustion. In particular under increased physical 
pressure elite athletes showed faster response times, increased risk taking for 
decisions where probability outcomes were explicit, but no significant change in 
risk-taking when probability outcomes were unknown.  These responses were 
different to those reported in the literature in non-elite athletes and healthy 
controls. However, direct comparisons are difficult due to methodological 
differences.  In addition, individual changes in performance under pressure did 
not correlate across tasks, highlighting that response to physical pressure across 
tasks were specific to the individual athlete.  This finding emphasizes the 
limitation of statistical approaches based on group means, a key issue when 
examining how one applies psychological data in elite sport psychology.  Indeed 
there was no one athlete who showed an ‘average’ response to pressure across 
the three tasks.  In order to aid insight and understanding of decision-making in 
the elite sporting environment, the feedback of individual results was useful to 
provide insight into the unique strengths and weakness’s of the individual athlete.  
The use of engaging athletes and coaches in psychological testing in order to 
increase insight into psychological concepts is highlighted, as well as the 
development of a common language to communicate key concepts.  In the 
following chapter a similar protocol is used to assess the decision-making with 
semi-elite athletes.  
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7.  Decision-making Under Physical Pressure in Semi-elite 
Athletes  
7.1. Abstract 
Background: Having investigated the influence of acute physical exhaustion on 
decision-making in world-class elite athletes, here a similar method is applied to 
semi-elite athletes. These semi-elite athletes were enrolled on a Team GB talent 
development program and were undergoing training for possible Olympic 
competition in four to eight years. They differ from elite athletes examined 
previously according to expertise and age. While considered elite (Swann, Moran 
& Piggott, 2015), the semi-elite athletes had approximately eight-years less 
sporting experience and were yet to obtain frequent sustained success on the 
international stage. Additionally, the average age of the semi-elite sample is 20 
years; thus, they are still undergoing the behavioural, cognitive and neuronal 
changes that occur as one transitions from late adolescence to young adulthood 
(Blakemore & Robbins, 2012). Previous work has used broad definitions of elite 
status in sport, from Olympic competition to inclusion on university varsity teams; 
as such, it has overlooked different categories within the spectrum of elite athletes 
(Swann et al., 2015). Therefore, it is important to consider semi-elite athletes as 
a discrete point on the developmental trajectory of elite sporting expertise.  
 
Objective: This work aims to investigate the influence of physical pressure on 
key indicators of decision-making in semi-elite athletes. It forms part of a wider 
project examining decision-making across different stages of the developmental 
trajectory in elite sport. In doing so, it aims to further examine how to apply and 
develop psychological insights useful to an elite sporting environment.   
 
Method: 32 semi-elite athletes (Swann et al 2015) (18 males; mean age = 20 
years) enrolled on a national Team-GB training program, aiming for Olympic 
competition in four to eight years, participated in the study. In accordance with 
chapter 6, performance across three categories of decision-making was 
assessed under conditions of low- and high-physical pressure. Decision-making 
under risk was measured with performance of the CGT (Rogers et al., 1999), 
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decision-making under uncertainty with BART (Lejuez et al., 2002) and fast 
reactive responses and inhibition via the SSRT (Logan, 1994). Physical 
exhaustion was induced via intervals of maximal exertion exercise on a watt bike.  
 
Results:  Under pressure, semi-elite athletes showed increased risk taking for 
both decisions where probability outcomes were explicit (on the CGT) and those 
where probability outcomes were unknown (on the BART). Despite making 
quicker decisions under pressure - with fewer errors - on the CGT, semi-elite 
athletes showed a reduced ability to optimally adjust betting behaviour according 
to reward and loss contingencies. Fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli 
and response inhibition did not change as a result of physical pressure. Individual 
responses to pressure showed a negative correlation in that a decrease in 
reaction times on the SSRT under pressure were associated with an increase in 
risk taking on the BART. When assessing the applicability of results based on 
group averages to individual athletes, 17% of the sample showed an ‘average’ 
response (within 1 SD of the mean) to pressure across all three decision-making 
tasks. 
 
Conclusion:  Indicators of decision-making in a sample of semi-elite athletes are 
influenced by physical pressure, with a shift towards increased indiscriminate risk 
taking. The influence that physical pressure has on decision-making was different 
to that observed in world-class elite athletes; this highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between athletes at the elite level (Swamm et al., 2015). The 
application of this work to a novel sub-group of elite athletes are discussed.  
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7.2. Introduction 
Having noted decision-making and performance under pressure as crucial factors 
to sporting success (Bar-Eli, Plessner & Raab, 2011; Jordet & Hartman, 2008; 
Kaya, 2014; Wells & Skowronski, 2012), this chapter forms part of a wider project 
examining these abilities across different developmental stages of elite sporting 
expertise. Using a similar protocol to that employed in chapter 6, the influence of 
physical pressure on decision-making is examined in a sample of semi-elite 
athletes. The semi-elite athletes were enrolled on a Team GB talent development 
program, training for competition at an Olympic level in four to eight years. While 
these athletes make a living from sport and compete internationally, several 
hallmarks of an elite status (Swann et al., 2015), they are yet to reach the highest 
levels of performance in their given sport. Thus, it is important to consider them 
as a separate class of athlete to provide a more nuanced view of expertise at the 
elite level. Importantly, they differ from the world-class elite athletes studied 
previously according to two key factors: experience and age. 
 
When it comes to the development of expertise, there is the widespread 
acceptance that it takes 10 years - or 10,000 hours - of accumulated, deliberate 
practice to reach expert status within a given field (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-
Römer, 1993). On average, semi-elite athletes have approximately 12 years of 
sporting expertise and are considered within the top 50 national players. In 
comparison to the elite athletes in chapter 5, they have, on average, eight-years 
less sporting experience; a difference that is likely to impact decision-making 
competencies and responses to performance pressure. Unsurprisingly, previous 
work has shown that decision-making competencies within sport develop with 
expertise (Abernethy, Baker & Côté, 2005). Moreover, a recent review revealed 
that sporting expertise modified responses to physical pressure. In particular, 
following intense physical exercise, athletes with a higher level of expertise 
showed faster responding on simple choice reaction time tasks, when compared 
to novices (Schapschröer, Lemez, Baker & Schorer, 2016).   
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Almost all research examining decision-making and expertise has explored the 
differences between elite and non-elite athletes, rather than examining the 
spectrum of elite athletes. Indeed, sports psychology has been criticized for its 
considerably broad definition of ‘elite athlete status’, ranging from Olympic 
champions to those included in a regional or university sports team (Swann et al., 
2014). This led Swann et al. (2014) to propose a categorization system to 
distinguish the spectrum of expertise at an elite sporting level. The semi-elite 
athletes included in this sample would fall into the semi-elite and competitive-elite 
expertise categories, as outlined by Swann et al. (2014), due to their inclusion of 
talent development programs, competitive success at a national level and 
infrequent success at international competition. The elite-athletes included in 
chapter 6 would fall into their successful-elite or world-class elite expertise 
category, due to their frequent appearance and sustained success in globally 
recognized competition.  
 
In addition, the semi-elite athletes are distinct in terms of age. They are in their 
late adolescence and early 20s (mean age = 20), in contrast to the elite athletes 
who were in their late 20s (mean age = 28); this is relevant as the semi-elite 
athletes are undergoing cognitive changes and brain developments characteristic 
of adolescence, a process that does not cease until the mid-20s (Arain et al., 
2013). Many of these developments relate to decision-making (for a review, see 
Blakemore & Robbins, 2012). In terms of behaviour, this period is characterized 
by a tendency to engage in increased risk-taking in relation to adults (Defoe, 
Dubas & Figner, 2015), likely to arise from a heighted responsiveness to 
incentives and increased influence of socioemotional factors (Blakemore & 
Robbins, 2012; Chein, Albert, O’Brien, Uckert & Steinberg, 2011). In terms of 
anatomical brain development, regions that show late structural maturity include 
the DLPFC; an area involved with impulse control and weighing up the 
consequences of decision-making (Giedd, 2004).  
 
Additionally, development of the corpus callosum and association tracts, 
including the inferior and superior longitudinal and fronto-occipital fasciculi, 
occurs during the 20s (Lebel & Beaulieu, 2011; Pujol, Vendrell & Junqué, 1993), 
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changing thought to support complex cognitive processing (Blakemore & 
Robbins, 2012).  Structural and functional brain differences between early to late 
adulthood have also been observed. For example, Veroude, Jolles, Croiset and 
Krabbendam (2013) revealed that young adults (23-25) and adolescents (18-19) 
engage different brain regions when performing cognitive tasks. When 
undertaking the Stroop task, the young adults showed stronger activation in the 
DLPFC, left inferior frontal, left middle temporal gyrus and middle cingulate, when 
compared to those in the adolescence group. Although such functional changes 
are yet to be fully deciphered, differences in the neural underpinnings of cognitive 
control are notable. These ongoing developmental changes reiterate the 
importance of considering semi-elite athletes as a discrete stage of elite sporting 
expertise.   
 
In light of the findings from the previous chapter, and work that has highlighted 
the importance of considering the high pressured context in which decisions in 
sport occur (Hepler, 2015; Kinrade, Jackson & Ashford, 2015; Pighin, Savadori & 
Bonini, 2015; Smith et al., 2016), the aim of the current study was to examine this 
topic in semi-elite athletes. The semi-elite athletes will perform tasks assessing 
decision-making under conditions of low and high physical performance 
pressure. Decision-making under risk will be assessed via performance of the 
CGT (Rogers et al., 1999) and decision-making under uncertainty via the BART 
(Lejuez et al., 2003), as well as fast reactive responses and inhibition via the 
SSRT (Logan, 1994). Performance pressure was induced by physical exhaustion 
protocols consisting of intervals of maximal exertion exercise on a watt bike.  
 
This studies methodology will allow a greater insight into decision-making under 
pressure in semi-elite athletes, which may prove useful in understanding the 
developmental trajectory of expertise in elite sport. In line with the previous 
chapter, an additional aim of this work is to examine how to apply and develop 
psychological insights useful to an elite sporting environment.  
 
 
7.3. Methods 
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7.3.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 31 semi-elite athletes (16 males), aged between 18 and 
27 (mean age = 20 years). All athletes were part of a Team GB national 
centralized program, focused on training for Olympic competition in four to eight 
years; i.e. not the next Olympic games but the one after that (in this case Tokyo 
2020). They all fell within the ‘semi-elite’ and ‘competitive-elite’ expertise 
categories defined by Swann et al (2015). They are considered as a top-50 
national performer in their given sport, but yet to gain international success at 
international competition. Moreover, they are enrolled and paid to be part of a 
training development scheme. All athletes included in the sample were from the 
same sport. The approximate age of entry for this sport is eight years and, thus, 
these semi-elite athletes had been training for approximately twelve years. All 
semi-elite athletes were able bodied with normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight.   
 
Recruitment, ethical consent and debriefing procedures were in line with those 
used in the previous chapter. Recruitment and testing occurred during a seven-
day residential training camp, with the assistance of the Team GB Sports 
psychologist and coaches. The squad were initially informed of the aims and 
procedures of the study via a group presentation, then a testing session was 
scheduled with athletes wishing to participate. While participants did not receive 
financial reimbursement for their participation, a cash prize was awarded to the 
top three performers on the BART. Upon completion, a detailed debriefing 
session was undertaken in conjunction with Team GB coaches and a sport 
psychologist. The study and consent procedures were approved by the UCL 
ethics board, in compliance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
7.3.2. Experimental Protocol 
The protocol in this study was like that outlined in chapter 6. A within-subject 
design was used, whereby the decision-making of semi-elite athletes was 
assessed under conditions of low- and high-physical pressure (Figure 7.1). 
Testing was undertaken within a single session at a Team GB training facility.  
Performance on three decision-making tasks was examined via a laptop 
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computer; these included the BART (Lejuez et al., 2003), the CGT (Rogers et al., 
1999) and the SSRT (Logan, 1994). Initially participants received instructions and 
completed a short practice of each task. The semi-elite athletes then undertook 
these tasks at rest; i.e. in the absence of additional physical pressure. Following 
this, conditions of elevated physical pressure were induced via a protocol of 
intense physical exertion undertaken on a watt bike. Semi-elite athletes 
undertook two sessions of six repetitions, 30-second maximal exertion sprints, 
followed by 30 seconds of recovery. The CGT was performed following one of 
these sessions; the SSRT and BART followed the other. Taking this into account, 
the order in which the decision-making tasks were undertaken was 
counterbalanced across participants. After completion, the semi-elite athletes 
were debriefed in a feedback session where the results of the study were 
discussed and applied to the sporting context. Athletes were also provided with 
a profile of their own performance.  
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Figure 7.1: The experimental protocol. Upon enrolment, participants undertook a short practice, followed by a performance of the 
BART, the SSRT and CGT under conditions of low and high physical pressure.   Physical pressure was induced via two sessions of 
six x 30-seconds maximal exertion sprints and a 30-second recovery on the ergometer. Immediately following one session, the BART 
and SSRT were performed and, following the other session, the CGT was performed and the order was counterbalanced across 
participants. Upon completion, participants were debriefed and received feedback of their individual performance; the application of 
this to sport was also discussed. 
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7.3.3. Physical Pressure Induction  
A similar physical exertion protocol as described in chapter 6 was undertaken to 
induce conditions of elevated physical pressure, adjusted to the fitness level of 
the semi-elite athletes. Again, the protocol was undertaken on a watt bike. 
Athletes undertook two sessions of six repetitions, 30-second maximal exertion 
(all-out sprints), followed by 30 seconds of recovery. Maximal exertion was 
derived as a matter of self-report and athletes were instructed: “You are required 
to cycle for six sequences of 30 seconds on and 30 seconds rest. We ask that 
you give maximum effort for each of the 30-second periods and recover 
afterwards”. The athlete was instructed to decide on an appropriate resistance 
level that reflected the usual parameters they use in training. Verbal 
encouragement and a five-second countdown to each sprint was given to ensure 
high levels of motivation and adherence to the protocol. The aim was to induce 
physical exhaustion in accordance with the intermittent type of physical exertion 
that the athlete endures during competition. At the end of each session, 
participants quickly proceeded to perform the decision-making tasks. Two 
separate exercise sessions were undertaken to ensure that physical exhaustion 
was maintained across all decision-making tasks.  Prior to undertaking the 
procedure, athletes undertook a warm up, consisting of low-resistance exercise 
and several maximal intensity exertion sprints to reduce risk of injury. 
 
7.3.4. Decision-Making Tasks  
Tasks were delivered via a laptop computer, with a 17-inch display screen, run 
using Inquisit software version 4.0.7.0 (Millisecond Software Seattle WA); used 
to automatically record responses for subsequent analysis. Participants made 
responses via the use of a mouse or button press. 
 
7.3.4.1. BART 
The BART (Lejuez et al., 2003) (see Figure 3.2) is a standardized measure of 
risk taking under uncertainty. The task requires participants to inflate a series of 
computerized balloons to accrue money (5p per pump). The winnings from each 
balloon can only be added to the total if they are ‘banked’ before the balloon 
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bursts. Participants do not know when the balloon will burst and must decide 
when to transfer winnings to obtain the highest amount of money. The degree to 
which the balloon is inflated, in particular the average adjusted number of pumps, 
provides a measure of risk taking and is used for the analysis; this is the number 
of pumps for the balloons that did not burst, thus removing the variation that 
occurs because of the randomly-generated explosion point.  
 
The full task parameters and delivery are outlined in section 3.3.4.1. As in chapter 
6, participants undertook a shorten version of the task with 20 balloons. This has 
been used by many studies to date (e.g., Cheng & Lee, 2016; Derefinko et al., 
2014; Ryan, MacKillop & Carpenter, 2013; Vaca et al., 2013) to make testing as 
efficient as possible in an elite sample whose availability was limited. While 
participants did not receive cash equating to the final sum accumulated in the 
safe wallet, the top three highest scorers on the task (average of low- and high-
pressure performance) received a cash prize. This method of reimbursement has 
been used in previous studies (Fecteau et al., 2007; Sela, Kilim & Lavidor, 2012). 
 
7.3.4.2. CGT   
The CGT (Rogers et al., 1999) (see Figure 6.2) was used to assess decision-
making under risk, where the probability of different outcomes is explicit. The task 
presents the participant with 10 boxes; these are coloured red or blue according 
to different ratios (9:1, 8:2, 7:2 and 6:4). There is a token hidden in one of these 
boxes and the participant must choose whether to look in the red or blue boxes 
to locate the token. The participant is then given the opportunity to select the 
amount of points they wish to gamble on their decision. The amounts that can be 
bet appear as a number on screen; they are a proportion of the participant’s total 
points and are presented in either in an ascending (from 5%, 25%, 75% to 95% 
of total points) or descending (from 95%, 75%, 25% to 5%) sequence. The 
participant is required to click on the value when it represents their chosen 
gamble. If they are correct, the value is added to the score; if they are incorrect, 
the value is taken away from their score. The task is administered via 
standardized instructions which include a short practice of the task (outlined in 
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Manes et al., 2002; Rogers et al., 1999).  Further details of task parameters and 
delivery are described in section 6.3.4.2).  
 
Performance on the task is measured by several dependent variables which were 
used in the analysis of this task (further details on these measures can also be 
found in section 6.3.4.2). The response time was measured as the duration from 
trial presentation to when the participant identifies whether they chose to look in 
the blue or red box. The error rate is measured as the proportion of trials whereby 
participants choose to look in the most likely box colour. The mean percentage 
points gambled is used to represent the degree of risk taking; participants who 
show risky decision-making gamble a higher number of points. This is examined 
in the context of ascending or descending point presentations, to provide an 
indication of motor impulsivity.   Risk adjustment was calculated from the 
amount gambled across different trial types quantifies a participant’s ability to 
vary their risk taking in response to task contingencies. Optimal behaviour is 
when larger bets are made on trials where there is a higher likelihood of winning 
(i.e., those with the odds ratio of 9:1), in comparison to trials where the likelihood 
of winning is lower (i.e., those with the odds ratio of 6:4). Risk adjustment is 
calculated using the following equation: (2* % bet at 9:1)+ (% bet at 8:2) – (% bet 
at 7:3) – (2* % bet at 6:4) / average % bet) in accordance with previous work 
(Manes et al., 2002; Rogers et al., 1999).  
 
7.3.4.3. SSRT Task  
The SSRT task (Logan, 1994) was used to measure reaction times and response 
inhibition (see Figure 7.2). Response inhibition refers to the ability to suppress a 
response that is no longer required; it is an executive control process that allow 
behaviour to be adapted in response to a dynamic environment (Logan, 1994; 
Verbruggen, Logan & Stevens, 2008).    
 
In this task, participants are instructed to respond as fast as possible to a ‘go’ 
stimuli - in this case the appearance of an arrow. Participants are required to 
indicate whether the arrow is pointed to the left (by pressing the D key) or to the 
right (by pressing the Y key). Participants are instructed to inhibit their responses 
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(and not make a button press) if the arrow appears alongside a ‘stop’ signal - in 
this case a bleep noise. The stop signal (bleep) always appears after the go signal 
(arrow). The duration at which the bleep is presented following presentation of 
the arrow is called the stop signal delay (SSD). 
 
The task adjusts the SSD in a stepwise procedure, according to performance.  
When a participant is unsuccessful at responding to a stop signal and fails to 
inhibit their response, the SSD is decreased; therefore, making it easier on the 
next trial. When the participant successfully responds to the stop signal trial and 
inhibits their button press, the SSD is increased; thus, increasing the difficulty on 
the next trial. The SSD is initially set to a duration of 250 ms and is increased or 
decreased by 50 ms each time - standard parameters for the task. This stepwise 
procedure allows the SSD duration at which the participant can withhold their 
response in half of the trials to be deduced. This is necessary to calculate the 
stop signal reaction time (SSRT).   
 
The SSRT refers to the time taken to inhibit the response provoked by the ‘go’ 
signal. This is inferred indirectly and calculated as the average response time to 
‘go’ trials minus the SSD duration for which the participants are successful at 
withholding the response 50% of the time. In more detail, the horse race model 
(Logan, 1994) states there are two independent processes initiated in this task: 
one that responds to the go signal and an inhibitory process that responds to the 
stop signal. Whichever process finishes first determines the behavioural 
response. When the duration of the stop signal delay is longer, the initiation of 
the stop process is delayed, thus it is more likely to finish after the go process 
and not influence behaviour. The SSD duration for which participants are 
successful 50% of the time allows the point at which the stop and go processes 
are aligned to be determined. Therefore, subtracting the SSD from the go 
reaction time allows the SSRT to be deduced.  
A standard version of the task was administered (as laid out in Verbruggen, 
Logan & Stevens, 2008); this had a total number of 192 trials, of which 42 were 
‘stop’ trials and 150 ‘go’ trials. These were presented in three blocks of 64 trials, 
each of which had 14 ‘stop’ trials and 50 ‘go’ trials. In half the trials, the arrow 
pointed right and in the other half the arrow pointed to the left. For each block, 
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the order of the trial type (stop or go) or arrow direction (left or right) were 
randomized. The blocks were separated by a black screen containing a summary 
of performance; this was presented for 10 seconds, following which the task 
automatically proceeded to the next trial. Moreover, the task started with a 10-
trial practice to familiarize the participant. The instructions given to the participant 
were standardized and laid out in Verbruggen, Logan & Stevens (2008). 
Importantly, it was emphasized that the participant should not wait to respond to 
the go trials as the program adapts, nor should they worry if they are not 
successful as response inhibition was designed to be difficult. The two dependent 
variables on the task that will be used in the analysis are the reaction times to 
‘go’ trials and the SSRT. 
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Figure 7.2: The SSRT task: A) On go trials, an outline of a circle appears on 
screen (for 250 ms) to alert the participant to the presentation of the arrow. The 
arrow appears in the circle, which points either to the left or the right. If the arrow 
points to the left the participant must press the D key and if it points to the right 
they must press the K key. Following this a blank screen is presented for 500 ms 
until the next trial appears.  B) On stop trials, the presentation of the arrow is 
shortly followed by a beep. The beep indicates that no response to the arrow is 
required.  
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7.3.5. Data Analysis  
In accordance with chapter 6, to explore whether decision-making on the three 
tasks is influenced by performance pressure, ANOVA or paired t-tests (two tailed) 
were undertaken to compare task performance under conditions of low- and high-
physical pressure. Where relevant, Mauchly's test of sphericity was performed 
and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. Bonferroni correction was 
used to correct for multiple comparisons. For each task, the dependent variables 
used in this analysis are laid out below.  
 
BART: The mean adjusted number of pumps (the average pump count for 
balloons that did not burst) was analysed as a measure of risk taking under 
uncertainty. A three-way mixed ANOVA was undertaken to compare performance 
of the task under conditions of low- and high-physical pressure (within-subjects 
factor of pressure: low pressure, high pressure) broken down by time (within-
subject factor of balloon number: 1-10, 11-20). A between-subject factor of 
gender was included (male, female), due to previous work that has shown gender 
to influence risk taking under pressure. 
 
CGT: The response times (the duration from the trial appearing on screen and 
the participant choosing to look in a red or blue box) and the error rates (the 
percentage of trials in which the participant chose the most likely box colour) were 
analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA. This was undertaken to compare 
the response times under conditions of low and high pressure (within-subjects 
factor of physical pressure: low pressure, high pressure) broken down by the odd 
ratios presented in the trial (within-subject factor of odds ratio:  1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6). 
This part of the analysis was collapsed across the ascending and descending 
trials as the presentation and selection of bets occurred after these variables 
were recorded.  
 
To explore gambling behaviour in decision-making under risk, the mean 
percentage number of points bet on the task were analysed. This analysis 
included trials in which participants chose the most likely outcome to not confuse 
betting behaviour and decision-making. A three-way mixed ANOVA was used to 
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compare the amount of points bet for ascending and descending trials (within-
subject factor point presentation: ascending, descending) under conditions of 
high- and low-physical performance pressure (within-subjects factor of pressure: 
low-performance pressure, high-performance pressure). A between-subject 
factor of gender was included (male, female), due to previous work that has 
shown gender to influence risk taking under pressure. Overall, higher gambles 
are indicative of increased risk taking, a large difference in the amount bet on 
ascending compared to descending trials is indicative of impulsivity. 
 
Lastly, a measure of risk adjustment was derived from the data and a paired t-
test was performed to compare the degree of risk adjustment under conditions of 
low- and high-physical pressure.  
 
SSRT task: One participant was excluded due to experimenter error (failure of 
audio presentation). Therefore, 30 participants were included in the analysis. 
Paired t-tests were undertaken to compare reaction times on go trials and the 
SSRT under conditions of low- and high-physical pressure.  
 
Correlation analysis assessing performance across tasks: The following 
analysis was undertaken with 30 participants; this number excludes the 
participant who has incomplete data on the SSRT task. To examine whether an 
individual’s responses to pressure was consistent across the three decision-
making tasks, the difference under pressure score was calculated for key 
indicators of task performance by subtracting the score under high pressure from 
that under low pressure. The variables chosen as indicators of task performance 
are: The average adjusted number of pumps on the BART (a positive score 
represents better performance under pressure); The reaction time to ‘go’ trials on 
the SSRT (a negative score represents better (quicker) performance under 
pressure), and; The risk adjustment score on the CGT (a positive score 
represents better performance under pressure). The difference under pressure 
scores for each task were compared, using the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, 
to examine whether participants showed a consistent response to pressure 
across tasks.  
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Applicability of group data to individuals: To explore the degree to which 
group data applies to individuals, the number of athletes whose change under 
pressure showed an ‘average’ response to pressure across the three tasks was 
assessed. In accordance with previous work, an average response was 
calculated as a score that fell within one standard deviation of the mean (0.5 SD 
above and below) (Daniel, 1952; Rose, 2016) for the average adjusted number 
of pumps on the BART, the reaction time to control trials on the Stroop task and 
the risk adjustment score on the CGT. The participant who did not complete the 
SSRT was excluded due to incomplete data; therefore, 30 participants were 
included in this analysis. 
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7.4. Results  
7.4.1. Effect of Physical Pressure on the BART 
To explore the influence that pressure has on the decision-making of semi-elite 
athletes, the performance of the BART, CGT and SSRT under conditions of low- 
and high-physical pressure was assessed. For the BART, the mean-adjusted 
number of pumps was analysed as a measure of risk taking under uncertainty 
(Figure 7.3). The ANOVA revealed: A significant effect of physical pressure 
(F(1,29)=6.38, p<0.05); A significant effect of balloon number (F(1,29)= 5.12, 
p<0.05), and; No significant effect of gender (F(1,29)= 0.52, p=0.47). All 
interactions were non-significant, including a non-significant interaction of 
pressure and balloon number (F(1,29)=1.40, p=0.25), of gender and pressure 
(F(1,29)=0.01, p=0.94), as well as of gender and balloon number (F(1,29)=1.40 
p=0.25). There was also a non-significant three-way interaction of pressure, 
balloon number and gender (F(1,29)=0.71, p=0.41). Hence, in this sample of semi-
elite athletes, physical pressure increased the average adjusted number of 
pumps; this is indicative of increased risk taking (Mean = Low pressure: 33.79 
pumps; High pressure: 39.72 pumps). Also, the average adjusted number of 
pumps were higher for the latter part of the task (Mean = Balloon number 1-10: 
32.39 pumps; Balloon number 11-20: 38.12 pumps); this reflects the usual 
learning effects found on this task. There were no differences in the risk taking of 
male and female semi-elite athletes as a result of increased physical pressure.  
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Figure 7.3: BART results: In semi-elite athletes, there was a significant increase 
in the average adjusted number of pumps under high physical pressure, 
indicative of increased risk taking. There was also a significant effect by the 
balloon number, with the average adjusted number of pumps found to be larger 
for the last half of the task. *Denotes statistical significance at p<0.05. Error bars 
represent SEM. 
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7.4.2. Effect of Physical Pressure on the CGT 
Response Times: Next, the influence of physical exhaustion on the CGT was 
examined. First, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed on response times 
(see Figure 7.4a). This finding revealed a significant main effect of physical 
pressure (F(1,30)=22.08, p<0.01), with the mean deliberation time being less under 
conditions of high-physical pressure (Mean = Low pressure: 2168.11 ms; High 
pressure: 1661.23 ms). In addition, there was also a significant effect by the trial 
ratio (F(3,90)=8.67, p<0.01). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the response 
times to trials with 1:9 ratios were significantly quicker than compared to those 
with 4:6 (p=0.04) (Mean: 1:9 = 1665.82 ms; 4:6 = 1960.50 ms) and to 2:8 
(p=0.001) (Mean: 2:8 = 2170.23 ms). There was no significant interaction of trial 
ratio and physical pressure (F(2.13,63.80)=0.64, p=0.54); this indicates that elite 
athletes tend to response faster under pressure and when trials ratios are higher. 
 
Error rates: Next, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the error 
rates (% number of trials in which the participant chose the most likely box colour) 
(see Figure 7.4b); this revealed a significant main effect of physical pressure 
(F(1,30)=4.49 p<0.05) and a significant main effect of trial ratio (Greenhouse 
Geisser correction applied F(2.06,61.67)=1.33, p=0.27). There was a non-significant 
interaction of ratio and physical pressure (F(2.09,62.83)=0.33, p=0.73).  Semi-elite 
athletes were less accurate and opted for the most-likely box colour on fewer 
occasions under conditions of low pressure (Mean % correct = Low pressure: 
96.8%; High pressure: 99.1%).   
 
Mean percentage points bet: Next, a mixed ANOVA was performed on the 
mean number of points gambled (%) as a measure of risk taking (see see Figure 
7.4c); this revealed a significant effect of physical pressure (F(1,29)=39.16, p<0.01) 
and a significant effect of point presentation (ascending or descending) 
(F(1,29)=47.73, p<0.01). There was also a significant interaction of physical 
pressure and point presentation (F(1,29)=11.99, p<0.01). Post hoc tests revealed 
that there were significantly more points gambled under high pressure on both 
ascending trials (t(30)=-7.09, p<0.01) (Mean = Low-pressure ascending: 50.84%; 
Low-pressure descending: 76.40%) and on descending trials (t(30)=-3.09, 
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p=0.004) (Mean = High-pressure ascending: 64.20%; High-pressure descending: 
82.20%). 
 
Additionally, there was no significant main effect of gender on the number of 
points gambled (F(1,29)<0.01, p=0.97) and no significant interactions of gender 
and other main effects; including of physical pressure and gender (F (1,29)=1.02, 
p=0.32) or points presentation and gender (F(1,29)=0.03, p=0.86). There was also 
no significant three-way interaction of gender, point presentation and physical 
pressure (F (1,29)=0.34, p=0.57).   
 
Risk Adjustment: A paired t-test revealed there was a significant difference in 
the measure of risk adjustment between conditions of low and high physical 
pressure (t(30)=2.77 p=0.01) (see Figure 7.4d).  The tendency for semi-elite 
athletes to modify the amount bet according to the different reward and loss 
contingencies were reduced under conditions of high physical pressure (Mean 
risk adjustment score: low pressure: 1.52; high pressure: 1.10).   
 
 
 
  197 
 
 
  198 
 
Figure 7.4; CGT results; A) The semi-elite athlete showed significantly faster 
response times under physical pressure. B) Under pressure, semi-elite athletes 
made significantly fewer errors compared to conditions of low pressure.; C) 
Under physical pressure, the semi-elite athletes also showed increased amount 
of points gambled, indicating increased risk taking. There was a significant 
increase on both ascending and descending trials. D) The degree of risk 
adjustment was significantly reduced under conditions of increased pressure. 
*Denotes statistical significance at p<0.05. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean. 
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7.4.3. Effect of Physical Pressure on the SSRT task 
Paired t-test results show there were no significant differences in the reaction 
time when responding to ‘go’ trials under the conditions of low- and high-physical 
pressure (t(29)=0.63, p=0.53). There was also no significant difference in the 
SSRT task under the conditions of low- and high-physical pressure (t(29)=-0.06, 
p=0.95) (see Figure 7.5). Therefore, increased physical pressure did not 
influence reaction times to ‘go’ trials or respond to inhibition processes as 
assessed by the SSRT task.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: SSRT task results: The semi-elite athletes showed no significant 
differences under conditions of low- and high-pressure in the time taken to 
respond to ‘go’ trials (left) or on the SSRT (right).  *Denotes statistical significance 
at p<0.05. Error bars represent SEM. 
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7.4.4. Correlations of Performance Under Pressure Across Tasks 
Pearson correlations were undertaken to examine whether individual responses 
to pressure were consistent across key indicators of performance the three 
decision-making tasks. There was a significant correlation when comparing the 
two performances on the BART and on the SSRT task  
(r(30)=-0.62, p<0.01); this showed that as reaction times decreased under 
pressure on the SSRT, the degree of risk taking under pressure on the BART 
increased (see Figure 7.6). There were no further significant correlations when 
comparing the degree of change under pressure on the BART and the CGT 
(r(30)=0.16, p=0.39) or on the BART and SSRT task (r(30)=0.01, p=0.99).   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: There was a significant negative correlation when comparing the 
difference under pressure performance on the BART and the SSRT task. This 
showed that quicker reaction times to ‘go’ trials on the SSRT under pressure were 
associated with increased risk taking on the BART under pressure.  
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7.4.5. Representativeness of Group Data  
To explore the degree to which group data applied to individual athletes, the 
number of athletes who showed average responses (defined as 0.5 SD above 
and below the mean) to pressure across key performance indicators of decision-
making tasks were assessed. In line with previous work (Daniel, 1952; Rose, 
2016), this categorization of an ‘average’ responder meant that, at least, the 
middle 43% of the group were categorized as falling within the ‘average’ on each 
variable. The results of this analysis revealed that there was 16.67% of the 
sample who were average responders across the average adjusted number of 
pumps on the BART, the reaction time to control trials on the Stroop task and the 
risk adjustment score on the CGT.  
 
As the group average scores were not representative of the behaviour of athletes 
across the three measures in the large majority of cases, this highlights the 
importance of feeding back individual results in an elite setting, where providing 
insight at an individual level is paramount.   
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7.5. Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to investigate the influence of physical 
exhaustion on key indicators of decision-making in semi-elite athletes. The study 
formed part of a wider project assessing decision-making across different 
developmental stages of elite sporting expertise and, in doing so, examined how 
to increase psychological insight in this environment. The main findings were that, 
under the conditions of physical pressure, semi-elite athletes showed increased 
risk taking, as well as a reduced ability to modify behaviour in line with explicit 
reward and loss contingencies. There was no change to fast reactive responses 
of perceptual stimuli and response inhibition under conditions of increased 
physical pressure. 
 
The decision-making of semi-elite athletes showed an increase in risk taking 
under physical pressure, in response to both decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty. On the BART, there was an increase in the adjusted number of 
pumps under conditions of high pressure; which may be notable given the high 
correlation that performance on this task has with real-world risk taking 
behaviours (Aklin, Lejuez, Zvolensky, Kahler & Gwadz, 2005; Crowley, 
Raymond, Mikulich-Gilbertson, Thompson & Lejuez, 2006; Lejuez et al., 2003). 
On the CGT, while semi-elite athletes made fewer errors and were faster to 
respond to simple probabilistic decisions under physical pressure, they also 
opted to gamble a higher number of points. In this case the increase in risk taking 
was evident for across both ascending and descending point presentations trial 
types. These findings support the previous work that has shown modulations to 
risk taking following physical exertion (Black, Hochman & Rosen, 2013; Pighin et 
al., 2015). In line with the notion that the physiological responses to exercise is 
akin to those observed under stress/arousal, the results also align with work that 
has shown risk taking to be affected by other sources of acute stress (for a review: 
Starcke & Brand, 2012). One finding from the previous body of work not 
supported by the current study: the influence that gender has on risk taking under 
pressure. In particular, males have been reported to show an increase, while 
females a decrease, in risk taking under pressure, across both non-elite athletes 
under physical exertion (Pighin et al., 2015) and non-athletic healthy samples 
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following stress induction paradigms (Lighthall et al., 2009; 2012; van den Bos, 
Harteveld & Stoop, 2009; Preston et al., 2007). In the current study, there was no 
effect of gender on measures of risk taking across two different decision-making 
tasks and the behaviour of male and female semi-elite athletes did not 
significantly differ from one another. The shift towards more cautious decision-
making reported in female healthy volunteers and non-elite athletes was not 
evident in semi-elite female athletes.  
 
On the CGT, the semi-elite athletes also showed a significant reduction in risk 
adjustment and the ability to gamble appropriately according to different 
probability ratios under pressure. This measure is thought to reflect the degree to 
which the participant can use information relating to the decision to appropriately 
modify ones propensity for risk (Clark, Manes, Antoun, Sahakian & Robbins, 
2003; Rogers et al., 1999). Together, the results of the CGT show an increase in 
risk taking (in the number of points bet) and a decrease in the responsiveness to 
optimal betting scenarios (reduced risk adjustment). Thus, such a pattern may 
indicate a sub-optimal shift in risky decision-making under pressure in semi-elite 
athletes. This may be noteworthy in a sporting context, while reductions in risk 
taking have been linked to performance decrements in elite sport (Jordet & 
Hartman, 2008; Paserman, 2007), the relationship between risk taking and 
sporting performance is likely to be one of adaptability. In some circumstances, 
taking risks would provide the athlete with the competitive edge; i.e., in a football 
match when the losing team substitutes a defender for an attacker as they enter 
injury time. While in others, the potential exposure to negative outcomes that risk 
entails means playing it safe is optimal; for example, in a football match when the 
team which is in the lead and decides to adopt a defensive strategy as they enter 
injury time (Bronson & Merryman, 2013).  
 
In relation to reaction times, fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli - i.e., 
the time taken to respond to ‘go’ trials on the SSRT task - did not change under 
increased physical pressure. There were also no differences in the time taken to 
inhibit responses measured by the SSRT.  Considering the intense level of the 
physical exhaustion protocol undertaken by the semi-elite athletes the 
consistency in responding may be indicative of expertise. However, in 
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consideration of the previous research, the lack of significant improvements on 
this measure is notable. In particular, a recent review in this area reported high-
intensity levels of physical exertion to have faciliatory effects on response time 
measures on perceptual-cognitive tasks, but only in athletes with high levels of 
sporting expertise (Schapschröer et al., 2016). While the semi-elite athletes are 
within the top-50 national players in their chosen sport, faster responses under 
physical exertion were not evident. These differences may allude to the variation 
of abilities across elite samples which, due to the broad definition in elite status 
in the current review, could not be teased apart (Schapschröer et al., 2016).  
 
At an individual level, there was a consistent response to physical pressure 
across indices of performance on two of the decision-making tasks. There was a 
significant correlation of performance on the BART and the SSRT, with semi-elite 
athletes showing quicker reaction times to ‘go’ trials under pressure and showing 
increases in risk taking on the BART. This indicates that semi-elite athletes may 
show a more general orientation at an individual level in terms of responding to 
physical pressure. 
 
Together, the indiscriminate increases in risk taking and lack of facilitation in fast 
reactive responses to perceptual stimuli in semi-elite athletes may be indicative 
of reduced resilience to physical exhaustion; this is in comparison to world-class 
elite athletes performing a similar protocol and showing faster reaction times in 
perceptual stimuli (notably to a different task) and there were no impairments on 
their abilities to adjust risk taking according to task contingencies under pressure. 
Importantly, the differences here highlight that elite athletes are not a 
homogenous group and the importance of considering differences between 
expertise at the elite athletic level (Swann et al., 2014).  As well as expertise, the 
two groups of athletes were distinct in terms of age, which may help to explain 
the differences noted here. The semi-elite athletes who are in their late teens to 
early 20s are still undergoing the cognitive changes and brain developments 
characteristic of adolescence; those abilities that are important in determining 
decision-making (Blakemore & Robbins, 2012). In particular, there is a heighted 
tendency to engage in increased risk-taking during this time in relation to young 
adults (Defoe et al., 2015), which is in line with the findings from the current study.  
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As a similar protocol was used to chapter 6, with the limitations discussed in the 
previous chapter also applying here; these include a lack of counterbalancing of 
low- and high-pressure conditions. When performing under conditions of high-
physical pressure, participants were also undertaking the tasks for the second 
time. Therefore, small improvements in performance may be due to the design of 
the study.  While the lack of counterbalancing of low- and high-pressure 
conditions were not optimal, it was a necessary compromise due to the 
constraints of working with an elite population to whom time and access were 
limited. Moreover, adherence to the physical exertion protocol was devised via 
self-reporting and monitoring - no objective measure was taken.  
 
A further goal of this study was to explore how psychology can be applied to 
improve insight into decision-making within the elite sporting environment. In 
accordance with chapter 6, the results highlight the limitation of statistical 
approaches based on group averages. When examining the number of athletes 
that showed average responses to increased physical performance pressure, 
16% of the sample presented a mean response to pressure across three indices 
of decision-making. Thus, in the large majority of cases, it would be incorrect to 
apply results based on group means to the individual athlete.   Therefore, in line 
with chapter 6, the feedback of individual results - along with group means for 
context - provided the most useful in a context where understanding the 
behaviour of individuals is most crucial.  
 
Moreover, building on the framework developed in chapter 6, the implementation 
of features that had been a success were applied to this new sample. In keeping 
with previous work, the application involved individualized feedback sessions and 
the further development of the decision-making taxonomy. These sessions 
provided the athlete, coaches and sport psychologist the opportunity to apply 
decision-making concepts and insights from performance of the study to an 
individual athlete sporting practice.   These included the implementation of 
accessible terminology based on key psychological concepts represented with 
the chosen decision-making tasks, to allow the development of a common 
language of decision-making that aids understanding and communication among 
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sports professionals. In addition, features of the testing environment that were in 
keeping with the sporting culture, such as the competitive element whereby 
prizes were awarded to the top three performers (gold, silver and bronze), 
increased motivation among the athletes. It also meant that the application was 
mainly practitioner led and, in several cases, interventions based on specific 
sporting decision scenarios or attributes were developed.  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
The findings of the current study show that the decision-making of semi-elite 
athletes were influenced by physical exhaustion. Under physical pressure, semi-
elite athletes showed increased risk taking for both decisions where probability 
outcomes were explicit and where outcomes were unknown, as well as a reduced 
ability to adjust risk-taking behaviour according to the odds.  There were no 
differences in fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli under physical 
pressure, despite previous findings of faciliatory effects on these measures. The 
influence of physical exhaustion on semi-elite athletes was different from those 
observed previously in elite world-class athletes, highlighting the importance of 
considering the differences between athletes at the elite level. The application of 
this work to a novel sub-group of elite athletes were examined. The importance 
of feedback of individual patterns of behaviour in the elite sporting environment 
is highlighted. Work in the following chapter investigates the influence of mental 
pressure on decision-making in junior-elite athletes who are at the earliest point 
of entry to elite sport programs.   
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8.  Decision-Making Under Mental Pressure in Junior-Elite 
Athletes  
8.1. Abstract 
Background: Having investigated the decision-making of world-class elite and 
semi-elite athletes, here the abilities of those at the earliest stage of entry to elite 
sport are examined. Junior-elite athletes have undergone initial national selection 
according to their potential for later success at an international level and are 
younger than athletes examined previously (mean age = 13 years). Decision-
making under mental pressure is explored in this sample. During performance an 
athlete encounters a wide array of mental pressures, these include the 
psychological impact of errors, negative feedback and requirements for sustained 
attention in a dynamic environment (Anshel & Wells, 2000; Mellalieu, Neil, 
Hanton, & Fletcher, 2009).  Such factors increase the cognitive demands of the 
athletes, inducing distracting anxiety related thoughts known as rumination 
(Beilock & Gray, 2007). Mental pressure has been shown to reduce performance 
in decision-making tasks where reward and loss contingencies are explicit, with 
a shift towards increased risk taking (Pabst, Schoofs, Pawlikowski, Brand, & Wolf, 
2013; Starcke, Pawlikowski, & Wolf, 2011). Mental pressure has been shown to 
exert detriments in decision-making speed in comparison to physical stress, 
highlighting the importance of considering a range of different pressures 
encountered by athletes (Hepler, 2015). 
 
Objective: To investigate the influence of mental pressure on key indicators of 
decision-making in junior-elite athletes. Thus this chapter explores those at the 
earliest stage of entry to elite sport, and concludes a wider project examining 
decision-making across developmental stages in elite sport.  In doing so this work 
further explores how psychological insights can be applied and developed in an 
elite sporting environment and in particular tailored to the requirements of junior 
athletes.  
 
Method: 17 junior-elite athletes (10 males, mean age =13 years) enrolled on a 
national youth athletic development program participated in the study.  
Performance across three categories of decision-making was assessed under 
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conditions of low and high mental pressure. Decision-making under risk was 
measured with the CGT (Rogers et al., 1999), decision-making under uncertainty 
with BART (Lejuez et al., 2002), and fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli 
via the Visual Search task (Treisman, 1982).  Mental pressure was induced with 
the addition of a concurrent verbal memory task, whereby participants had to 
memorize and later recall a list of words. This was used to increase cognitive load 
and mimic the distracting effects of anxiety related rumination.  
 
Results:  In junior-elite athletes, fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli  (on 
the Visual Search task) were slower under conditions of mental pressure. 
Decision-making under risk (on the CGT) was also affected by mental pressure.  
In particular there was an interaction of mental pressure and gender on the 
amount of points gambled, indicating a higher level of risk taking in male athletes 
in comparison to female athletes.  For decision-making under uncertainty there 
was no influence of mental pressure on risk taking. There were no significant 
correlations in the degree to which individuals’ responses changed under 
pressure across the three measures of decision-making. When assessing the 
applicability of results based on group averages there were no junior-elite 
athletes who showed an ‘average’ response (within 1SD of the mean) to mental 
pressure across all the three decision-making tasks. 
 
Conclusions:  Mental pressure affects decision-making in a sample of elite junior 
athletes, with a similar pattern of results seen in previous research, for example 
a slowing of response times, and modulations in the performance of decision-
making under risk tasks, that have a higher requirement for working memory. In 
relation to sport these findings may suggest that novel situations that place high 
cognitive demands on the athlete may be particularly influenced by mental 
pressure.  The results also highlight that at this stage in the athletic development 
trajectory male and female junior-elite athletes respond differently to mental 
pressure. The application of this work in youth athletes are discussed. 
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8.2. Introduction 
Following on from work investigating world class elite and semi-elite athletes, this 
chapter concludes a wider project examining the development of decision-making 
in elite sport.  It does so by exploring the influence of mental performance 
pressures on the abilities of junior-elite athletes.  Junior-elite athletes are at the 
earliest stage of entry to elite sporting programs, having undergone national 
selection according to their potential for later success at an international level.  
These athletes are younger than those assessed previously with a mean age of 
13 years. Moreover they have approximately five years of experience in their 
given sport, and thus much less exposure of the coupling of decision-making 
skills and performance pressures.  
 
Previous work, including that laid out in this thesis, has established that decision-
making abilities are influenced by the stressors that athletes encounter during 
performance (Hepler, 2015; Kinrade, Jackson, & Ashford, 2015; Pighin, Savadori, 
& Bonini, 2015; Smith et al., 2016).  Performance pressure has been broadly 
categorized into, physical stress, such as physical exhaustion, and injury, as well 
as mental stressors, that include the desire to perform at one’s best often 
exacerbated by the importance of the competition, the impact of errors, sources 
of negative feedback and requirements for sustained attention in a dynamic 
environment (Anshel & Wells, 2000; Mellalieu et al., 2009).  One way in which 
mental pressure has been proposed to influence performance is via increased 
cognitive load, with irrelevant thoughts such as worrying diverting mental 
resources away from the task in hand (Beilock & Gray, 2007). In research, in 
order to mimic conditions of increased mental pressure, the addition of a 
distracting dual task is often used. Hepler (2015) compared the effects of mental 
pressure (the addition of a dual subtraction task) and physical pressure (physical 
exertion) in non-elite athletes.   This study revealed mental and physical pressure 
to exert different effects on decision-making, mental pressure was found to impair 
decision-making speed, while physical pressure had no effect (Hepler, 2015).  
This highlights the importance of considering a range of different sources of 
pressure in the understanding of athletic performance.  
 
  210 
Previous work in this area has mainly been undertaken with adult samples.  In 
particular, in non-elite adult athletes with sports specific decision-making tasks, 
mental pressure has been reported to increase decision speed (Hepler, 2015; 
Smith et al., 2016) and to impair accuracy of choices (Smith et al., 2016), 
especially in complex scenarios (Kinrade et al., 2015). Interestingly, in the latter 
study the levels of self-reported rumination arising from the mental pressure 
manipulation predicted response decrements.   Work by Beliock, Kulp, Holt & 
Carr (2004) in non athletic healthy adults further highlight that the influence of 
mental pressure (induced via socio-evaluative stressors and performance related 
rewards) may depend on task requirements, in particular tasks that placed high 
demands on working memory were found to be selectivity impaired.   This is also 
evident when examining the influence of mental pressure on different types of 
decision-making. In particular under mental pressure (increased cognitive load) 
reduced performance on decision-making under risk have been reported, with a 
suboptimal shift towards risky strategies observed (Pabst, Schoofs, Pawlikowski, 
Brand, & Wolf, 2013; Starcke, Pawlikowski, & Wolf, 2011).  Decision-making 
under uncertainty tasks however have been shown to be less susceptible to 
mental pressure. Indeed Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, & Carzolio (2005) reported that 
increased mental pressure (cognitive load) did not affect performance on the 
Iowa Gambling Task, this was proposed to be due to a reduced requirement for 
working memory (Starcke, Pawlikowski, & Wolf, 2011).  Moreover mental 
pressure has also been found to interfere with visual search strategies in athletes, 
in that they show increased fixations for shorter duration (Liu & Zhou, 2015) and 
a decreased ability to detect peripheral stimuli (Janelle & Singer, 1992).  
 
Due to the age group of the junior-elite athlete cohort they may show notable 
differences in their decision-making and responses to pressure.  Cognitive 
abilities go through profound changes in the transition from early adolescence to 
adulthood (Blakemore & Robbins, 2012). In particular early adolescents show an 
increase in risky decision-making especially in ‘hot’ contexts, where there is 
feedback of rewards and losses, in comparison to late adolescents and adults 
(Defoe, Dubas, & Figner, 2015). Additionally, during this time visual search 
strategies are developing, with those in later childhood shown to have a reduced 
ability to switch attention from one item to another (Trick, 1998).  Differences in 
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how these junior-elite athletes respond to mental stress may also be likely.  On 
the one hand, adolescents show increased stress volatility, displaying for 
example a heightened response to laboratory stress induction protocols in 
comparison to adults (Tottenham & Galvan; 2016).  On the other, individuals with 
high working memory capacities have been reported to be most affected by 
mental pressure, as these individuals employ cognitively demanding strategies 
that fail when resources are limited (Beilock & Carr, 2005).  As such, in this age 
group who have reduced working memory capacities in comparison to adults 
(Gathercole, Pickering, & Ambridge, 2004), the effects of mental pressure on 
decision-making may be less severe.  
 
In order to investigate the influence that performance pressure has on decision-
making, junior-elite athletes will be assessed under conditions of low and high 
mental pressure.  Mental pressure was induced via the addition of a dual task, 
whereby the participant has to memorise a list of words. In adherence to chapter 
6 and 7, decision-making under risk will be assessed via performance of the CGT 
(Rogers et al., 1999) and decision-making under uncertainty via the BART 
(Lejuez et al., 2003).   Fast reactive perceptual responses will be assessed via 
performance of a Visual Search task (Treisman, 1982).  
 
Thus this study aims to provide greater insight into the abilities of those at the 
earliest  stage of entry on elite sporting development programs and together with 
chapter 6 and 7 provides a detailed look at the development of decision-making 
abilities in elite athletes.  Mental pressure has been shown to modulate markers 
of optimal decision-making in non-athletic adults and non-elite athlete samples.  
Whether similar findings are also present in junior-elite athletes will be examined.  
As in previous chapters, a central aim of this work is to explore how psychological 
insights can be applied and developed in an elite sporting environment and in this 
case tailored to the requirements of junior athletes.   
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8.3. Methods 
8.3.1. Participants  
The sample consisted of 17 junior-elite athletes (10 males), aged between 12 and 
14 (mean age = 13 years).  All junior-elite athletes had undergone selection to be 
part of a national youth development program, designed to develop skills for 
progression onto a Team GB training pathway and later success at an 
international level. All junior-elite athletes included in the sample were from the 
same sport.  The approximate age of entry for this sport is eight years old, thus 
the junior-elite athletes had been training for approximately five years.  
 
Junior-elite athletes were recruited via collaboration with Team GB Sports 
Psychologists and Coaches working within the program.  Recruitment, testing 
and debriefing took place during weekend training camps. Parents and athletes 
were informed about the purpose and the procedures of the study and provided 
consent prior to participation. Elite- junior athletes did not receive financial 
reimbursement for their participation.  Upon completion a detailed debriefing 
session was undertaken in conjunction with Team GB coaches, a sports 
psychologist and a member of the research team. The study and consent 
procedures were approved by the UCL ethics board in compliance with the 
principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
8.3.2. Experimental Protocol  
A within-subject design was used, whereby the decision-making of junior-elite 
athletes was assessed under conditions of low- and high- mental pressure 
(Figure 8.1). Testing was undertaken in a single session.  Performance on three 
decision-making tasks was examined via a laptop computer; these included the 
BART (Lejuez et al., 2003), the CGT (Rogers et al., 1999) and the Visual Search 
task (Treisman, 1982).  Initially participants received instructions and completed 
a short practice of each task.  The tasks were undertaken at rest; i.e. in the 
absence of additional mental pressure, and under conditions of high mental 
pressure. The order in which these conditions were undertaken were 
counterbalanced across individuals, and separated by a short break.  Mental 
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pressure was induced via increased cognitive load whereby participants 
simultaneously performed a dual word memory task.   Athletes were presented 
with a verbal list of single words, which they were required to memorize and recall 
at the end of each task. After completion, the junior-elite athletes and parents 
were debriefed in a feedback session where the results of the study and relevant 
psychological concepts were discussed.  
 
8.3.3. Mental Pressure Induction 
To induce elevated mental pressure, junior-elite athletes undertook a secondary 
dual task to increase cognitive load. The athletes were required to simultaneously 
remember a verbal list of words presented to them while performing each 
decision-making task.  For each task there was a unique list of twenty words, of 
which all were concrete nouns (bed, kettle, flower etc) and matched on frequency.  
The words were presented at varying intervals over a maximum duration of 4 
minutes, so that it was difficult for the participant to predict their presentation.  
 
Participants were instructed that they must memorize the words presented to 
them and to write these down at the end of each task.  Participants were advised 
that one efficient method of performing this was via subvocal rehearsal, whereby 
one repeats the words in mind so as to not forget.  The aim of this dual task was 
firstly, to mimic distracting ruminative thoughts provoked by stressful situations 
and secondly, to expend the processing resources available for a given task, thus 
increasing the demands placed on the junior-elite athletes. 
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Figure 8.1: The experimental protocol. Upon enrolment, junior-elite athletes undertook a short practice of the tasks.  The BART, 
the CGT and Visual Search task were undertaken both at rest and under conditions of high mental pressure (in a counterbalanced 
order).  Mental pressure was induced by dual word memory task designed to increase cognitive load and mimic distracting thoughts.  
Upon completion, athletes and parents were debriefed where they received feedback of their individual performance.  
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8.3.4. Decision-making Tasks  
Tasks were delivered via a laptop computer, with a 17-inch display screen.  They 
were run using Inquisit software version 4.0.7.0 (Millisecond Software Seattle 
WA), which was used to automatically record responses for subsequent analysis.   
 
8.3.4.1. BART 
Decision-making under uncertainty was measured via performance of the BART 
(Lejuez et al., 2003) (see Figure 3.2).  In this task participants are required to 
accrue money (5p per pump) through the inflation of a number of computerized 
balloons.  For the winnings of each balloon to be added to the total, participants 
must decide to transfer winnings from each balloon into a safe wallet, before the 
balloon explodes.  In light of not knowing when the balloon will explode 
participants have to decide when to transfer the winnings in order to obtain the 
maximize winnings.  The administration of the task, including task parameters 
and delivery, is identical to that laid out in section 6.3.4.1. To summarize, a well 
validated shortened version of the task including 20 balloons were used (e.g. 
Cheng & Lee, 2016; Derefinko et al., 2014; Ryan, MacKillop, & Carpenter, 2013; 
Vaca et al., 2013), to make testing as time efficient as possible.  Unlike in previous 
chapters the junior-elite athletes did not receive cash incentives for performance 
of this task. 
 
The average adjusted number of pumps provides a measure of risk taking on this 
task, which was used for the analysis.   This is the number of pumps for balloons 
that did not burst, removing the variation resulting from the randomly generated 
balloon explosion points. 
 
8.3.4.2. CGT 
Decision-making under risk was measured by the performance of CGT (Rogers 
et al., 1999) (see Figure 6.2). Full details of the task parameters and delivery are 
described in section 6.3.4.2.   In short, the participant is required to guess the 
location of a yellow token, hidden in one of ten boxes presented on screen.  The 
boxes are coloured red or blue according to different ratios (9:1, 8:2, 7:2 and 6:4).  
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Once the participant indicates the colour box they wish to gamble on, they then 
have to select a wager. The amounts that can be bet appear as a number on 
screen, either in an ascending (from 5%, 25%, 75% to 95% of total points) or 
descending (from 95%, 75%, 25% to 5%) sequence. If the participant is correct 
the value is added to the score, if they are incorrect the value is deducted.  
 
The following dependent variables will be used in the analysis in this task.  The 
response time measured as the time taken for the participant to identify whether 
they chose to look in the blue or red box. The error rate measured as the 
proportion of trials whereby participants look in the most likely box colour. The 
mean percentage points gambled represents the degree of risk taking on the 
task, and is examined in context of ascending or descending point presentations, 
to provide an indication of motor impulsivity.   Risk adjustment quantifies a 
participants ability to vary their risk taking in response to probability ratios, and is 
calculated using the following equation: (2* % bet at 9:1)+ (% bet at 8:2)- (% bet 
at 7:3) – (2* % bet at 6:4) / average % bet). 
 
8.3.4.3. Visual Search Task  
The Visual Search task  (Treisman, 1982) was used to measure reaction times 
to perceptual stimuli.  In this task participants are required to search visual arrays 
in order to identify the presence or absence of a target image, in this case a red 
square.   There were three different types of distractor items, a green square, a 
green circle and a red circle. The number of items presented in one display is 
known as a set size.  The set sizes used in this task were three, six or nine items 
arrays. There were two different trial types; target present where the items 
displayed on screen included a red square, and target absent where the items 
displayed on screen did not include a red square.   If the red square was present 
participants were instructed to press the U key, and if the target was absent press 
the I key. Participants were instructed to place their index and middle finger over 
these keys to ensure a prompt response.  They were instructed to make their 
responses as quickly and accurately as possible (see Figure 8.2).  
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Each trial began with the presentation of a blank white screen with the word 
‘Ready’ in the centre.   This was presented for 750 ms to orientate the 
participants’ attention at the beginning of the trial.   A blank screen followed this 
with a central fixation cross for 600 ms, which was preceeded by a visual array. 
The items of the array were located in one of nine designated positions equally 
spaced in a circle formation (181 mm diameter).   The visual array stayed on 
screen until the participant made a response.  Following this there was an inter-
trial interval of 750ms, consisting of the presentation of a blank screen.        
The task was arranged into three blocks, with each block consisting of 108 trials. 
There were 54 target present and 54 target absent trials (18 of each set size). 
The distractors were randomly sampled without replacement from 12 different 
images, four of each of the three distractor types, after the 12 random drawings 
the pool resets. Set size and trial type were randomised within block.  The 
locations of distractor and target images were also randomised within each block 
but with the constraint that all locations were equally as likely, i.e. the target image 
would appear equally as often (six times) in each of the nine possible positions 
per block. Each block was separated by a blank screen which instructed 
participants to press the space bar when they wished to continue to allow a short 
break if needed.  
Before commencing the task, participants undertook a short practice consisting 
of 5 trials to familiarize themselves with the task. These were identical to the task, 
except that there was feedback given.  If a wrong answer was given during the 
practice a red cross appeared on screen, if the correct answer was given the task 
continued to the next trial.  The two dependent variables on the task used in the 
analysis, were reaction times and error rates for target absent and target present 
trial types of each set size. 
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Figure 8.2: Visual Search task: Figure presents target-absent and target-
present trial types. A) On target absent trials, the word ‘ready’ appears in the 
centre of the screen for 750ms followed by the presentation of a fixation cross 
for 600ms. The stimulus array is then presented. In this case there is no red 
square among the items presented, therefore the participant is required to press 
the I key.  Following this there is an inter-trial interval of 750ms.  B) On target 
present trials a red square is presented among the items in stimulus array, 
therefore the participant is required to press the U key. .  
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8.3.5. Data Analysis 
Performance of the dual task 
The numbers of correct words recalled were counted in order to assess whether 
participants were performing the task.  A one way ANOVA was undertaken to 
assess whether there were differences in the performance of the dual task across 
decision-making tasks (BART, CGT, Visual Search).  
 
Group statistical analysis 
In accordance with chapters 6 and 7, to explore whether decision-making on the 
three tasks is influenced by performance pressure, ANOVA or paired t-tests (two 
tailed) were undertaken to compare task performance under conditions of low 
and high physical pressure. Where relevant, Mauchly's test of sphericity was 
performed and Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied. Bonferroni correction 
was used to correct for multiple comparisons. For each task, the dependent 
variables used in this analysis are laid out below.  
 
BART: The mean adjusted number of pumps (the average pump count for 
balloons that did not burst) was analyzed as a measure of risk taking under 
uncertainty. A three way mixed ANOVA was undertaken to compare performance 
of the task under conditions of low and high physical pressure (within subjects 
factor of pressure: low pressure, high pressure) broken down by time (within 
subject factor of balloon number: 1-10, 11-20). A between subject factor of 
gender was included (male, female), due to previous work that has shown gender 
to influence risk taking under pressure. 
 
CGT: The response times (the duration from the trial appearing on screen and 
the participant choosing to look in a red or blue box) and the error rates (the 
percentage of trials in which the participant chose the most likely box colour) were 
analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA. This was undertaken to compare 
the response times under conditions of low and high pressure (within subjects 
factor of physical pressure: low pressure, high pressure) broken down by the odd 
ratios presented in the trial (within subject factor of odds ratio:  1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6). 
This part of the analysis was collapsed across the ascending and descending 
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trials as the presentation and selection of bets occurred after these variables 
were recorded.  
 
In order to explore gambling behaviour in decision-making under risk the mean 
percentage number of points bet on the task were analyzed. This analysis 
included trials in which participants chose the most likely outcome in order to not 
confuse betting behavior and decision-making. A three way mixed ANOVA was 
used to compare the amount of points bet for ascending and descending trials 
(within subject factor point presentation: ascending, descending) under 
conditions of high and low physical performance pressure (within subjects factor 
of pressure: low performance pressure, high performance pressure). A between 
subject factor of gender was included (male, female), due to previous work that 
has shown gender to influence risk taking under pressure. Overall, higher 
gambles are indicative of increased risk taking, a large difference in the amount 
bet on ascending compared to descending trials is indicative of impulsivity. 
 
Lastly, a measure of risk adjustment was derived from the data and a paired t-
test was performed to compare the degree of risk adjustment under conditions of 
low and high physical pressure. 
 
Visual Search Task: Mean reaction times and error rates were analyzed for  
target absent and target present trial types of each set size. A repeated measures 
ANOVA was undertaken to compare performance of the task under conditions of 
low and high mental pressure (within subjects factor of pressure: low pressure, 
high pressure), for target-absent and target-present trial types (within subjects 
factor trial type: target-present, target-absent) broken down by set size (within 
subject factor: set size 3, 6 and 9).  Reaction times for correct responses only 
were included in the analysis.  
 
Correlation analysis assessing performance across task: As performed in 
previous chapters, the following analysis was undertaken to examine whether 
individuals’ responses to pressure were consistent across tasks.  The difference 
under pressure score was calculated for key indicators of task performance, by 
subtracting the score under high pressure from that under low pressure. The 
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variables chosen for indicators of task performance are; the average adjusted 
number of pumps on the BART (a positive score represents better performance 
under pressure), the reaction time on the Visual Search task (a negative score 
represents better performance under pressure) and the risk adjustment score on 
the CGT (a positive score represents better performance under pressure). The 
difference under pressure scores were compared, using Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient, in order to examine whether participants showed a consistent 
response to pressure across tasks. 
 
Applicability of group data to individuals: In order to explore the degree to 
which group data applies to individuals the number of athletes whose change 
under pressure showed an ‘average’ response to pressure across the three tasks 
was assessed. In accordance with previous work an average response was 
calculated as a score that fell within 1 standard deviation of the mean (0.5 SD 
above and below) (Daniel, 1952; Rose, 2016) for the average adjusted number 
of pumps on the BART, the reaction time on the Visual Search task and the risk 
adjustment score on the CGT.  
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8.4. Results 
8.4.1. Dual Task Performance 
In the mental pressure condition the average number of words that junior-elite 
athletes recalled were 8.5 (with a range of 3-16).  On two occasions the 
participants scored less than four correct items.  There were no significant 
differences between the three tasks on the amount of words recalled (F(2,32)=2.33, 
p=0.11). Therefore the junior-elite athletes were performing the concurrent verbal 
memory task consistently across the decision-making tasks in the mental 
pressure condition.  
 
8.4.2. Effect of Mental Pressure on the BART 
In order to examine whether decision-making changes under conditions of low 
and high mental pressure, performance was assessed across the three decision-
making tasks.  Firstly on the BART the mean adjusted number of pumps was 
analyzed as a measure of risk taking under uncertainty (see Figure 8.3).  The 
ANOVA revealed no effect of mental pressure (F(1,15)<0.01, p=0.94) and no effect 
of gender (F(1,15)=0.77, p=0.39), while there was a significant main effect of 
balloon number (F(1,15)=14.42, p<0.05).  In addition, there was no interaction 
between mental pressure and balloon number (F(1,15)=0.95, p=0.34), mental 
pressure and gender (F(1,15)=0.98, p=0.34), or balloon number and gender 
(F(1,15)=3.76, p=0.79).  Finally there was no three way interaction between mental 
pressure, balloon number and gender (F(1,15)<0.01, p=0.99). Therefore in this 
sample of junior-elite athletes, mental pressure did not induce any significant 
changes in the degree of risk taking on decision-making under uncertainty.  
However it was found that the average adjusted number of pumps was higher for 
the latter half of the task (mean: balloon number 1-10: 27.27; balloon number 11-
20: 34.01), this reflects the usual learning effects found on this task. 
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Figure 8.3: BART results: In junior-elite athletes there was no significant effect 
of mental pressure on the mean adjusted number of pumps. There was a 
significant effect of balloon number, with a higher pump count for the last half of 
the task. *denotes statistical significant at p<0.05. Error bars represent SEM. 
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8.4.3. Effect of Mental Pressure on the CGT 
Reaction Times: Next, the following analysis examines the influence of mental 
pressure on the CGT.  For this a number of different performance measures were 
analysed. First a repeated measures ANOVA performed on response times 
(Figure 8.4A) revealed no significant effect of pressure (F(1,16)=0.44, p=0.52), but 
a significant effect of trial ratio (F(1.79,28.60)=4.68, p=0.02). Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the response times for trials with 1:9 ratios (mean: 1749.77 ms) 
were significantly quicker than those with 6:4 (p<0.05) (mean: 2369.50 ms) and 
2:8 (p<0.01) (Mean: 2149.72 ms).   There was no significant interaction of mental 
pressure and trial ratio (F(3,48)=1.30, p=0.28).  This indicates that junior-elite 
athletes respond faster when the trial odds ratios were higher, but mental 
pressure had no effect on the time taken for participants to indicate a simple 
probabilistic choice on this task. 
 
Error Rates: Next a repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the number 
of errors made on the task (% number of trials in which the participant chose the 
most likely box colour) (Figure 8.4B). There was no significant effect of mental 
pressure (F(1,16)=0.83, p=0.37) or trial ratio (F(1.41,22.49)=2.45, p=0.12) and no 
interaction of mental pressure and trial ratio (F(1.65,26.35)=0.18, p=0.80). Therefore 
the accuracy of junior-elite athletes was not affected by mental pressure or by 
different odd ratios presented in the trial.   
 
Number of points gambled: Following this a mixed ANOVA was performed on 
the mean percentage points gambled.  This revealed no effect of mental pressure 
(F(1,15)=0.36 p=0.56) or gender (F(1,15)=1.21, p=0.29), but a significant interaction 
of mental pressure and gender (F(1,15)=5.41, p=0.03).  Post hoc independent t-
tests revealed that under pressure there were significant differences at a trend 
level (p<0.1) between male and female junior-elite athletes (t(13.68)=2.04, p=0.06), 
whereby male athletes bet more points compared to female athletes under 
pressure (mean points bet (%): females= 56.8%; males= 68.5%).  At baseline 
there were no differences between male and female junior-elite atheletes (mean 
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point bet (%): females= 61%; males= 60%) (equal variances assumed: t(15)=-
0.25, p=0.81) (Figure 8.4C).  
 
There was also a significant effect of point presentation (F(1,15)=37.67, p<0.01), 
whereby a higher number of points were gambled on ascending compared to 
descending trials (mean points bet (%): ascending= 39%; descending= 84%).  
This large difference is indicative of motor impulsivity, as junior-elite athletes did 
not wait patiently on ascending trials for the points to increase. Lastly there were 
no other significant interactions, including no interaction of point presentation and 
gender (F(1,15)=1.83, p=0.20) or mental pressure and point presentation 
(F(1,15)<0.01, p=0.97), or a three-way interaction between mental pressure, point 
presentation and gender (F(1,15)=0.27, p=0.61).  
  
Risk Adjustment: A paired t-test revealed there were no differences in the 
measure of risk adjustment between conditions of low and high mental pressure 
(t(16)=-0.09, p=0.93) (Figure 8.4D), therefore the tendency for junior-elite athletes 
to modify the amount bet according to the different reward and loss contingencies 
were not influenced by conditions of high mental pressure. Junior-elite athletes 
scored poorly on this measure consistently.  
 
.. 
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Figure 8.4: CGT results continued C) There was a significant interaction of 
mental pressure and gender on the amount of points gambled.  Under mental 
pressure the amount bet was higher for male compared to female athletes at a 
non-significant trend level (p<0.1). D) There was no effect of mental pressure on 
risk adjustment. * denotes statistical significance at p<0.05. Error bars represent 
SEM. 
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8.4.4. Effect of Mental Pressure on the Visual Search Task  
Reaction Times: The reaction times on the visual search task (from trial onset 
to participant indicating the presence or absence of an object), were analyzed 
(Figure 8.5a). Repeated Measures ANOVA revealed an effect of mental pressure 
on reaction times (F(1,16)=5.30, p=0.03) and junior-elite athletes were slower to 
respond under conditions of mental pressure (mean: low pressure: 824.90ms; 
high pressure: 969.05ms).  There was also a significant effect on the time taken 
to respond to trials when the target was present or absent (F(1,16)=8.11, p=0.01), 
and the athletes were faster to respond when the target was present (mean: 
target present: 855.08 ms; target absent: 938.87 ms). Lastly, there was a 
significant effect of set size (F(2,32)=23.18, p<0.01), pairwise comparisons 
revealed that junior-elite athletes were significantly faster at responding for set 
sizes of 3, than set sizes of 9 (p<0.01) and set size of 6 (p<0.01), and significantly 
faster at responding for set size 6 than set size 9 (p<0.01) (Mean response time: 
set size 9: 651.23ms; set size 6: 893.78ms; set size 3: 845.91ms).   
 
There were no significant interactions of any of the main effects, including mental 
pressure and trial type (F(1,16) =0.86 p=0.37), mental pressure and set size 
(F(2,32)=0.12, p=0.88), and of set size and trial type (F(2,32)=0.53, p=0.59).  There 
was also no three way interaction of mental pressure, set size and trial type  
(F(2,32)=0.32, p=0.73). 
 
Error Rates: Repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was no significant 
main effect of mental pressure on the number of correct responses on the visual 
search task (F(1,16)<0.01, p=0.94) (see Figure 8.5b).  There was also no effect of 
set size on the number of correct responses (F(2,32)=0.28, p=0.76) and no effect 
on whether the target was absent or present (F(1,16)=0.93, p=0.35) on the number 
of correct responses. Moreover there were no interactions between any of the 
main effects including, between mental pressure and trial type (F(1,16)=1.79, 
p=0.68), mental pressure and set size (F(2,32)=0.77, p=0.47), or trial type and set 
size (F(2,32)=1.83, p=0.18).  There was also no three way interaction of mental 
pressure, trial type and set size (F(2,32)= 1.85,p=0.17).
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Figure 8.5 Visual Search task results: A) Reaction times: Under high mental pressure junior-elite athletes were slower to 
respond. There were also faster reaction times when the target was present and when set size was smaller (not marked on the 
graph) B) Error rates: There were no differences in the number of errors made under conditions of mental pressure.  * denotes 
statistical significance at p<0.05. Error bars represent SEM. 
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8.4.5. Correlations of Performance Under Pressure Across Tasks 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient were undertaken to examine whether individual 
responses to pressure were consistent across the key indicators of performance 
on the three decision-making tasks.  The results showed that there were no 
significant correlations between the degree of change under pressure on 
performance of the BART and the CGT (r(16)= -0.03, p=0.90), on the  BART and 
Visual Search (r(16)= 0.08, p=0.76).  There was also no significant correlation on 
performance of the Visual Search task and the CGT (r(16)=-0.36, p=0.17).  
Therefore, individual participants’ responses to pressure were not consistent 
across key indices of decision-making over the three tasks. 
 
8.4.6.  Representativeness of Group Data  
In order to explore the degree to which group data applies to individual athletes, 
the number of athletes who showed an average response (defined as falling 
within 0.5 SD above and below the mean) to pressure across all three tasks was 
assessed.  In line with previous work (Daniel, 1952; Rose, 2016), this 
categorization meant that at least the middle 35% of the group were categorized 
as falling within the ‘average’ range for each variable. The results revealed that 
there were no athletes who showed mean responses to pressure across all three 
indices of decision-making.  As the group average scores were not representative 
of the behaviour of a single individual athlete across the three measures, this 
highlights the importance individualized profiling of results in an elite sport setting. 
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8.5. Discussion    
The study examined the effects of mental pressure on key indicators of decision-
making in junior-elite athletes.  Results revealed that fast reactive responses to 
perceptual stimuli were slower in junior-elite athletes under conditions of mental 
pressure.  Decision-making under risk, where reward and loss contingencies 
were explicit, were also influenced by mental pressure.  In particular there was 
an interaction of mental pressure and athlete’s gender, whereby under pressure 
male athletes showed higher levels of risk taking than female athletes.  For 
decision-making under uncertainty there was no influence of mental pressure on 
risk taking. 
 
The findings of the current study show that in junior-elite athletes mental pressure 
impaired fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli.  In particular, athletes were 
slower to identify the presence or absence of an item in a visual array.  This 
slowing was seen to be similar across trial types, and while reaction times were 
also increased for larger set sizes and when the target was absent (compared to 
present), there was no interaction of these factors with mental pressure. The 
findings of increased reaction times under conditions of mental pressure have 
also been reported in non-elite adult athletes on sport specific decision-making 
tasks (Hepler, 2015; Kinrade, Jackson, & Ashford, 2015).  In line with this, visual 
search strategies have also been reported to become more erratic in athletes 
under competitive pressure, in that eye movements show an increased number 
of fixations for shorter duration (Liu & Zhou, 2015) and a decreased ability to 
detect peripheral stimuli (Janelle & Singer, 1992).  Deployment of visual attention 
plays an important role in sport whereby the athlete is responsible for monitoring 
a dynamic environment consisting of multiple players (Williams, Davids, & 
Williams, 1999), moreover visual attention has shown to differentiate the 
performance of novice and expert athletes (Alves et al., 2013).  
 
Mental pressure was also found to influence decision-making under risk where 
probability outcomes were explicit.  In particular there was an interaction of 
mental pressure and gender on the amount of points gambled on the CGT.  Under 
mental pressure male junior-elite athletes showed a higher level of risk taking 
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than females (although post hoc comparisons only reached a non significant 
trend level p<0.1). These respective shifts in the propensity for risk taking across 
genders have also been reported following acute physical exercise in non-elite 
adult athletes (Pighin et al., 2015), as well as in a number of studies examining 
the influence of stress (experimentally induced elevated cortisol levels) on 
decision- making (Lighthall et al., 2009; 2013; Preston et al., 2007).   
 
The mechanisms underlying the gender related shifts in risk taking are unknown, 
however the main theories put forward are evolutionary in particular differences 
in intrasexual selection (Pighin et al., 2015). One study reported elevated cortisol 
to elicit opposing responses at a neural level in males and females performing a 
decision-making task (Lighthall et al., 2012). Under stress males showed 
increased activation in the insula and putamen, regions associated with risk 
estimations, but decreased activation in females. Moreover increased activation 
of the dorsal striatum was strongly associated with increased reward collection in 
stressed males, but not in stressed females (Lighthall et al., 2012). The 
differences observed here may therefore be a result of elevated cortisol in 
response to mental stress. 
 
Lastly mental pressure did not affect risk taking for decision-making under 
uncertainty, as indicated by the mean adjusted number of pumps on the BART. 
Robust performance of decision-making under uncertainty to mental pressure 
has been reported previously (Turnbull et al., 2005).  The differences observed 
here in comparison to those for decision-making under risk may be due to 
differences in underlying task requirements. In particular in the current study, 
mental pressure was operationalized as a dual working memory task. This 
protocol was used to mimic task irrelevant thoughts, such as worrying, that 
consume cognitive resources, diminishing those available for the task in hand. It 
has been proposed that decision-making under risk is particularly vulnerable to 
mental pressure as these tasks rely heavily on working memory resources, 
whereas decision-making under uncertainty is unaffected by mental pressure as 
they rely to a greater extent on automatic intuitive processing (Starke et al., 2011). 
In relation to sport these findings suggest that the influence of mental pressure 
may be particularly heightened when the junior-elite athlete is in a novel situation 
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that places high demands on executive processing resources (Beilock & Gray, 
2007).  One line of argument that proposed that individuals with high working 
memories are most detrimentally affected by mental pressure (Beilock & Carr, 
2005), may have hinted that the performance decrements of mental pressure 
reported in the literature in adult populations are less severe in this age group 
who have reduced working memories. However the overall pattern of results 
reported here are similar to those in previous studies in adults. 
 
The findings from the current study also showed that there was no correlation in 
the degree to which junior-elite athletes changed under pressure across key 
performance indicators on the three tasks.  This indicates that the influence of 
mental pressure was not uniform across decision-making abilities in these 
athletes. In particular an athlete who showed robust performance under pressure 
on one task or ability did not necessarily show similar improvements under 
pressure on a different task or ability.  This reiterates the importance of examining 
a range of different measures of decision-making in order understand 
performance under pressure in athletes. Importantly it highlights that 
understanding the unique strengths and weaknesses across a number of abilities 
together with the use of profiling individual athletes may be particularly insightful.  
 
A key aim of the current work was also to examine how these insights in decision-
making can be applied in an elite sport context; and in this case how this can be 
tailored to athletes at a junior level.  As in previous chapters the application of 
this work centered upon the decision-making taxonomy, including explanations 
of decision-making constructs using analogies. By this point, the elite athletes 
and semi-elite athletes of chapter 6 and 7 (all of whom were from the same sport) 
had applied the concepts represented by the tasks to their sport that proved 
useful here.  Again the taxonomy was useful in developing the idea that decision-
making is not a single concept, but instead is comprised of disparate skills and 
scenarios.  A second aim was to provide a common language by which decision-
making skills can be conceptualized and communicated between sporting 
professionals.   
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In line with previous chapters, the results of this chapter also highlight the 
limitation of statistical approaches based on group averages in an elite sporting 
context.   In particular there were no elite- junior athletes who showed an 
‘average’ response to pressure across all types of decision-making.  This again 
highlights that applying results based on group means to individual junior-elite 
athletes in the large majority of cases is unlikely to be useful. In order to help the 
junior-elite athlete use this taxonomy, instead of feeding back position ranking 
within the sample of athletes tested, it was thought to be more appropriate to 
provide descriptions of decision-making styles under conditions of low and high 
mental pressure, for example; under pressure you were best at ‘gun-slinging’ 
decision-making and under low pressure you best at ‘poker-playing’ decision-
making.   
 
As the junior-elite athlete is at the beginning of their training on elite programs, it 
could be argued there is more scope to embed decision-making education within 
their development. Historically when training an athlete the onus is placed on the 
improvement of physical ability, while psychological attributes involved in sporting 
performance receive less attention with the underlying assumption that they 
develop intuitively with practice (Furley & Wood, 2016).  Therefore in this group 
of junior-elite athletes there was greater emphasis on the development of the 
coach, who also performed the decision-making tasks and received individual 
feedback on their own decision-making performance within the taxonomy.   
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8.6. Conclusion  
In conclusion, mental pressure affected the risk-taking of junior-elite athletes for 
decision-making where probability outcomes were explicit, while there was no 
effect for decision-making under uncertainty. Moreover under mental pressure 
elite junior athletes showed slower reaction times to perceptual stimuli. Mental 
pressure, operationalized as increased cognitive load to mimic task irrelevant 
thoughts, may have consumed working memory, impairing decision-making 
scenarios that require these resources.  Mental pressure may also have had a 
detrimental impact on the allocation of attention in visual search.  In relation to 
sport these findings suggest that novel situations that place high cognitive 
demands on the athlete may be particularly influenced by mental pressure. In 
order to develop understanding of decision-making within this sample, there was 
a greater focus on the coach, who also undertook the protocol for education 
purposes.   
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9.  General Discussion   
This thesis had the translational goal of understanding and increasing insight into 
the decision-making processes of elite athletes. It focused in on two areas: Firstly, 
the utility of tES methods as a tool for modifying decision-making was explored, 
to assess the potential for use in decision-making training in athletes; Secondly, 
the influence of performance pressure on decision-making across different 
developmental stages of elite sport was examined. The key findings, limitations 
and implications for this work are summarized below. 
 
9.1. tES Work 
9.1.1. Principle Findings 
There have been a number of proposals for the application of tES techniques in 
sport to enhance abilities that underlie peak performance (Banissy & Muggleton, 
2013; Okano et al., 2015; Reardon, 2016; Vitor-Costa et al., 2015). Before 
findings could be generalized beyond the laboratory, it was important to establish 
the reliability of behavioural effects in the cognitive neuromodulation literature. In 
chapter 3, the ability of tDCS applied to the DLPFC to modulate risky decision-
making was assessed via conceptual replication of Fecteau et al., (2007). In this 
case, tDCS was found to have no effect on decision-making; this finding added 
to two further studies that also reported no effect of tDCS on performance of the 
BART (Cheng & Lee, 2016; Weber, Messing, Rao, Detre & Thompson-Schill, 
2014). Together, these findings raise doubt about the efficacy of tDCS to 
modulate decision-making and, in chapter 4, the mechanistic basis of this failure 
to replicate was explored. The physiological effects of tDCS (chapter 4) and, later, 
hf-tRNS (chapter 5) were examined using parameters common in the application 
of these techniques. The findings from these chapters revealed that the effects 
of tES are fragile to changes to stimulation parameters. Our understanding of the 
polarity dependent shifts in corticospinal excitability induced by tDCS comes from 
work that has applied stimulation using unilateral electrode arrays at 1mA (current 
densities of 0.029mA/cm2). In the application of tDCS for cognitive 
neuromodulation, researchers have deviated from these parameters; for 
example, in Fecteau et al., (2007), tDCS was applied using bilateral montages at 
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2mA (current densities of 0.057mA/cm2). Despite these divergent parameters, 
the assumption that tDCS is exerting anodal-excitatory/cathodal-inhibitory effects 
remain. Fecteau et al., (2007) proposed that reductions in risky decision-making 
resulted from concurrent excitation and inhibition of bilateral DLPFC. The findings 
from chapter 4, however, reveal that anodal and cathodal tDCS delivered with 
bilateral electrode arrays (at 1 and 2mA) did not induce respective excitatory or 
inhibitory effects on corticospinal excitability.  Therefore, this guiding assumption 
is undermined in studies which apply stimulation with these parameters - which 
accounts for a large majority of the cognitive neuromodulation literature (e.g., 
Boggio et al., 2010; Cohen Kadosh, Soskic, Iuculano, Kanai & Walsh, 2010; 
Fecteau et al., 2007; Snowball et al., 2013). All but one study - Beeli, Koeneke, 
Gasser and Jancke (2008) – examining decision-making and tDCS have applied 
stimulation via bilateral electrode montages.  
 
Similarly, in chapter 5, the assumptions that underpin the application of an 
emerging neuromodulatory technique – tRNS - were examined. Again, the 
findings of this chapter reveal that the characteristic excitatory effects established 
when hf-tRNS was delivered with unilateral electrode arrays for 10 minutes 
(Terney, Chaieb, Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 2008), do not withstand deviations 
from these parameters. Using parameters common in the application of this 
approach, namely bilateral montages and durations of 20 minutes, hf-tRNS was 
not found to exert consistent excitatory shifts in cortical excitability. Again, the 
assumption embedded in much of the literature is that the excitatory effects 
remain, despite divergent stimulation parameters (e.g.: Cappelletti et al., 2013; 
Chawke & Kanai, 2015; Popescu et al., 2016; Romanska, Rezlescu, Susilo, 
Duchaine & Banissy, 2015; Vanneste, Fregni & De Ridder, 2013). These findings 
are in line with several other demonstrations from the physiological sciences, 
which have highlighted the importance of stimulation parameters in determining 
the effects of tES. In particular, the importance of electrode montage was 
demonstrated in one of the earliest studies in the tES field: Nitsche and Paulus 
(2000) explored electrode placement in assessing the rapid induced effects of 
weak DC stimulation.  Here, the unilateral electrode array produced the most 
robust effects and, thus, it persisted as convention in subsequent studies (Nitsche 
& Paulus, 2000). The effects of tES techniques have also been reported to not 
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be present using extra-encephalic montages, when the reference electrode is 
placed off the head (Moliadze, Antal & Paulus, 2010). In addition, the unilateral 
and bilateral electrode montages have also been shown to induce differing effects 
on functional connectivity, as assessed by fMRI (Lindenberg, Sieg, Meinzer, 
Nachtigall & Flöel, 2016; Sehm, Kipping, Schäfer, Villringer & Ragert, 2013); 
while computational modelling work has suggested that differences in inter-
electrode distance between these two montages may influence the spatial 
locality, depth and the amount of current reaching the cortex (Bestmann, de 
Berker & Bonaiuto, 2015; Datta et al., 2010; Faria, Hallett & Miranda, 2012; 
Miranda, Faria & Hallett, 2009). Moreover, there have been other indications that 
duration is an important factor in determining the effects of brain stimulation 
techniques; in particular, longer durations of anodal tDCS (Paulus, Antal & 
Nitsche, 2013) and TBS (Gamboa, Antal, Moliadze & Paulus, 2010) change the 
induced effects from excitation to inhibition. 
 
Together, the results showed: i) A failure to replicate the behavioural findings of 
Fecteau et al. (2007) of tDCS modulating risky decision-making, within the wider 
context of a number of other non-replications (Cheng & Lee, 2016; Fecteau et al., 
2014; Horvath et al., 2015; Minati, Campanhã, Critchley & Boggio, 2012; Weber 
et al., 2014); ii) Findings that undermine the physiological assumptions upon 
which much of this work is predicated. The assumption of anodal-
excitation/cathodal-inhibition with tDCS, or corticospinal excitation with tRNS, 
was not supported using parameters common in the cognitive neuromodulation 
field. These assumptions are fundamental in that they guide study design and 
are used to interpret results. As such, the results of chapters 3, 4 and 5 undermine 
the original proposal of tES for cognitive neuromodulation, suggesting that these 
techniques are not robust enough to warrant application in elite athletes at this 
time. 
 
 
 
 
9.1.2. Implications 
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The results from these three chapters led to unintended implications of advancing 
our understanding of tES, In particular in highlighting that parameters used in the 
application of these techniques should be based on the parameters used to 
establish the physiological effects. At present, studies in the cognitive 
neuromodulation field have wrongly extrapolated the physiological findings of tES 
to all work that applies stimulation regardless of the parameters used. In 
particular, it is clear that there are two fundamental principles held by the literature 
(which are more like historical accidents) that may not be true. Firstly, that anodal 
is always excitatory and cathodal always inhibitory. In addition to the work here, 
there are several reasons or examples of other cases where this is not true; for 
example, the non-homogenous morphology of the brain and likelihood of current 
clustering within certain structures is likely to create both increased and 
decreased excitation under each electrode (Bestmann et al., 2015). In addition 
Batsikadze, Moliadze, Paulus, Kuo & Nitsche (2013) showed cathodal tDCS, 
delivered at 2mA (current density 0.057mA/cm2), induced excitatory shifts in 
corticospinal excitability. The second principle held by the literature is that the 
effects of tES are linear - i.e., in relation to intensity and duration. The data 
presented here joins other examples of when this has not been the case 
(Batsikadze et al., 2013; Gamboa et al., 2010).   
 
A number of studies have highlighted concerns of non-replicability in relation to 
the application of tES approaches in its application for cognitive 
neuroenhancement (Horvath et al., 2015; Riggall et al., 2015; Sahlem et al., 
2015; Vannorsdall et al., 2016). For instance, a recent meta-analysis found there 
to be no evidence of cognitive effects in healthy populations from single-session 
tDCS (Horvath et al., 2015); however, the selection criteria for this meta-analysis 
have been criticized (Price, McAdams, Grossman & Hamilton, 2015). Further, a 
recent study into researchers perspectives in this area  highlighted non-reporting 
of negative findings and weak methodological rigor as issues facing the field 
(Riggall et al., 2015). The physiological findings of chapter 4 and 5 may provide 
an explanation for other non-replication results within the literature.  
9.1.3. Future Directions 
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These findings highlight avenues for future work, in particular the importance of 
a more detailed examination of the physiological effects of tES techniques; not 
only at parameters used in application, but also whether these extend to other 
groups, such as older adults and atypical populations. Additionally, an 
examination of whether the physiological effects of tES remain unchanged when 
applied to the brain’s non-resting state; i.e., while engaged in a cognitive task.  
 
9.2. Decision-Making Under Pressure in Elite Athletes  
9.2.1. Principle Findings 
The second part of the thesis examined the influence pressure has upon indices 
of decision-making across three developmental stages of elite sport.  In chapters 
6 and 7, the influence of physical exhaustion was examined. In chapter 6, world-
class elite athletes who have had frequent success on the international stage 
(including six Olympic medal winners) were shown to have faster reaction times 
in response to physical pressure. Physical pressure was also found to increase 
risk taking when reward and loss contingencies were explicit (on the CGT), but 
did not affect risk taking when probability outcomes were unknown (on the 
BART). There was also no change to a measure of risk adjustment under high 
pressure; thus, despite an increase in risk taking, elite athletes retained the ability 
to use information relating to the decision to appropriately modify behaviour. 
Overall, in elite athletes, this may indicate a calculable shift towards risk taking 
and resilience to physical pressure.  
 
In chapter 7, a different pattern of behaviour was observed in response to 
physical exhaustion in semi-elite athletes. These athletes were enrolled on a 
Team GB talent development program, training for possible Olympic competition 
in four to eight years. In response to physical exhaustion, there was increased 
risk taking for both decision-making, where probability outcomes were explicit (on 
the CGT) and unknown (on the BART). In addition, semi-elite athletes showed a 
significant reduction in the ability to adjust gambles, according to probability ratios 
and, thus, use information to appropriately modify one’s propensity for risk. 
Together with the increase in risk taking and a decrease in responsiveness to 
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ideal risk-taking scenarios, this may indicate a sub-optimal shift towards risk 
taking. In addition, under physical pressures, there were no changes to fast 
reactive responses to perceptual stimuli and response inhibition on the SSRT. 
 
In chapter 8, the influence of mental pressure was examined in junior-elite 
athletes who are at the earliest stage of entry to elite sport - a first in athletes of 
this age and expertise level. Mental pressure caused an increase in reaction 
times. For decision-making, where reward and loss contingencies were explicit 
(on the CGT), there was an interaction of gender and mental pressure; males 
showed an increase and females a decrease in risk taking. Mental pressure had 
no effect on decision-making under uncertainty (on the BART).  
 
Together, the findings from these chapters highlight two points: Firstly, when 
studying decision-making in sport, it is important to consider context in which 
athletes operate.  Almost all prior work in this area has examined decision-making 
without consideration of the mental or physical pressures of performance that the 
athletes encounter, while the findings in the thesis have demonstrated these to 
have an influence on the decision-making of even those with high levels of 
expertise. This oversight in much of the work is surprising, considering the 
anecdotal importance that performance under pressure has in sport. For 
example, reports from elite coaches describe the technical and physical 
differences between elite athletes as minimal, that the distinguishing feature is 
one’s ability to consistently make optimal choices on the day under the pressure 
of competition (Thelwell, Harwood & Greenlees, 2016).   
 
Indeed, almost all the work that has considered the influence of performance 
pressure on decision-making has been undertaken with non-elite athletes. A 
second important point of conclusion to discern from this thesis is that expertise 
may be crucial in determining how decision-making is influenced by performance 
pressure; that results from non-elite athletes may not be representative of elite 
athletes. The findings of faster response times under physical pressure in elite 
athletes aligns with a previous review, which reported athletes with greater 
expertise to show more facilitation in reaction times in response to performance 
pressure. The findings of the semi-elite athletes who did not show reaction time 
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facilitation under physical pressure may allude to the variation of abilities at the 
elite athlete level. This variation, due to the broad definition of expert athletes, 
could not be discerned from the Schapschroer et al. (2016) review. Thus, the 
findings here extend these observations - to those competing at the highest elite 
standard. This latter point emphasizes a broader criticism of sport expertise 
psychology and of the wide inclusion criteria of an elite athlete; in previous 
studies, this ranges from Olympic champions to those included in university 
sports teams (Swann et al., 2014). This may be masking the nuance of abilities 
at the elite level and unmasking this is one of the successes of the current thesis.  
 
In relation to risk taking, different patterns of decision-making were also evident 
in elite and semi-elite athletes, with a shift towards indiscriminate risky decision-
making in semi-elite athletes under conditions of physical pressure.  Modulations 
to risk taking have also been reported in previous work following laboratory 
protocol that elevate cortisol (Lighthall et al., 2009; Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield 
& Bechara, 2007; van den Bos, Harteveld & Stoop, 2009) and in responses to 
physical exertion (Black et al., 2013; Pighin et al., 2015). The gender differences 
reported in non-elite athletes in response to physical pressure, such as the 
increased risk taking in males and decreased risk taking in females, were not 
reported in elite and semi-elite athletes. The shift towards more cautious 
decision-making was not evident in elite and semi-elite females. Again, these 
differences indicate the failure of transfer between work undertaken in elite and 
non-elite athletes. There was, however, a gender-by-stress interaction in the level 
of risk taking on the CGT in junior-elite athletes; males showed higher levels of 
risk taking under pressure in comparison to female athletes. Although 
comparisons should be made with caution, due to differences in the stress 
induction protocol used in these studies, it is of interest that across all three 
groups there were modulations of some sort in risk taking as a response to 
pressure. This highlights that further investigations into how changes in risk 
taking on these tasks directly relate to sporting performance are warranted.  
 
Differences in terms of expertise may underlie the observations between elite and 
semi-elite athletes. The world-class elite athletes have at least five years’ more 
experience than their semi-elite athletes and, therefore, more experience in the 
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coupling of decision-making and stress. In line with this, previous work has shown 
decision-making competencies within sport develop with expertise (see section 
2.5.3), as well as that expertise modifies responses to physical pressure 
(Schapschroer et al., 2016). The elite and semi-elite athletes also differed 
according to age, which may also allude to the differences observed here (mean 
age = Elite: 28; Semi-elite: 20). There are marked changes in behavioural, 
cognitive and neuronal development that occur as one transitions from 
adolescence to adulthood - which will influence decision-making (Blakemore & 
Robbins, 2012) - and these changes do not cease until the mid-20s (Arain et al., 
2013). The finding of increased indiscriminate risk taking under pressure may be 
reflective of adolescence being a time of increased risk taking in relation to adults, 
which is thought likely to arise from a heightened responsiveness to incentives. 
They may also be reflective of structural and functional brain differences relating 
to cognitive control between adolescence (18-19 years) and young adults (25 
years) (Veroude, Jolles, Croiset & Krabbendam, 2013). In addition, differences in 
adolescence, in terms of increased stress volatility, have been reported and, thus, 
the influence of pressure may be more marked.  
 
The junior-elite athletes also differed in terms of the type of pressure they were 
exposed to. When comparing reaction time measures under mental pressure, 
junior-elite athletes’ reaction times were slower; while under physical pressure, 
elite and semi-elite athletes were either facilitated or remained stable. This may 
be due to the different mechanisms by which these types of stress exert their 
effects. For instance, improvements due to physical pressure have been linked 
to increases in physiological arousal (and increased cerebral blood flow) because 
of physical exertion (McMorris, Tomporowski & Audiffren, 2009).  In addition, 
mental pressure may have a more pronounced influence, as this is congruent 
with the type of task performed (Hepler et al, 2015). However, direct comparisons 
with other chapters should be undertaken with caution, due to additional 
differences in terms of age and expertise in these samples. These observations 
highlight that direct comparison of different types of performance pressures in the 
same athletes would be an interesting avenue for further exploration. 
 
9.2.2. Limitations 
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In addition to mapping the influence that performance pressure has on decision-
making at various points of elite athlete development, a key aim of this work was 
in examining how psychology could be applied to increase insight into decision-
making in an elite sport setting. Undertaken with a specialized sample group, this 
work has high ecological validity. However, in some instances, these goals were 
competing which required a number of compromises. 
 
Firstly, there was no counterbalancing of low and high pressure conditions in 
chapter 6 and 7; therefore, when performing the tasks under high pressure, the 
elite and semi-elite athletes were also performing these for the second time. It 
was a necessary compromise due to the nature of working with elite athletes, to 
whom time and access were limited. Thus, testing was required to occur within a 
single session. While conditions could have been counterbalanced within a single 
session across participants, as undertaken with mental pressure in the junior-elite 
athletes, this was not undertaken due to the likely carry over effects of physical 
exhaustion. To reduce the influence of learning effects, attempts were made to 
choose tasks whereby performance was robust to repeated testing. However, 
one cannot be certain that improvements in task performance; for example, in the 
reaction times of elite athletes was not due to learning. Despite this, the 
comparison between elite and semi-elite athletes - who were subject to similar 
protocols - are valid.  On the other hand, this limitation replicates exactly what 
athletes do: they perform the training and then under pressure – real-life is not 
counterbalanced.  
 
The second limitation is that completion of maximal effort on the physical 
exhaustion protocol (in chapters 6 and 7) was inferred via self-reporting and 
observation. One could argue that the lack of an objective measure of physical 
exertion was a limitation. In this case, it was deemed reasonable to allow the elite 
athletes to exert themselves to the level they felt reflected the guidelines of 
maximal exertion. A key goal of the current work was to provide insights that 
would transfer to training and performance, therefore keeping formalization of the 
testing procedure to a minimum was important. During a performance, elite 
athletes exert themselves to their own recommendation because of their own 
investments and motivation, which was replicated in the current work. Notably, 
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this population is very driven in comparison to the usual cohort of volunteers in 
psychology experiments. However, physiological measures - such as heart rate, 
blood lactate levels or cortisol levels - would have allowed further conclusions 
regarding the underlying mechanisms of the effects observed.    
 
A third limitation relates to the selection of tasks. Standardized, well-validated 
measures were chosen to represent clearly defined psychological constructs 
relating to decision-making. The influence of stress on these measures has been 
well documented, as has the application of these across different age groups. 
While this gave the work laboratory-based confidence, how the performance on 
these tasks translates to decision-making in sport is unknown. Indeed, the tasks 
do not capture many aspects of sporting decisions, including their dynamic 
evolving nature, as well as the type (i.e., complex motor skill compared to button 
presses) and variability of response output required (i.e., unpredictability in 
response outcomes is key to successful decisions in sport).  
 
In addition, the choice of task for fast reactive decision-making showed the 
progression of the work in this thesis, while a consistent measure would have 
been beneficial in terms of comparison across athletes. The Stroop task used in 
elite athletes was not the most appropriate measure to capture fast reactive 
responses. Thus, the Stroop task was replaced by the SSRT in the semi-elite 
athletes group. In the junior-elite athletes, the SSRT was replaced by the Visual 
Search task due to the perceived difficulty of the SSRT that incrementally 
increases accuracy to the level of 50%. In addition, the Visual Search task was 
used due to the interest in pattern matching in this population.  
 
9.2.3. Application of Work to Elite Sport  
The application of this work, to increase insight into decision-making in elite 
sporting professionals, was examined; this centred on several key themes, 
including the importance of individualized feedback, the development of a 
decision-making taxonomy, as well as aligning the work within the sporting 
culture. 
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9.2.3.1. The Importance of Individualized Feedback  
In elite sport understanding the behavior of the individual athlete is paramount.  
This goal is in contrast to the majority of psychological research that makes 
statements about the average responses of groups of individuals. This approach 
has been criticized due to its inaccuracies regarding any one individual in 
particular; this has been termed ‘the fallacy of the average individual’ (Rose 
2016).    
 
In assessing how this information can be of use to elite sporting professionals, 
this thesis examined the representativeness of the results based on group means 
to individual athletes; doing so by assessing the number of athletes that showed 
an ‘average’ (defined as falling within 1 SD of the mean) response to pressure 
across the three categories of decision-making. In the elite and junior-elite cohort, 
there was no one individual athlete that presented an average response to 
pressure across the three indices of decision-making, while 16% of the semi-elite 
athlete cohort showed an average response to pressure. These findings highlight 
that applying results based on group means to understand the behaviour of the 
athletes would not be representative in most cases. It is surprising that this even 
needs to be said, but the pretense of translation from population to individual is 
perhaps the weakest link in all of sports psychology. 
 
Therefore, the application of this work centered upon individualized profiling of 
athletes that were presented during feedback sessions, consisting of the elite 
athletes, coach, sports psychologists and a member of the research team. In 
addition to how the individual athlete performed under pressure, the feedback 
consisted of the average performance of the group, to provide context from which 
to interpret the behaviour of the individual. The profiling was beneficial in the 
insight it gave regarding the unique strengths and weaknesses of the athlete, in 
relation to the group, which would have been masked with application of group 
performance averages only. In the case of elite sport, it is likely to be this 
individuality that provides athletes with the competitive edge.  In addition, the 
personalized nature of feedback meant that training interventions and tactical 
discussions could be tailored to the needs of individual.  
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9.2.3.2. The Development of a Decision-Making Taxonomy 
Across the feedback sessions, a taxonomy of decision-making was developed, 
which provided a framework that could be used to conceptualize decision-making 
and tailored to the individual athlete. The taxonomy was based on the three types 
of decision-making assessed during the study. It was developed in conjunction 
with the coaches and athletes who provided sporting examples of the 
psychological constructs examined.  
 
The taxonomy increased psychological insight in this population, a) by 
highlighting the notion that decision-making is not a singular concept and of the 
different types of decision-making scenarios. b) By offering the opportunity for 
coaches and athletes to apply psychological principles to their practice. And c) it 
also provided an accessible shared language by which sport professionals could 
use to understand their own, and others’ decision-making, and communicate 
these constructs with one another.  
 
In the application of this framework, a key challenge was in how best to 
communicate the different decision-making concepts to an audience with no prior 
knowledge of psychology; this centered on the use of analogies to represent 
concepts relevant to the type of decision-making, which provided accessible, 
easily memorable and terminology. Decision-making under risk on the CGT was 
described as ‘poker playing’, to represent a scenario in which one takes risks 
considering having information about the reward and loss probabilities - i.e. the 
cards in their hand. This type of decision-making was identified as most 
applicable to tactical decisions in sport. Regarding decision-making under 
uncertainty on the BART, this was described as ‘playing chicken’, with reference 
to a well-known game devised to test the nerve of each contender whereby two 
people drive straight towards each other; the first car to swerve (and, thus, miss 
a head on collision) is named the ‘chicken’.  As neither driver knows the behaviour 
of the other, this type of risk taking was thought a relevant metaphor for decision-
making under uncertainty. In sport, this type of decision-making was common to 
dynamic play, where athletes make decisions - i.e., decide who to pass to - with 
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incomplete knowledge relating to opponents’ positions and intentions. Fast 
reactive decision-making has been described as ‘gun slinging’; a shooting match 
whereby a person must shoot a target as quickly as possible but with the 
requirement to not hit innocent bystanders. These terms gave the decision-
making tasks, undertaken by the athletes, real-world validity.   
 
9.2.3.3. Acknowledging the Sporting Culture  
A collaborative effort was needed for the successful application of this work, thus 
aligning the project within the sporting culture was necessary to increase ‘buy-in’ 
from coaches and athletes - this was done in a number of ways.  Firstly, coaches 
were included from the inception of the project. They highlighted a need to 
increase insight in decision-making and the lack of formal training in these skills 
in their coaching practices; attributes that were often assumed to develop 
implicitly with practice. Moreover, the decision-making tasks used in this work 
were initially road tested with the coaches during a training day.  This first-hand 
experience of the coaches was fundamental in the development of the decision-
making taxonomy and, with the junior-elite coaches, the psychological insights 
were mainly targeted at the level of the coach. In addition, the perspective of 
decision-making under pressure aligned with the expertise of the sport 
psychologist - i.e. in helping athletes cope with performance anxiety and stress. 
Thus, the project was not solely targeted at an area of expertise traditionally 
thought to be the knowledge of the coach - i.e., tactical decision-making and 
allowed for the collaborative implementation of the project.  
 
A key issue highlighted by coaches in the collaboration with scientists is the 
balance between the amounts of time that research takes away from training, in 
relation to the performance improvement gains (Farrow & Raab, 2008).  Tangible 
performance gains are difficult to discern, especially at an early stage of a 
research project. One way to deal with this concern was to embed the current 
study as a training exercise within the given sport. Indeed, ‘resilience training’, 
whereby exercises are performed under adverse conditions to increase difficulty 
is common to the training of elite athlete, which has a similar ethos to the protocol 
applied in this setting. In line with this, the experimental protocol was designed to 
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have a competitive component, in that gold, silver and bronze prizes (cash) were 
awarded to the top scorers on the BART; this even further increased engagement 
among the athletes who thrive on competition.  
 
9.2.4. Future Directions  
The work in this thesis has outlined guidelines of how psychology can be applied 
in an elite sport setting to improve insight into decision-making; these may be 
helpful in future collaborations between scientists and sports professionals.  
 
In addition, the work here began to explore the influence that performance 
pressure has on decision-making, across different developmental stages of elite 
sporting expertise. There are many avenues for further exploration and 
improvement. The athlete is exposed to numerous sources of pressure during 
performance. In the current work, the influence of physical exhaustion and mental 
pressure were examined. Direct comparison of these types of pressure in the 
same athletes would allow a more detailed picture regarding the influence each 
has on decision-making, as would examining the effects of these types of 
pressure in combination (during competition they rarely present in isolation). The 
investigation of other sources of pressure may also be informative. One important 
pressure for the athlete not examined here is time pressure. The intensity of 
performance pressure could also be manipulated; to show the level of pressure 
needed for modulations in decision-making in these populations. To examine the 
underlying mechanism that may be responsible for pressure-related changes, 
physiological measures could be recorded - such as testosterone and cortisol. 
Lastly, an examination of how the measures of decision-making within the 
proposed taxonomy directly relate to decision-making in sport would also be 
useful in taking this work forward. 
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